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 Abstract 
 
The transitions from communist rule throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have 
resulted in high regime diversity among the postcommunist regimes. Which factors may explain 
these differences in the political development of postcommunist regimes, and why have several of 
these states got «stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes? 
 
Theoretical models that have been conceived to analyse transitions from communism have been 
able to shed light on two of the major political pathways in the postcommunist region: those leading 
to either democracy or autocracy. With regard to the regimes that have got stuck in the «middle» as 
hybrid regimes, far less significant explanations have been found, which most likely can be 
attributed to the apparently higher regime diversity among these regimes. Thus, the structure of this 
thesis is twofold: First, theories regarding transitions from communism as well as general theories 
of democratization are reconstructed as independent variables, and their relative impact on the 
dependent variable (regime types) in 1994 and in 2008 are assessed in two correlation analyses. 
Second, a qualitative operationalisation of regime types is combined with case studies of the hybrid 
postcommunist regimes, in order to compare and analyse their political development. 
 
In the quantitative analyses, where scores from Freedom House were used to measure the dependent 
variable, the majority of the hypotheses were confirmed, as existing theories largely accounted for 
the political trajectories of authoritarian and democratic regimes, whereas the hybrid regimes were 
poorly explained. However, when applying the qualitative case study approach, it became possible 
to identify several variables that may explain not only why several postcommunist countries turned 
into hybrid regimes, but also the varying degrees and types of democraticness that have emerged 
among these regimes during the last two decades.  
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1. Introduction 
 
After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and the fall of the Soviet Union two 
years later, the evolving postcommunist regimes suddenly had to face several simultaneous 
transitions and challenges. Firstly, it involved a political transition, and a move from communism 
toward a new type of governance; either a re-consolidation of authoritarian rule, a transition to 
democracy, or to something in between (as a hybrid type of regime, combining authoritarian and 
democratic elements). Secondly, they had to deal with an economic transition from a state-governed 
plan economy to a capitalist market economy. Thirdly, the postcommunist regimes were also in dire 
need of a rapid and efficient state-building process in order to cope efficiently with the political and 
economic transitions (particularly the new states without a previous history of statehood). In 
addition, several of the postcommunist regimes that had large multi-ethnic populations also had to 
solve the challenges of «nation-building» (i.e. determine the procedures regarding citizenship, and 
assimilating different ethnic groups). As all of these transitions from communism erupted at nearly 
simultaneous historical moments throughout the entire postcommunist region (between 1989-1991), 
and because all of these regimes share a similar historical legacy (communism), a comparison of the 
political development among these regimes appears to be of high validity, and also of great 
importance. 
 
Despite this occurrence of nearly simultaneous transitions from communism, the political 
development among these regimes has differed greatly over the last 20 years. While some of these 
countries have experienced successful transitions to democracy, several other postcommunist 
regimes have ended up as hybrid regimes, in a grayzone between autocracy and democracy. In 
addition, several postcommunist regimes have also reverted to authoritarianism. Most strikingly, the 
different political pathways of the various postcommunist regimes display a highly visible 
geographical pattern. While many of the regimes with a Western geographical location have become 
democracies, several regimes that are located further East (within the postcommunist region) have 
reverted to authoritarianism. With regard to the regimes that are situated in the «middle» 
geographically, there seems to be a much higher likelihood of becoming a hybrid regime. Thus, 
since the fall of communism, a high level of regime diversity has emerged among the 
postcommunist countries.  
 
Which factors may explain these differences in the political development of postcommunist regimes 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?  
Why have several of these states ended up as hybrid regimes, unable to consolidate its political 
 6 
development in either an democratic or authoritarian direction? 
 
Since the fall of communism, several influential studies have been conducted on the political 
development of postcommunist regimes, and on their transitions from communism. The 
significance of these theories with regard to the political development in the postcommunist region 
will therefore be tested in a statistical analysis (in chapter 3). While several of these explanatory 
paradigms have already been convincingly presented and explained by scholars such as: Bunce 
(2003), McFaul (2002), Fish (2006), Fish and Choudry (2007), and Kitschelt (1999), this 
dissertation will seek to combine the most influential independent variables (also including general 
theories of democratization), and explore their relative effects on the dependent variable in 2008 
(and also in 1994). A similar regime typology to the one originally applied by Diamond (2002), is 
used when conducting this statistical analysis. This analytical approach is also reminiscent of Jørgen 
Møller's comparative study of postcommunist regimes in 2007 (Møller, 2009), although he applied 
a typological analysis1
 
, whereas the present research study utilizes the bivariate correlation method, 
when seeking to explain the political development of postcommunist regimes. However, the main 
aim of this research project transcends evaluating whether or not these theories display significant 
effects on the dependent variable in a more recent setting, in 2008. As will be demonstrated in the 
statistical analysis, the available literature on transitions from communism (and on democratization 
in general), appear to be highly efficient tools when explaining why some of the postcommunist 
regimes have either become democratic or have reverted to authoritarianism. With regard to the 
regimes that have «got stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes, there are very few significant 
correlations, which also seem to illustrate why there is such great scholarly disagreement on how to 
define different regime types. Thus, it also seems necessary to adopt a more qualitative approach 
when examining the political development of these hybrid regimes. A qualitative operationalisation 
of the dependent variable (in section 2.2 of chapter 2), which is partly based on the regime 
typologies developed by Wigell (2008), and Storm (2008), is therefore combined with case studies 
of these hybrid regimes (in chapter 4), in order to explain the political development of those 
regimes that «get stuck in transition». Thus, the greatest innovation of this dissertation seems to be 
the combination of a quantitative approach, which assesses and confirms much of the existing 
theory regarding postcommunist regimes, with a qualitative case study approach, which seeks to 
explain the political development of the hybrid regimes in the postcommunist region, which so far 
have been relatively poorly explained.  
                                                 
1 A typological analysis can be defined as a multidimensional and conceptual classification, involving an ordering of 
concepts (regime types) on a compound of attributes (independent variables/conditions) (Møller, 2009: 77-78). 
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In order to explain the political development of the postcommunist regimes, it is necessary to begin 
by defining the dependent variable; regime types. Initially, in section 2.1 of chapter 2, the 
operationalisation of regime types is executed in a quantitative manner. The theoretical discussion 
in this chapter, regarding the operationalisation and classification of regime types, and of the related 
concepts, such as democracy and autocracy (and any other type of regime that may be included in a 
regime typology), makes it very clear that there is a considerable lack of scholarly consensus 
regarding the «regime question». The various disputes regarding how to define different regime 
types, and democracy in particular, also highlights the severe challenges of measuring these 
different regime types properly, and especially when applying statistical datasets/indices (such as 
Freedom House or Polity IV) as a means to operationalise the dependent variable. In these cases, it 
may often be difficult to know whether a definition that has been carefully established theoretically 
actually corresponds to the measures that have been collected from these quantitative datasets. 
Thus, instead of producing an explicit definition of different regime types, and of the differences in 
the level of democraticness that separates them, the statistical operationalisation will rather be based 
on a theoretical discussion of regime types, which is then linked to one of the most widely used 
measurement tools of democratization processes: Freedom House. As a consequence of this 
theoretical debate, four main types of political regimes are then identified: liberal democracies, 
flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies. These concepts are then measured by 
applying scores from Freedom House, which although highly criticized, is also one of the most 
popular tools to measure political regimes and political development. Thus, this methodological 
choice should make this operationalisation, and the following statistical analysis (in chapter 3), 
highly comparable to many other studies that have been conducted on democratization. Given the 
inherent methodological flaws in many large datasets, which are pointed out by authors such as 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002), the main aim of the statistical operationalisation of regime types is 
therefore not to determine the precise nature of each of the regimes (i.e. to precisely reveal 
differences both in kind and in degree of democraticness), but rather to uncover some important 
generalizations regarding how and why the political development has proceeded like it has, 
throughout the postcommunist region. Thus, the statistical operationalisation of the dependent 
variable will subsequently be applied in the statistical analysis, in chapter 3. 
 
A more elaborate and carefully constructed definition of the dependent variable is instead developed 
in the following section of chapter 2 (in section 2.2). The rationale behind developing a qualitative 
operationalisation of regime types, is mainly that it seems necessary to make a definition of regime 
types that can be more explicitly linked to empirical realities. While the scores from Freedom 
House (and other statistical datasets) are regularly applied by political scientists, their measurement 
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and conceptualization of different components of democracy are still highly controversial. 
However, without questioning the ability of Freedom House to reveal fairly accurate (but perhaps 
not flawless) differences in the level of democraticness (between different political regimes), a more 
explicit definition of the dependent variable, which can subsequently be linked directly to the 
measures applied to analyse postcommunist regimes, still seems necessary. This approach is not 
only motivated by methodological concerns, but also by the necessity of complementing the results 
of the statistical analysis, and hopefully provide explanations of different patterns and developments 
that the statistical analysis is unable to provide. Thus, the qualitative operationalisation of the 
dependent variable in section 2.2 of chapter 2, will subsequently be applied as a measure to 
compare postcommunist regimes in a qualitative analysis (in chapter 4), which is then combined 
with the application of second-hand sources (that are found to be relevant when evaluating these 
regimes). This qualitative regime typology will be established by identifying the most important 
elements of democracy, which in turn are based on theories regarding democratization. In order to 
achieve greater analytical differentiation between the different regime types, and at the same time 
avoid conceptual stretching, it is therefore vital to attribute more weight/significance to those 
concepts/elements of democracy that are theoretically assumed to be more democratically 
important, than the other definitional components of democracy. This also enables the qualitative 
operationalisation to differentiate both between differences in kind (i.e. what type of hybrid regime, 
and which elements of democracy it incorporates) and in degree (i.e. which hybrid regimes are the 
most democratic) simultaneously. It is therefore likely that this qualitative operationalisation of 
regime types will avoid grave errors of conceptual stretching, and simultaneously be able to detect 
and incorporate many more types of political development (i.e. the process of democratization may 
proceed very differently from country to country, which is not always sufficiently accounted for in 
many regime typologies). 
 
Having defined the dependent variable twice (but in different ways), it is then necessary to indentify 
the independent variables that may have had an impact on the dependent variable. In section 2.3 of 
chapter 2, different theories associated with democratization and with transitions from communism 
are assessed, in order to select independent variables that may have influenced the political 
development in the postcommunist region. These independent variables (13 in total) are then 
operationalised in terms of their hypothesised relationships to the dependent variable. Before 
moving on to the statistical analysis, where the relative significance of these variables are further 
explored (through the application of two correlation analyses that assess the political situation in 
1994 and 2008, respectively), the data reliability of the empirical analysis (conducted in chapter 4) 
is discussed in section 2.4 of chapter 2.  
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Then, in chapter 3, the correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
(and also among the different independent variables) are analysed in order to uncover some 
generalizations regarding the political development of the postcommunist regimes.  
 
In chapter 4, the hybrid regimes that are poorly explained by the statistical analysis, will be 
analysed more thoroughly. An empirical analysis, employing relevant sources regarding the 
countries under consideration, will then be conducted in order to answer how these regimes 
correspond to the qualitative operationalisation of regime types (developed in chapter 2.2), and why 
they have developed the way they did. 
     
Due to lack of statistical data, only 25 out of the 29 postcommunist regimes currently located in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have been included when analysing the political development 
within the postcommunist region. Thus, four regimes (Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-
Heregovina) have been excluded from the analysis because there are not sufficient available data for 
these regimes. 
 
 
2. Theory: 
 
2.1: Defining the dependent variable: A quantitative operationalisation of regime types 
 
One of the greatest and perhaps most important challenges within democratization theory, is making 
an adequate operationalisation of different regime types (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). This will also 
be very important here, especially because regime types constitute the dependent variable. In order 
to uncover the main explanatory factors behind the political development in 25 postcommunist 
regimes, it therefore seems necessary to begin by defining the most important distinctions between 
various regime types.  
 
Defining and differentiating between various regime types is getting increasingly difficult, or at 
least more confusing as the variation among various regimes seems to have increased following the 
third wave of democratization. These transitions from authoritarian rule, have led to a growing 
number of hybrid regimes (regimes that are characterized by a mix of both autocratic and 
democratic elements), and thus it has also contributed to greater confusion and disagreement on 
how to classify different regime types. Because of this development, relatively similar and 
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overlapping concepts and definitions (but with different names) are used by various political 
scientists, and there seems to be a lack of coordination and a great deal of confusion when dealing 
with the classification of regime types, which in turn has negative consequences for the efficient use 
of theories on regime change and democratization (Collier et al., 1997: 450).  
 
In order to solve this mess, Sartori suggests differentiating the concepts by comparing them 
hierarchically (Sartori in Collier et al., 1997: 436). This would entail that concepts with less defined 
attributes (i.e. regime), fits more cases than concepts that have more defined attributes (i.e. 
parliamentary democracy). When applying this method, it is not possible to achieve differentiation 
both in kind (i.e. different types of democracy) and degree (i.e. level of democraticness) 
simultaneously. Thus, achieving greater analytical differentiation between the concepts may come at 
the expense of conceptual stretching, by categorizing cases that don't fit the concepts (Collier et al., 
1997: 437). In order to distinguish between differing degrees of democracy without «stretching» the 
concepts it is, according to Collier and Levitsky, necessary to define the different regime types in a 
way that shows how they fulfill various democratic standards, for instance on a scale from illiberal 
democracy to electoral democracy (Collier et al., 1997: 437). This also entails the use of diminished 
subtypes, that highlight the elements (types) of democracy (or authoritarianism) that are either 
present or missing (Collier et al., 1997: 438). However, in studies where there is a high number of 
cases (large N), the use of diminished subtypes may not be sufficient to avoid conceptual stretching 
due to the greater political differences examined (Wigell, 2008: 232). This is especially true when 
comparing different regions or a set of cases with great political variation. 
 
There are many different opinions among researchers regarding which requirements (and how 
many) that should be fulfilled in order for a a regime to be democratic. According to Robert Dahl, a 
regime is democratic when it functions as a responsible and accountable political system to the 
interests of its citizens (Dahl, 1971: 2), by fulfilling two dimensions of democracy: public 
contestation and public participation (Dahl, 1971: 4). Each of these two dimensions incorporates 
several different criteria (such as free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections, and the protection 
of basic civil liberties). While democracy therefore could be regarded as a political system where 
parties lose elections, authoritarianism is a system where opposition parties always lose elections 
(Schedler, 2002: 47). Thus, hybrid regimes should be found somewhere in between these two 
extremes, not sufficiently democratic, nor are they quite authoritarian. There are, however, many 
who disagree with the minimalist standards applied by Dahl, and demand that several additional 
criteria need to be met in order for a regime to qualify as democratic. While Dahl's definition of 
democracy can be defined as a procedural minimum definition, as it incorporates only a small 
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number of vital democratic procedures, other scholars argue that additional features relating to the 
output side of democracy should also be incorporated (Collier et al., 1997: 433). For example, in an 
expanded procedural minimum definition, the criterion that the government must have effective 
power to govern, is also included (Collier et al., 1997: 434). Other, more maximalist definitions of 
democracy also include additional political, economic, and social features (such as socioeconomic 
equality) associated with industrial democracy (Storm, 2008: 216). However, according to Collier 
and Levitsky, it is more viable to treat many of these additional features as potential causes or 
consequences of democracy, rather than as a part of democracy itself (Collier et al., 1997: 434). 
While the minimalist, and procedural definitions of democracy have become increasingly influential 
in studies of democratization (and particularly in quantitative/statistical studies, which is partly 
because democratic procedures are easier to measure/quantify than the additional features of 
democracy), there is still great disagreement regarding the number of regime types, and where the 
boundaries should be drawn between different forms of hybrid regimes, and between hybrid 
regimes and closed authoritarian regimes. In addition, many scientists often use different concepts 
or definitions that often mean nearly the same. Extra properties or adjectives are added to their 
various definitions of democracy and/or regime types, which make the classification of regime 
types even less lucid. Thus, it could also be debated whether various hybrid regimes ought to be 
considered as subtypes of democracy or autocracy (Collier et al., 1997: 450).   
 
The great difficulties in classifying regimes in an efficient and categorical manner (that also could 
create consensus among scientists), is partly caused by the problems of defining the concepts of 
transition and consolidation, which are two of the most vital concepts within democratization theory 
(Munck, 2001: 123-24). As there are several different methods being used to measure the process of 
democratization, there are also differing opinions regarding how the outer and inner boundaries of 
regime transitions and the consolidation of a new regime should be defined. Using dichotomous 
measures, by identifying key thresholds to conclude when a political transition is being initiated or 
a democratic regime has been consolidated, is one possible procedure. Thus, the outer boundaries of 
a transition are often considered to be the fall of an authoritarian (or democratic) regime and the 
consolidation of a new regime, either authoritarian or democratic (Schedler, 2001: 6). The challenge 
of defining the inner boundaries within a transition, or between various forms of hybrid regimes, is 
possibly even more problematic, as there is a lack of consensus regarding which (and to what 
degree) democratic standards should be met when defining and differentiating among various forms 
of regime types. One of the most common requirements when considering if a regime is democratic 
or not, is whether there is free and fair political elections. This is criticized by Schedler, who argues 
that elections increasingly are being used as a tool by political elites in order to manipulate the 
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masses (Schedler, 2002: 36). Another possible problem with focussing to much on elections, is that 
it implies that transitions necessarily must end with the installation of a new democratic or 
authoritarian regime, but precludes the possibility of a consolidated hybrid type of regime 
(Schedler, 2002). This view partly originates from modernisation theory, which asserts the 
importance of structural variables, such as economic growth, economic development 
(modernisation) and urbanisation, as crucial in explaining transitions from autocracy to political 
democracy (Lipset, 1960). Due to growing globalisation and subsequent modernisation, this theory 
argues that democracy is a natural endpoint of any political transition or regime change. 
 
As there is a growing number of hybrid regimes with a relatively high level of stability, and that 
shows no signs of moving towards either democratic or authoritarian modes of governance, the 
critique of the structural approaches to democratization (and modernisation theory in particular) has 
increased over the last couple of decades. Several scholars, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) 
have therefore suggested that a more qualitative approach that applies actor-centred variables is 
more efficient when explaining processes of democratization. This view was partly induced by the 
third wave of democratization that began in the 1970s and 80s, and that led to an unprecedented 
level of political variation between different countries, and different regions. Actor-centred theories 
therefore suggest that regime transitions are particularly characterized as periods of high 
institutional uncertainty, where negotiations and the struggle for power among relevant actors 
within (and between) the elites and the opposition, should be seen as crucial to the eventual 
outcome of such processes (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 6). Thus, according to O'Donnell, 
transitions should be considered as simply the interval between two regimes, and therefore 
precludes the possibility of a «permanent transition» that lasts until either authoritarian or 
democratic modes of governance have been consolidated (O'Donnell in Schedler, 2001: 11). In 
other words, also hybrid regimes should be regarded as consolidated regimes as every regime per 
definition is consolidated. 
  
Despite different methodological approaches, there are still several similarities between actor-
centred studies and the structural approach in their classification of regime types. According to 
Schedler (actor-centred approach), the processes of transition and consolidation could potentially be 
divided into four different phases (or potential regime types); Solid and weak autocracy, and weak 
and solid democracy (Schedler, 2001: 6). Depending on the level of uncertainty, these phases could 
then develop at four different levels; gradual changes, fluctuations (i.e. cycles, non linear 
processes), permanent transition, or sudden changes (only process where the outer boundaries could 
easily be defined). As mentioned above, O'Donnell disagrees with the idea of a permanent transition 
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as it implies a certain level of stability (thus it is also consolidated). Looking at the empirical reality, 
it also seems evident that political transitions could end at any point during the four phases put 
forward by Schedler. This is also supported by O'Donnell, who operates with four relatively similar 
outcomes to those of Schedler; continued autocracy, liberalised type of autocracy, transition to 
democracy, or civil war/revolution (O'Donnell et al., 1986).  
 
Larry Diamond, who applies a structural approach, operates with six different categories in his most 
recent analysis of postcommunist regimes (from 2002), but like Schedler and O'Donnell he also 
differentiates among four main groups of regime types. These groups are; democratic regimes, 
hybrid regimes that fulfills many democratic standards, hybrid regimes that fulfills few democratic 
standards, and closed authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002: 25). Diamond asserts that all hybrid 
regimes are pseudodemocratic, in the sense that their formal democratic institutions function 
efficiently to conceal the authoritarian nature of the regime (Diamond, 2002: 24). While many 
hybrid regimes have established electoral forms of democracy with relatively free elections, they 
fail in many other aspects of political democracy (i.e. lack of civil liberties, poor political 
accountability/transparency, lack of rule of law etc.), which is one of the reasons why it is so hard to 
classify/define the various subtypes of hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002: 22). Another important 
aspect of this development is the fact that transitions to democracy increasingly are expected to 
happen over night. As the fundamental principles of democracy, which evolved gradually over 
centuries in the oligarchic democracies in Western countries, are already in place, the prospects of 
establishing new (democratic) institutions as well as expanding voting rights immediately is so 
intimidating for authoritarian elites, that they apply other methods to limit and control political 
competition (Diamond, 2002: 23-24). In other words, they've got more to lose when the transition to 
democracy is expected to occur rapidly rather than gradually (by opposition, international observers 
etc.), and thus they turn to repressive means, that in the end often reinforce or consolidate the hybrid 
(or authoritarian) nature of the regime.  
 
Diamond has based his categorization of regime types on scores from Freedom House, which 
presents annual ratings on the democratic performance of all the countries in the world (Diamond, 
2002: 25). Freedom House operationalises democracy as two dimensions; political rights and civil 
liberties, and categorizes the regimes based on a rating from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). The two 
dimensions applied by Freedom House incorporate the minimum democratic requirements 
identified in Dahl’s' procedural definition of democracy, but also include a large number of other 
criteria. Thus, according to Gerardo Munck, the dataset provided by Freedom House should 
therefore be regarded as a maximalist definition of democracy (Munck, 2002: 9). One of the main 
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challenges involved in applying a maximalist definition of a concept, is that it often includes 
attributes that should rather be regarded as a part of other concepts (i.e. the inclusion of attributes 
such as «property rights» and «freedom from war» in the conceptualization of democracy applied 
by Freedom House), or perhaps as potential causes or consequences of the defined concept (Munck, 
2002: 9). Munck also criticizes the method that Freedom House has applied to measure democracy 
and regime types, as the relationship between the selected components of democracy is not 
theoretically justified or explained, and because Freedom House doesn't offer any explanation of 
how the different components have been coded (Munck, 2002: 20). This also weakens the 
aggregation of the different measures of democracy, as the implied equal weighting of the various 
components is theoretically a highly controversial decision (Munck, 2002). For instance, whether 
elected officials have effective power to govern is theoretically a more important component of 
democracy than for example the decentralization of political power (Munck, 2002: 25). Thus, 
according to Munck, it is not evident whether these graded measures (from Freedom House) 
actually correspond to Diamond's defined regime types (Munck, 2001: 125), and he therefore 
concludes that the datasets provided by Freedom House «have to be accepted largely on faith» 
(Munck, 2002: 20). Munck rather suggests that comparative and nuanced methods looking more 
closely on the background and stability of regime types, is a better way of making research on 
processes of democratization (Munck, 2001: 143). This critique is partly reflected in the view that 
all political systems combine authoritarian and democratic elements to a varying extent, and that 
there may often be an overlap of democratic (or authoritarian) elements between various types of 
regimes (Wigell, 2008: 233). While there may exist some cases of conceptual stretching in 
Diamond's classification of regime types, he still manages to establish a framework that seems 
promising in order to uncover the main political trajectories or trends, in the postcommunist region. 
 
In his regime typology, Diamond differentiates between two democratic regime types (liberal 
democracy (common in the West), and electoral democracy), three forms of hybrid regimes 
(ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarianism, and hegemonic authoritarianism) as well as one 
regime type containing closed, authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002: 25). In addition to the scores 
from Freedom House, Diamond also takes into account the perceived intentions and the power of 
the elites by incorporating the percentage shares of seats in parliament, presidential votes for the 
incumbent party at the previous election, as well as the time period the incumbent rulers have been 
in government, when operationalising the various regime types into different categories (Diamond, 
2002: 32). His analysis is therefore more an attempt to classify the postcommunist regimes based on 
the situation in 2002, than explaining why the various transitions that were initiated with the 
collapse of communism had developed like they did. However, the classification scheme that 
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Diamond uses, seems like a good starting point, when aiming to understand and explain the political 
development in the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the downfall of 
communism. 
 
Table 2.1: Diamond's classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (2002): 
 
 
 Liberal 
democracy 
Electoral 
democracy 
Ambigious 
regimes 
Competitive 
Authoritarianism 
Hegemonic 
Authoritarianism 
Politically closed 
regimes 
Postcommu
nist  
Regimes 
(former 
Soviet 
Union) 
 
N=26 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Romania 
 
 
 
 
 
Moldova 
Albania 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Macedonia 
Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
Russia 
Belarus 
Azerbaijan 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan 
 
 
 
After Diamond's analysis in 2002, three more states have gained their independence within the 
postcommunist region. Montenegro and Serbia became independent in 2006, and Kosovo gained 
independence in 2008. Unfortunately there is a great lack of data for Serbia-Montenegro (the state 
that previously incorporated all of these new independent regimes), and also for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Thus, it is not feasible to incorporate these four countries in my analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to make an update of Diamond's table in order to take account of the 
political development in the other countries in recent years, and base it on scores from 2008. It also 
seems necessary to make a slightly different operationalisation of the dependent variable than 
Diamond. In fact, his original division into four main categories may seem to correspond better to 
the empirical realities than the six categories applied above (Møller, 2009: 30). While the 
differentiation between competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic authoritarianism may seem 
necessary in order to get a better picture of the various kinds of hybrid regimes, it is hard to say 
whether the scores from Freedom House provide sufficient theoretical justification for the inclusion 
of these subtypes (of hybrid regimes) in the statistical analysis. Instead, the various differences and 
similarities among hybrid regimes will be explored more thoroughly in a qualitative analysis based 
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on second -hand literature, and function as a complement to the results from the statistical analysis 
(in chapter 4). Also, the category of ambiguous regimes doesn't seem necessary, as its vague 
operationalisation, as regimes that are neither quite hegemonic nor competitive, and at the same 
time just below the thresholds of electoral democracy, doesn't really contribute to explaining 
various kinds of regime types, but instead offers another concept which it is difficult to connect to 
the empirical realities.  
 
According to Møller, who divides postcommunist regimes into a tripartition; democracies, hybrid 
regimes and autocracies, Diamond's differentiation between liberal democracies and hybrid regimes 
that fulfill many democratic standards (also referred to as electoral democracy), is also problematic 
as it is difficult to disentangle the liberal (civil liberties) and electoral (political rights) standards 
from each other when comparing empirical examples (Møller, 2009: 37). Analysing scores from 
Freedom House on these two dimensions, Møller found that they share an increasing co-variation, 
and that the developments of the electoral and liberal dimensions usually goes in the same direction 
(Møller, 2009: 39). Thus, differentiating between liberal and electoral democracies makes little 
sense according to Møller (Møller, 2009: 36), and he therefore proposes to collapse these two types 
into one; democracies (Møller, 2009: 47). However, this increasing co-variation has occurred 
mostly over the last decade, and as Diamond points out there was more often than not higher 
electoral than liberal scores among democratic states at the end of the 1990s (Diamond, 1999: 12). 
More importantly, Diamond argues that it is vital to make a distinction between liberal democracies, 
and other democracies that lack many democratic standards (whether it is liberal or electoral 
standards) in order to better depict the differences in regime types (Diamond in Møller, 2009: 29). 
Even though Møller has lowered his threshold (to an average score of 2 instead of 3 in Freedom 
House) when defining democracy, and thereby decreased this conceptual problem, he instead faced 
the challenge of a very broad category of hybrid regimes (ranging from 2.5 to 5.5 in Freedom 
House), that theoretically could entail a number of very different regime(type)s.  
 
In order to avoid the empirical challenges that might arise when differentiating between liberal and 
electoral democracy, and at the same time producing a regime typology that corresponds well to the 
empirical realities, I have decided to use some slightly different thresholds and categories from 
those applied by Diamond and Møller. Similar to their studies, and despite the flaws identified by 
Munck, I will also base the operationalisation of the dependent variable; regime types, on the scores 
from Freedom House using the average value of political rights and civil liberties. The main reason 
for this decision, is that while the dataset provided by Freedom House perhaps has incorporated too 
many features of democracy, which makes it vulnerable to conceptual stretching, many of the 
 17 
alternatives (such as POLITY IV) seem to incorporate too few components of democracy, which 
may stem from the fact that these indices of democracy often apply minimalist and procedural 
definitions of democracy (Munck, 2002: 9) In a typology where the aim is to classify and explain 
regime types on a scale from authoritarian to liberal democratic, and not only whether they are 
democratic or not, it seems necessary to include criteria such as the rule of law and civil liberties, 
which are provided by Freedom House, but not in POLITY IV (Møller, 2009: 27). Another reason is 
that the data from Freedom House have been widely used by other scholars, and my results would 
therefore be comparable to other analyses of the postcommunist region (such as the studies 
conducted by Møller and Diamond).   
 
My fourfold categorization of regime types has the following definitions: 
Liberal democracies are political regimes in which the average value is 1.5 or less on the scores 
produced by Freedom House. Flawed democracies are political regimes in which the average value 
ranges from 2 until 2.5 on the scores from Freedom House. Hybrid regimes are political regimes in 
which the average value ranges from 3 until 5 on scores from Freedom House, and Autocracies are 
political regimes in which the average value is 5.5 or higher on the scores from Freedom House. 
This operationalisation is fairly similar to the categories used by Freedom House; free (1-2.5), 
partly free (3-5) and not free (5.5-7). The difference is of course that I have included an additional 
category, flawed democracies, which in fact is an elaborated version of Diamond's regime type; 
electoral democracy. Flawed democracy appears to be a more conceptually valid term, as also 
hybrid regimes may incorporate elements of electoral democracy. 
 
Table 2.2: Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia in 1994: 
 Liberal 
democracies 
Flawed 
democracies 
Hybrid regimes Autocracies 
Postcommunist 
regimes N=25 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=3 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
 
 
 
 
 
N=6 
Albania  
Armenia 
Belarus 
Croatia 
Georgia 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russia 
Ukraine 
N=11 
Azerbadjan 
Kazakhstan 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=5 
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Table 2.3: Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia in 2008: 
 Liberal 
democracies 
Flawed 
democracies 
Hybrid regimes Autocracies 
Postcommunist 
regimes (former 
Soviet Union) 
(N=25) 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
N=8 
 
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Romania 
Ukraine 
 
 
 
 
N=4 
Albania 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Kyrgyzstan 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
 
 
 
N=6 
Azerbadjan 
Belarus 
Kazakhstan 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
 
 
N=7 
 
 
2.2 A qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable 
 
As discussed in the previous section, there seem to be several drawbacks when applying large-N 
data sets to conceptualize and measure the dependent variable (see Munck, 2002). In order to better 
address the methodological challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation, and 
subsequently develop a more conceptually valid regime typology, it seem necessary to make a more 
qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable. This will be done by assessing the degree 
and type of democratic performance within several vital dimensions of democracy, which are 
identified and selected based on theoretical considerations. These components of democracy are 
then coded as either yes or no (either the element is present or it is not), and the consideration 
behind these verdicts (in chapter 4) are based on identified sources that are relevant to the different 
regimes that are being evaluated. The aggregation of the different criteria (for democracy) is also 
based on existing theory, as some of these democratic elements have been assigned more 
importance than the remainder of the criteria. The subsequent classificatory scheme of regime 
types, will then be applied to compare and categorize the regimes that got «stuck in transition», as 
hybrid regimes in the statistical operationalisation, in the empirical analysis in chapter 4. 
 
Perhaps the most important precondition for democracy is the existence of a state that has relatively 
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undisputed boundaries and a monopoly on the use of force and taxation (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17-
18). Without these capacities that hallmark the modern state, democracy is impossible according to 
Linz (Linz et al., 1996: 18). This is particularly relevant for new states and/or new democratic 
regimes, as they, unlike the Western countries that gradually developed their state structures and 
became democratized over several hundred years, often have to face the challenge of state 
formation at the same time as embarking on a transition to democracy. In the postcommunist region, 
stateness problems have been particularly troublesome in the Balkans and among the Central Asian 
countries, and many of these states also had large multiethnic populations that exacerbated the post-
independence challenges (Berg-Schlosser, 2003: 3). Thus, whether a regime has relatively 
undisputed territorial boundaries, and the extent to which it has a full monopoly on the use of force 
and taxation, is one of the dimensions that will be considered in the classification of regime types. 
 
The concept «democracy» descends from ancient Greece, and means «rule by the people» (Mclean 
and McMillan (red), 2003: 139). Traditionally, this happened by direct political participation of the 
citizens (in the Greek city-states), but in modern times democracy has been redefined as indirect 
political participation through a representative government (Wigell, 2008: 234). For a government 
to be representative, it requires that the electoral process be free, fair, competitive, and inclusive 
(with full suffrage), according to Wigell (Wigell, 2008: 237). The gradual evolution towards 
representative government (beginning in the 19th century), can partly be seen as a consequense of 
the fact that the concept of democracy had gradually merged with another ideological concept; 
liberalism, between the 17th and 19th  century (Plattner in Diamond and Plattner (red), 2001). 
Liberalism is based on the principles that all men are born with a natural liberty and equality (Locke 
in Diamond et al. (red), 2001: 80), and it therefore entails that the government has a responsibility 
to protect individual liberties and rights, and that there also must be a set of rules and institutions 
(typically a constitution and rule of law) that protect the individuals from the government by 
limiting its power (Plattner in Diamond et al. (red), 2001: 78). The merging of these two ideologies, 
democracy and liberalism, eventually resulted in the transition to liberal democracy in most of the 
Western world during the 20th century.  
 
According to Wigell, democracy should therefore be defined as the two separate, but interdependent 
dimensions of electoralism and constitutionalism (Wigell, 2008: 234). The former dimension is the 
mechanism that provides the level of representativeness in a regime, and can therefore be 
operationalised as the four electoral criteria mentioned above (free, fair, competitive and inclusive 
elections), which also constitute the minimum electoral threshold of democracy (Wigell, 2008: 
237). However, in order for a regime to be classified as democratic it must also fulfill the following 
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four minimum criteria on the constitutional dimension; Freedom of organization (citizens are free to 
join and establish organizations, parties etc.), freedom of expression/speech, right to alternative 
information (independent, and uncensored media), and freedom from discrimination (minority 
groups are free to express their views/interests and participate in the political process). Regimes that 
fulfill all of these minimum criteria on Wigell's twodimensional typology are democracies (as they 
meet the procedural minimum definition of democracy). However, only those regimes that fulfill 
another eight additional criteria (four on each dimension) are considered to be liberal democracies 
by Wigell (Wigell, 2008: 238). 
 
The four additional electoral criteria are; 1) Electoral empowerment (elected officials have an 
effective power to govern, that is not formally (constitutionally) constrained by other 
unelected/undemocratic actors such as the military or religious authorities). 2) Electoral integrity 
(all electoral votes weigh equally when the distribution of seats in parliament are decided). 3) 
Electoral sovereignty (the decision making authority of elected officials are not dependent or highly 
influenced by its informal relations with external actors, such as foreign powers, patrimonial 
networks or economic corporations). 4) Electoral irreversibility (the democratic process is not 
jeopardised by violent actions from other unelected actors). The four additional constitutional 
criteria are; 1) Executive accountability (the government is horizontally accountable to other state 
institutions, such as an independent judiciary, the legislature, and other independent control organs). 
2) Legal accountability (Efficient and independent judiciary that is able to hold public officials 
accountable for their actions). 3) Bureaucratic integrity (politically independent, transparent and 
efficient bureaucracy, which applies the law without being corrupt). 4) Local government 
accountability (local governments abide by the same constitutional rules as the national 
government) (Wigell, 2008: 242). Liberal democracies fulfill all of these minimum and additional 
democratic criteria (16 in total). In between the threshold of democracy and liberal democracy 
several other types of democracy can be found. Wigell distinguishes between democracies that 
performs well on the electoral dimension and badly on the constitutional dimension (electoral 
democracies), and vice versa (constitutional democracies). In addition, there is also a category of 
limited democracies that barely pass the thresholds on both dimensions (Wigell, 2008: 246).   
 
These two dimensions can also be applied to distinguish between other regime types, such as hybrid 
and authoritarian regimes (Wigell, 2008: 243). Like many other scholars (i.e. O'Donnell, Schedler, 
Diamond), Wigell differentiates between four main types of regimes. These are; democracies, 
constitutional-oligarchic (fulfills all of the minimal constitutional criteria, and perhaps none, some, 
or all of the additional criteria, but fails to meet the threshold for the minimum or the additional 
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electoral criteria), electoral-autocratic (opposite from constitutional-oligarchic), and authoritarian 
regimes (fails to meet the threshold for the minimum criteria on both dimensions). In this 
categorization, both constitutional-oligarchic and electoral-autocratic regimes can be seen as hybrid 
regimes, as they fulfill the minimum threshold (all of the democratic criteria) on only one of the two 
dimensions. Authoritarian regimes may fulfill some of the different democratic criteria, but they fail 
to meet the minimum demands on either dimension. Thus, it is obvious that there may be great 
variation within each of these regime categories. While Wigell only chose to distinguish between 
different types of democracy in his study, this can also be done between different types within the 
other regime categories.   
 
Wigell's two-dimensional regime typology (electoral dimension goes vertically along the y-axis and 
constitutional dimension horizontally along the x-axis): 
 
Table 2.4: Wigell's two-dimensional regime typology:  
      y 
 
               Electoral-  
           Autocratic Regimes 
 
             Democratic 
               Regimes 
           
           Authoritarian  
              regimes 
 
           Constitutional- 
       Oligarchic Regimes 
                                                                                                    x 
 
The minimum definition (threshold) of democracy that is applied by Wigell, is fairly similar to 
Robert Dahl’s procedural definition of democracy (Dahl, 1971). Dahl's definition is one of the most 
influential and most cited definitions in democratization theory, and because it also seems to capture 
the most basic and important dimensions of democracy, Berg-Schlosser argues that it should be 
regarded as the «root concept» of democracy (Berg Schlosser, 2003: 4). The three elements in 
Dahl's minimalist definition of democracy mostly relate to the input side of political systems, and 
therefore illustrate the level of representativeness of a regime (Berg Schlosser, 2003: 4). As 
previously mentioned, these elements are public contestation (competitive electoral process), public 
participation (free and fair elections with full suffrage), and according to Berg Schlosser it also 
encapsulates a third, implicit dimension; protection and promotion of basic civil liberties (which 
relates to Wigell's constitutional dimension). While there exist many different definitions of 
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democracy within the scholarly literature, there is an increasing consensus that Dahl’s' definition 
incorporates the most important dimensions of democracy (Collier et al., 1997: 431). According to 
Collier and Levitsky, a standardized usage of such procedural definitions of democracy (or other 
concepts), has been largely successful in decreasing conceptual confusion and in avoiding 
conceptual stretching (Collier et al., 1997: 431). The main reason  is that democratic procedures 
(elections, guarantee of civil liberties etc.) is much easier to measure than more extensive 
definitions of democracy that also include the output side of political systems (functioning system 
of checks and balances, level of democratic political culture, etc.).  
 
While there seems to be reasonable consensus regarding the minimum requirements for democracy, 
there is still many disputes on how to differentiate between other types of regimes. Both between 
different democratic regimes, and between different hybrid and authoritarian regimes. These 
disputes relate both to difference in degree (level of democracy) and in kind (what kind of 
democracy). According to Wigell, most regime typologies are based on indexes of democracy that 
have a unidimensional approach, and that therefore only uncover the difference in degree of 
democraticness, but fails to discover the difference in kind (Wigell, 2008: 231). Thus, many regimes 
may perform similarly in their measured degree of democracy, but they may still be different 
democracies or different hybrid regimes. Several regimes (such as in Western Europe) did for 
instance develop its constitutional dimension before its electoral institutions, whereas other regimes 
(many Latin American countries) have followed the opposite trajectory towards democracy (Wigell, 
2008: 235). Thus, unlike for instance Diamond who defines democracy as a single dimension that 
can be differentiated along a linear scale, Wigell applies a two dimensional space (based partly on 
Dahl's scheme from 1971) that allows for more different political pathways and types of regimes to 
be identified (Wigell, 2008: 235). By applying two dimensions, Wigell also avoids the «fallacy of 
electoralism» as his constitutional criteria are of equal importance to the electoral criteria.  
 
Many regime typologies are often predominantly focussed on these minimum requirements (on the 
electoral and constitutional dimension) when defining democracy, while other criteria (such as 
Wigell's additional features) may not be included, or are of less importance (Schedler, 2002). Such 
additional features of democracy are therefore often ignored or vaguely conceptualised in studies 
that produce extensive regime typologies (Schedler, 2002). According to Berg-Schlosser, the most 
important additional features of democracy both relate to the efficiency and performance of the 
political system (and could therefore be found on Wigell's constitutional dimension) (Berg-
Schlosser, 2003: 5). The most important mechanisms for providing efficient and good democratic 
performance are the horizontal and vertical accountability, according to Berg-Schlosser. Horizontal 
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accountability refers to an independent and efficient judiciary and parliament, in addition to other 
specialised control organs that are able to hold the executive branch (government) accountable for 
its actions. Vertical accountability could be defined as various feedback mechanisms between state 
and society, such as independent media, public trust/ belief in the democratic system, a free, vibrant 
civil society, and most importantly the political elections. Thus, this type of accountability consists 
of three interdependent features; information, justification, and punishment/reward (Schedler in 
Diamond and Morlino, 2004: 25). The media and civil society therefore play a vital part in 
demanding information and justification from the government regarding policymaking, which 
subsequently influences whether the electorate chooses to punish or reward the incumbents in the 
next elections (Diamond et al., 2004: 25). Implicitly, this also entails a relatively free, fair, 
competitive political process, and respect for civil liberties, as necessary preconditions for vertical 
accountability. According to David Beetham, these criteria should not only be regarded as 
additional features but as crucial components of democracy (Beetham (red), 1994: 30). Beetham 
even rejects the idea of democracy as an essentially contested concept, and argues that the majority 
of political theory ever since the ancient Greeks have defined democracy as the interacting 
dimensions of popular control and political equality (Beetham (red), 1994: 28). Popular control 
consists of four overlapping elements; 1) popular elections, measured as the reach, inclusiveness 
and fairness of the electoral process, 2) open and accountable government, both horizontally (in 
relation to the parliament and the judiciary), and vertically (to the electorate), 3) guaranteed civil 
and political rights/liberties, and 4) independent and vibrant civil society (Beetham (red), 1994: 28-
29). These are all interdependent, and overlapping elements, and are further dependent on a high 
level of political equality (among individuals) within each of these areas (Beetham (red), 1994: 30). 
These two dimensions are fairly similar to the two dimensions applied by Wigell, but Beetham 
differs with him as he argues that democracy should be measured according to the degree to which 
regimes fulfill these dimensions on a unidimensional continuum scale, and not a two-dimensional 
space (Beetham (red), 1994: 32). Thus, in order to depict the variations in democratic performance 
(and to categorize regime types), a qualitative assessment of the extent and degree of democracy 
within each of these dimensions is needed (Beetham (red), 1994: 33). 
 
Paradoxically, however, there may be several non-democratic (hybrid or authoritarian) regimes that 
perform better with regard to the additional democratic features (that Berg-Schlosser and Beetham 
discuss above) than some of the democratically flawed states, but have yet to liberalise the electoral 
process, and/or protect basic human rights. Thus, it seems like the road to democracy can be very 
different from country to country (or region to region), something that is ignored in many of the 
theories on democratization, which is partly due to a Eurocentric perspective, according to Lise 
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Storm (Storm, 2008: 219). More problematically, this lack of democratic neutrality implies that all 
countries will follow the same pattern of democratization, where regimes in transition first 
implement democratic elections, then begin to respect civil liberties, before aquiring the effective 
power to govern, and possibly some additional features of democracy in the end (Storm, 2008: 219). 
According to Storm, this is simply not the case, and have led many cases to be wrongly categorized 
or simply overlooked (as they don't fit into any regime category). Underpinning Beetham's 
definition of democracy, Storm therefore argues that instead of focusing on different regime types, 
the various elements of democracy should be compared on a countinuus scale where more elements 
of democracy have an equal value (Storm, 2008: 224). By defining democracy as a continuum, the 
analytical differentiation increases, while at the same time avoiding conceptual stretching and the 
use of diminished subtypes (democracy with adjectives) (Storm, 2008: 226). However, unlike 
Beetham and similarly to Berg Schlosser and several other scholars (such as Diamond et al. (red) 
(2001), Dahl (1971), Levitsky et al. (1997), Storm also puts more emphasis on the core elements of 
democracy than on the additional features of democracy. The major difference is that she considers 
the democratic elements of the procedural minimum definition of democracy (free elections, civil 
liberties) to be of equal value to a third «core» element of democracy: namely that elected 
governments have the effective power to govern. This latter element has often been included in 
«expanded procedural minimum» definitions of democracy (especially in studies of South 
American countries) (Collier et al., 1997: 443). Thus, the inclusion of this latter criteria may be seen 
as raising the threshold of democracy, but instead Storm maintains that all non-authoritarian 
regimes (regimes that possess one or more elements of democracy) are in differing degrees 
democratic regimes (Storm, 2008: 224). Storm's operationalisation of regime types is therefore 
much more neutral in the sense that she focuses on the various elements of democracy (and most of 
them with an equal value), and their possible combinations on a continuum (from autocracy to ideal 
democracy), instead of creating dichotomous «boxes» of regime types where the theoretical 
definitions of these regime types not always confine to the enormous empirical variations. Thus, 
even though she operationalises democracy as a continuum (and not a two-dimensional space like 
Wigell), her relatively neutral typology still makes it possible to identify (democratic) differences 
both in degree and in kind. Democracy should therefore not be regarded as a static concept, and a 
comparison of all possible combinations of democratic elements makes it easier to grasp the 
political variation among different regimes (Storm, 2008: 222). 
 
Table 2.5: Storm's continuum: 
 
0             1               1+              2                2+              3               3+   (ideal type democracy) 
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On a similar continuum to the one in figure 1 above, Storm operationalises democracy into 4 
elements, where three of them; democratic elections (free, fair, competitive, and inclusive), basic 
civil liberties, and effective power to govern, have an equal value to each other, and higher than the 
last element; additional democratic features (i.e. political accountability/transparency, independent 
judiciary, and several other elements related to the «output» side of democracy). Storm then 
classifies regime types on a scale from 0 (regimes having 0 democratic elements, thus it is 
authoritarian) to 4 (democracies with all the 4 elements of democracy) (Storm, 2008: 223).  Thus, a 
regime in category 2+ possesses two of the former three elements as well as one (or more) of the 
additional democratic features. While the former two elements (democratic elections, civil liberties) 
constitute the procedural minimum definition of democracy by Robert Dahl (also applied by 
Wigell), the latter element (effective power to govern) closely resembles two of Wigell's additional 
features of democracy (electoral empowerment, and electoral sovereignty).    
 
If authoritarianism is defined in the same way Storm has done; as regimes with none of the three 
core democratic elements (it may have some of the additional democratic features), then it makes 
very much sense to operationalise the dependent variable according to the number of democratic 
elements that various regimes possess. In fact, the continuum scale could also be enhanced (below 
zero) in order to incorporate the variation among authoritarian regimes regarding which and how 
many authoritarian elements that various authoritarian regimes possess. Different regime types are 
then differentiated based on the number of democratic (or authoritarian) elements present, by 
applying the medium level of abstraction (Sartori in Storm, 2008: 226). Despite assessing this 
qualitatively, some dichotomous thresholds (of whether the democratic elements are present or not) 
seem to be inevitable, in order to subsequently categorize the regimes. However, there may for 
example still be qualitative differences in the level of horizontal accountability both among 
countries that are considered to fulfill this criterion, and among those that don't. The inherent 
implication that regime types still need to be separated by certain quantitative or dichotomous 
differences is also one of the greatest challenges when regime types are operationalised on a 
continuum from democracy to autocracy, according to Andreas Schedler (Schedler, 2001: 18-19). In 
other words, the various democratic elements are not simply absent or present, but there are 
differences in the kind or quality of various institutions and practices. This methodological problem 
is however mitigated by the fact that various regimes may be situated anywhere between its 
respective thresholds on the continuum, instead of directly on the threshold illustrating the number 
of elements present in the regime(s) (Storm, 2008: 220). Thus, a regime in the 2+ category may be 
situated anywhere between 2+ to 3 on the axis, and a more precise judgement on democratic 
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performances (and to what extent the elements really are present or not) would therefore be 
dependent on further empirical studies. 
 
By applying a similar continuum to the one used by Lise Storm, it seems quite feasible and 
conceptually valid to combine it with the fourfold regime typology that was developed in the 
statistical operationalisation above (in section 2.1). In this context, liberal democracies are regimes 
that fulfill all of the democratic elements (including all of the additional democratic features). 
Flawed democracies fulfill all of the three core democratic elements, but lack or performs badly 
with regard to additional democratic features. Hybrid regimes fail to meet at least one of the three 
core elements of democracy, and include all of the categories between the flawed democracies and 
the category that fulfills no democratic elements. The latter category consist of authoritarian 
regimes, as they fail to meet any of the three core democratic elements (they may fulfill some of the 
additional features of democracy). Through a careful qualititative assessment of how the various 
postcommunist regimes fulfill the various democratic dimensions, it is then possible to place the 
regimes on the continuum.  
 
The democratic elements that will be considered are based on the criteria that have been identified 
and applied in regime typologies by the scholars discussed above (Wigell, Dahl, Beetham, Storm 
etc.). The three core democratic dimensions constitute the minimum threshold to democracy, and 
are basically the same as the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy (see Collier et 
al., 1997), while the additional features of democracy are applied to further improve the 
differentiation of regime types.  
 
The core democratic dimensions: 
 
1): Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE).  
 
2): Basic civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organisation, right to alternative 
information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL).  
 
3): Elected governments have effective power to govern (EP). This criterion is operationalised as 
including two of Wigell's additional electoral criteria; electoral empowerment (that the decision 
making of elected governments is not constitutionally (formally) constrained by possible 
undemocratic actors such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves or religious authorities etc.), and 
electoral sovereignty (the decision making of elected governments should not be dependent on 
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informal relations/constraints from any external actors, such as other states, patrimonial networks, 
or organised crime networks). In addition to the requirement that there should be no significant 
formal or informal constraints on the government by undemocratic actors, the government itself 
needs to be democratically elected. Thus, governments that have effective power to govern, but 
cannot be regarded as rightfully elected (for example if the government is in complete control of the 
electoral process, and significantly violates the minmum electoral criteria), will therefore not be 
considered to fulfill this criterion. 
 
Additional democratic features (AF): 
 
4): Electoral integrity. All votes should be weighed equally, also when the votes are translated into 
seats (in parliament) (Wigell, 2008: 239). 
 
5): Electoral irreversibility. Elected officials should not be prevented by any undemocratic actors, 
using violent means, from assuming office or exercising power (Wigell, 2008: 240). 
 
6): Horizontal accountability. There should be a constitutional/legal system of «checks and 
balances, where the powers are separated between the state institutions. Thus, the various state 
institutions (such as the parliament, the judiciary, and other state agencies, ombudsman etc.) should 
be sufficiently independent from the government to hold it, and other state institutions, accountable 
for its actions (Diamond et al., 2004: 26). 
 
7): Vertical accountability. The citizens should be able to hold its elected officials accountable for its 
actions/policies. Ultimately, this requires relatively democratic elections where the electorate can 
punish or reward the incumbent government for its actions. However, it is also important that the 
media and civil society is able to monitor the government and demand information and justification 
for its policies, which also implies that there should be a relatively high level of civil liberties, and 
the rule of law, in order to enlighten the electorate so that they have a better foundation for making 
up their minds about their elected representatives (Diamond et al., 2004: 25). 
 
8): Legal accountability (rule of law). The judicial system needs to be independent from the other 
state institutions, in order to hold the government and the other state institutions accountable for its 
actions, as well as protecting civil liberties (O'Donnell in Diamond et al., 2004: 23). Thus, it is also 
vital that the judicial system is sufficiently professional and efficient, in order to perform these 
duties. 
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9): Bureaucratic integrity. The bureaucracy should be relatively independent from particular interest 
groups (such as clientelist networks) and party patronage (influence from political parties). It is also 
vital that the bureaucracy applies laws in a universal, effective, and transparent manner, and that 
there is a low level of corruption (Wigell, 2008: 241).  
 
10): Local government accountability. Local governments need to abide by the rules and laws in the 
constitution, as the legality of the constitution should be universalistic throughout the entire state 
territory (Wigell, 2008: 241). On the one hand, this implies that there should be a certain level of 
decentralization (as local governments need to have some degree of independence and not be totally 
dependent or controlled by the national government, in order to have the ability to comply with the 
constitutional rules), but at the same time it is also vital that there is a relatively high level of 
«stateness»; that the state has complete monopoly on the use of force and taxation (Linz et al., 
1996). 
 
Regarding the first two dimensions of democracy above (FCE, and BCL), only regimes that fulfill 
all of the four respective criteria, are considered to be a FCE or BCL regime type (or both if it 
fulfills all of the eight criteria in total). In addition to fulfilling these two dimensions, elected 
governments must also have an effective power to govern (EP), in order for a regime to be 
considered democratic. Regarding the fourth dimension (AF), regimes that fulfill all of the 
additional features of democracy are defined as an AAF regime type (includes all of the liberal 
democracies), while regimes that fulfill less of the additional features are AF regime types (except 
for autocracies, as they lack any of the core democratic attributes), and the number of additional 
features that are met will therefore be used to further distinguish between the regimes on the 
continuum. 
 
Table 2.6: A qualitative regime typology: 
0                 1                  1+                2                  2+                3                  3+                4 
Autocracy                          Hybrid regimes Flawed democracies Liberal 
democracy 
 FCE FCE+AF FCE, BCL FCE, 
BCL+AF 
FCE, BCL, 
EP 
FCE, BCL, 
EP+AF 
FCE, BCL, 
EP+AAF 
 BCL BCL+AF FCE, EP FCE, 
EP+AF 
   
 EP EP+AF BCL, EP BCL, 
EP+AF 
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In this qualitative definition of democracy, an expanded procedural minimum definition (FCE, 
BCL, EP) constitutes the threshold to democracy. The various thresholds that are included in the 
table above (between hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal democracies) were not 
included in Storm’s typology, as she only differentiated between authoritarian regimes and non-
authoritarian regimes (that were all defined as democratic, but in differing degrees). The reason why 
these additional thresholds (categories) have been included is mainly because it helps to produce a 
better understanding of how the different regime types are developing, and it also seems necessary 
to differentiate between those regimes that are truly democratic, and those that are hybrid. Raising 
the threshold of democracy, including the EP criterion (effective power to govern), also seems 
necessary because it appears to be very relevant for the complete fulfillment of the two other core 
elements of democracy (FCE, BCL). Especially in the postcommunist region where many states are 
either formally or informally deprived of power from undemocratic actors (such as patronage 
networks, minority groups with secessionist claims, foreign states etc.), and the minimum electoral 
and constitutional requirements may therefore not be universally applied even in regimes that are 
defined as FCE/BCL regimes, because a limited power to govern may entail that several 
geographical territories or areas of decision making are beyond governmental control. Moldova, an 
FCE regime type, is a good example of this, as it lacks control over the province of Transnistria 
(which has declared independence), and is therefore unable to enforce fully democratic elections in 
this area despite the fact that it is officially within Moldova's territorial borders. There are also 
many other examples of how the lack of EP can have a very damaging effect on democratization, 
and it therefore makes sense to include the EP element in the minimum threshold of democracy. 
However, perhaps the most important reason for the inclusion of the EP dimension is the necessity 
of rating the three core elements of democracy in an equal manner, as progress towards democracy 
can be very different from country to country (and region to region).   
 
2.3 Independent variables and hypotheses 
 
2.3.1 General theories of democratization 
 
Today, there are totally 29 postcommunist regimes within the boundaries of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, and 25 out of these regimes are included in this analysis. With such a 
high number of regimes (and data) to compare, a quantitative analysis based on structural variables 
may seem appropriate in order to produce statistical generalisations concerning the political 
development of postcommunist regimes. The selection of independent variables in this statistical 
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analysis is based on theories of democratization, and on the transition from communism.  
 
The modernisation theory has for decades been among the most influential theories of 
democratization. It maintains that the chances of a successful transition to democracy increases 
when a regime experiences high economic development and modernisation, because this often leads 
to increased industrialisation, urbanisation, better forms of communication/infrastructure, and a 
higher education and income level, which in turn results in a changed class structure and a more 
liberal political culture (Diamond in Marks and Diamond (red), 1991). It is therefore perceived to 
be a positive relationship between economic development and political democracy (Lipset, 1960). 
While there has been increasing disagreement regarding the causal relationship between economic 
development and democracy, as an increasing number of relatively poorly developed countries have 
also become democratic, there has been an increasing consensus that political democracies with a 
high level of economic development are very unlikely to break down (Bunce, 2000: 706).  
According to Larry Diamond, the majority of democratic regimes in the world are to be found either 
among the least developed/poorest countries or among the highest developed countries, while most 
authoritarian or hybrid regimes tend to be somewhere in between when it comes to the level of 
economic development (Diamond in Marks et al. (red), 1991: 109). O'Donnell explains this 
phenomenon with the alliances that tends to occur between authoritarian elites and parts of the 
bourgeoisie and/or middle classes when the growing economic development starts encouraging 
groups/processes in society to aim for democratic reforms (O'Donnell in Diamond in Marks et al. 
(red), 1991: 114). However, when a country exceeds a certain level of economic development 
(usually measured as the average income level, or GDP per capita), democracy becomes sustainable 
because there is less at stake for eventual losers in political elections (Przeworski in Møller, 2009: 
99). In other words, in situations where economic power is not highly dependent on political power, 
then political elites have more to lose by contesting democratically held elections. 
 
H1: Modernisation: The first hypothesis is that a high level of economic development, measured as 
the GDP per capita (in 2005 $ prices), has a high correlation with democratic regimes. A transition 
to democracy may occur at any level of economic development, but there is a much higher chance 
of a sustainable (consolidated) democracy at high levels of economic development. At an average or 
a low level of economic development, there may be a higher likelihood of a «consolidated» hybrid 
or authoritarian regime. If democracies occur at low levels of modernisation they are much less 
sustainable, and are more vulnerable to breakdown. The data to this variable are taken from World 
Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009). 
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H2: Economic growth: This hypothesis is partly related to the modernisation theory as a high level 
of economic growth may eventually lead to higher levels of economic development, and thus have a 
positive effect on the opportunities for democratization. A low level of economic growth may lead 
to decreased political stability, and therefore increase the possibility of regime breakdown (both 
whether it is a democratic or authoritarian regime) (Geddes, 1999: 119). This variable is 
operationalised as the annual GDP growth level (in %), and the data are taken from World 
Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).  
 
H3: Geographical location: The geographical location of the regimes is another structural variable 
that seems to be of importance when studying the political development of postcommunist regimes, 
because it implies the kinds of external pressure the regime is likely to experience. Regimes that are 
more influenced by the West, seem more likely to become democratic, than those states that are 
located closer to the influence and pressure from Moscow (Lucas, 2008). This is partly due to the 
neighbour effect (as all the states in Western Europe are democratic), and other forms of external 
pressure/influence (for instance, potential new member states in the European Union need to fulfill 
certain democratic requirements). In regimes that are predominantly influenced by Russia, and thus 
face less external pressure to become democratic, the elites face an easier task in preserving 
authoritarian institutions, thus increasing the likelihood of it becoming or remaining either an 
authoritarian or hybrid type of regime. This variable is operationalised as a dummy variable, where 
Eastern regimes are coded as 0, and Western regimes as 1. Countries are considered to have a 
vicinity to Western Europe if their capital city is situated less than 1000 miles from either Berlin or 
Vienna, and a vicinity to Russia if it is not. This operationalisation is based on Møller's 
operationalisation of the geographical location in the post-communist region, and he has based his 
operationalisation on Kopstein and Reilly (2000) (Møller, 2009: 99).  
 
H4: Natural resources: High availability of natural resources (i.e. oil or gas) should increase the 
likelihood of more authoritarian modes of governance. According to Ross, most states that have 
large quantities of such resources are authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). This is partly caused by 
the huge amount of extra income that these resources provide, and thus the regime could more 
easily reject demands of political liberalisation by for instance reducing the tax levels or offer the 
population other forms of economic benefits (welfare benefits, etc). This variable is operationalised 
as the percentage level that fuel exports make up of the total merchandise exports, and the data to 
this variable have been taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009). 
 
H5: Social inequality: According to Carothers, a high level of social inequality makes it harder for 
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regimes to escape the «greyzone» and become fully democratic, even if there is considerable 
political liberalisation (Carothers, 2002: 15). Thus, a high level of social inequality should increase 
the likelihood of a hybrid or authoritarian regime. This variable is operationalised using the Gini 
index, and the data have been taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 
2009). 
 
H6: : Level of corruption: According to Rasma Karklins, corruption is the main challenge to 
democratization processes in the postcommunist region (Karklins, 2002: 31), and a high level of 
corruption is therefore likely to lower the chances of democratization. One of the main reasons is 
that the former communist regimes enjoyed a full monopoly both within the political, economic and 
social sphere, and that this may have facilitated a continued culture of discretion and corruption in 
several of these countries (Karklins, 2002: 23). Whether corruption is characterized by low-level 
administrative briberies, clientelism, or «state capture» by corrupt networks, it ultimately has a 
negative effect on the level of accountability, transparency, justice, and the ability to execute good 
and efficient governance (Karklins, 2002: 23). Thus, it undermines some of the most vital building 
blocks of democracy, which in turn decreases the level of public trust and democratic legitimacy. 
While corruption may also be widespread in the private sector, corruption in the public sector has a 
more direct and devastating effect on the political system (and thus the prospects for democracy), 
especially if it is becoming an institutionalised feature of politics (Karklins, 2002: 24). Thus, 
corruption will be measured as the level of state control over corruption, and the data are taken from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009). 
 
H7: Multiethnicity: In countries where there is a high level of ethnic pluralism, and where ethnicity 
becomes a dividing political cleavage, it may have a detrimental effect on the prospects for 
democracy (Kitschelt, 1999: 31). When ethnicity becomes politicized it may endanger the political 
and civil freedoms for ethnic minorities (who may be disenfranchised), and could possibly also lead 
to the establishment of clientelist networks, a weaker bureaucracy, and a lack of rule of law 
(Kitschelt, 1999: 31). Multiethnicity is therefore an especially relevant variable in newly 
independent states, where the competition for the many new political offices is high. This variable is 
therefore measured as a scale from 0-100, where 0 = complete ethnic homogeneity and 100 = 
complete ethnic heterogeneity and data are taken from the Pippa Norris data set (Norris, 2009), 
which in turn has applied data collected by Alesina in 2002. 
 
H8: Religion: The level of religious fractionalization could provide another useful measure of social 
composition and diversity. For the same reasons that a high level of ethnical fractionalization may 
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be detrimental to democracy, this should also be relevant for a high level of religious heterogeneity. 
Many scholars have argued that societies with a high level of social diversity (including linguistic, 
ethnic, and religious differences), have a significantly smaller chance of becoming democratic (Fish 
and Brooks, 2004: 154). The data for this variable are also taken from the Pippa Norris data set 
(Norris, 2009), which have applied data collected by Alesina in 2002. 
 
H9: Openness: According to Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, the balance of power between the 
state and civil society, and the balance of power within civil society (the balance of class power) are 
two of the most crucial independent variables in determining the chances of democratization 
(Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1993: 73). Thus, if the «subordinate» classes in society (the 
working class, peasants, and middle class) have a high level of organizational power (ability to 
establish associations, parties, and unions, and mobilise strong support), and also are able to hold 
the regime and/or the state accountable, then the likelihood of democratization increases (Huber et 
al., 1993: 74). The openness variable will therefore be measured as the sustainability level of the 
non-governmental sector, which should provide a good indication of how well developed civil 
society is. The data to this variable are taken from the NGO index (USAID, 2008). 
 
2.3.2 Path-dependency, and transitions from communism 
 
The four remaining independent variables in this analysis are more specifically related to transitions 
from communism than the nine variables discussed in the previous section, and have previously 
been applied in studies that have analysed the political development of postcommunist regimes. All 
of these four variables are also hypothesised to have a path-dependent and long-term effect on the 
dependent variable, and it therefore seems important to distinguish between the deeper, structural 
conditions, and the more proximate and shallow causes of the dependent variable. According to 
Herbert Kitschelt there should be more focus on explaining the chains of causation in social science, 
where the deeper causes (structural conditions) are more effectively linked with the more shallow 
causes (the triggering causal mechanisms), in order to improve the explanation of social phenomena 
(Kitschelt, 1999: 12). He also argues that most proposed explanations of post-communist regime 
diversity are either too «deep» (as they lack causal mechanisms that links them to the explained 
outcome), or too «shallow» (as they nearly become a part of what is being explained) (Kitschelt, 
1999: 2). The application of such causal mechanisms that link the structural conditions to the 
dependent variable, also implies deliberate human actions, and these causal mechanisms/variables 
can therefore be regarded as actor-centred variables, according to Kitschelt (Kitschelt, 1999: 8).  
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One of these «path-dependent» independent variables, the historical legacy of post-communist 
regimes, which is operationalised as the type of administrative regime during communism, is 
considered to be a deeper structural condition/variable, and is also perceived to have a strong 
influence on the other three remaining independent variables: balance of power in the first post-
communist election, economic reform, and institutional arrangements. Because the latter three of 
these variables are more proximate to the outcome than the historical legacy variable, they could 
therefore be defined as triggering causal mechanisms that link structural conditions/variables, such 
as the prior administrative regime, to the outcome. As these variables also can be considered to be 
largely determined by the attitudes, behaviour, and interaction among and between political elites 
and the opposition, which again is influenced by structural conditions, during the transition period, 
they could also be defined as actor-centred variables, like Møller did in his analysis of the political 
development in the post-communist region (Møller, 2009). However, while the latter three variables 
perhaps could be seen as actor-centred explanations of the dependent variable in 1994, they should 
all be considered as structural conditions/variables by 2008, which is partly due to the longer 
temporal distance from the explained outcome, and partly because of their perceived path-
dependent and long-term effect on the political development in the post-communist region (see 
below).  
 
The historical legacy variable is based on two «master variables»; bureaucratic state development 
(including rule of law, and economic reform), and the patterns of civil mobilisation, which are 
perceived to have a long-lasting and path-dependent effect on the regime outcome (Kitschelt, 1999). 
Kitschelt applies these two dimensions of the historical legacy in order to distinguish between four 
different politically administrative systems during the era of communism (bureaucratic-
authoritarian, national-accommodative, patrimonial communism, and colonial peripheral systems). 
 
In states that were bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czech Republic, and also East Germany), the 
bureaucracies were relatively professional, and civil society had previously been highly mobilised 
(before communism). Thus, when communism collapsed, a rejuvenated civil society (that had been 
harshly repressed for fifty years) quickly mobilised, and seized power over a well developed state 
apparatus. These two factors also facilitated the transition to democracy. The second administrative 
type; national-accommodative communism, consisted of countries that had not been democratic 
prior to communism, but in which the regime allowed for gradual political and economic 
liberalisation (Kitschelt, 1999: 28). This in turn, led to a gradually stronger civil society and 
facilitated democratic negotiations between the incumbent regime and the opposition once 
communism fell. The latter two types; patrimonial communism and colonial peripheral systems 
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have, on the other hand, had a negative effect on democratization according to Kitschelt. In 
patrimonial communist systems, communism was usually preceded by authoritarian or sultanistic 
regimes, and civil society was weakly organised (partly due to lack of industrialisation and 
urbanisation, which inhibited the growth of the middle and working classes). This group of 
communist systems was also characterized by intense repression and cooptation of civil society 
(Kitschelt, 1999: 32). The last group; colonial peripheral systems shared fairly similar features, but 
in these states (mostly central Asian countries) the level of patrimonialism (society build around 
clientelist networks) was higher, and the opposition was virtually non-existent (Kitschelt, 1999: 28). 
 
H10: Historical legacy: This hypothesis claims that both bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) and 
national-accommodative (NA) systems have had a positive influence on the chances for a 
negotiated transition or clear victory for the opposition, due to a relatively well developed state 
apparatus and the considerable strength of civil society in such systems (Møller, 2009: 96). Thus, 
they are also likely to have had a long-lasting positive influence on the process of democratization. 
On the other hand, patrimonial communist systems (PC) and colonial peripheral systems (CP) are 
more likely to have had a negative effect on the chances for democratization because these states 
were less liberal, and thus the civil society and the opposition were weaker (Møller, 2009: 96.). This 
variable will therefore be measured as a dummy variable, in which BA=1, NA=2, PC=3, and CP=4. 
 
According to Bunce (2003) and McFaul (2002), the balance of power at the first election following 
the collapse of communism, has also had a significant and path-dependent effect on the political 
development among the postcommunist countries. It also seems like this variable has had a very 
different effect on postcommunist regimes than it has for authoritarian regimes in other parts of the 
world. Among the postcommunist states there have been greater chances of a successful transition 
to democracy in those cases where the opposition has won an overwhelming electoral victory over 
the incumbent rulers (Bunce, 2003: 188-189). In the rest of the world, the scenario has usually been 
quite the opposite, as compromises between the regime and the opposition often has been 
considered a vital requirement for democracy. Such political compromises have however had a 
devastating effect in several of the postcommunist regimes, where this usually have made it easier 
for the elites to preserve some of their power, while at the same time liberalising the political 
rules/institutions (Bunce, 2003: 189). Thus, it has in many cases contributed to the establishment of 
hybrid regimes. In cases where the incumbent regime won the majority of votes at the first election 
following the dissolution of communism, it often resulted in transitions to new authoritarian 
regimes. 
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The balance of power between the elites and the opposition when the transition was initiated was 
largely determined by the role of the military and the elites and whether there was a large scale 
mobilisation of opposition towards the regime, according to Bunce (Bunce, 2003: 189). She 
maintains that these two variables help explain why many of the Eastern European countries (that 
had a strong opposition and a relatively weak regime) became democratic, while several of the other 
postcommunist countries ended up as hybrid or authoritarian regimes. The arguments of Bunce are 
supported by McFaul's theory, which claims that the political development in the postcommunist 
regimes has largely been driven by «path-dependency», and therefore argues that the balance of 
power when transition began has had a significant importance for the long-term political 
development (McFaul, 2002: 216).  
 
H11: Balance of power: As mentioned above, the balance of power in the first postcommunist 
elections, is likely to be strongly influenced by the historical legacy of the postcommunist regimes 
(Kitschelt, 1999). Based on the theories of Bunce and McFaul, it also seems likely that the balance 
of power (between the regime and opposition) in the first elections after the collapse of communism 
have had a significant and long-term effect on the regime types in most of the postcommunist states. 
Given the perceived role of path-dependency on the long-term political development in these cases, 
it should also be expected that there has only been minor variations on the dependent variable over 
the last 20 years. This variable will be measured as a dummy variable with three values, where 
1=balance of power favouring the elites, 2=even balance of power, and 3=balance of power in 
favour of the opposition. 
  
H12: Economic reform: According to scholars such as De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996), and Fish 
and Choudry (2007), rapid economic liberalization has a positive relationship with democratization. 
Economic reform and liberalization may function as an effective constraint on authoritarianism as it 
leads to pluralism of power, and separates economic power from political power (Fish et al., 2007: 
257). Fish and Choudry have also discovered that economic liberalisation in the postcommunist 
region has had a positive impact on democratization and socioeconomic conditions in the long-
term, but no particular effect in the short term (Fish et al., 2007: 278). However, the causal direction 
may also be the opposite, as De Melo argues that a process of democratization inherently leads to 
economic liberalisation (De Melo et al., 1996: 420). When communism collapsed, all of the 
postcommunist countries embarked on both these processes simultaneously, and there has been a 
thorough academic debate about whether rapid or gradual economic reform was the best way to 
promote a well functioning market economy and democracy (Møller, 2009: 70). Those in favour of 
the gradual approach argued that it was necessary to set up effective institutions (that could regulate 
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the economy and provide rule of law) before liberalising the economy, while the «shock therapists» 
maintained that rapid reforms were more effective in eliminating all kinds of opposition towards 
democracy and capitalism (Møller, 2009: 70). Based on the empirical findings of Fish et al., (2007) 
and De Melo et al., (1996), and due to the theoretically indisputable strong relationship between 
democracy and economic liberalisation (both are necessary components of each other), it seems that 
a high degree of economic liberalisation is most likely to correspond in a high degree of democracy. 
This is only true to a certain extent however, as too much economic liberalisation may result in an 
unregulated (and unjust) economy where powerful private actors (such as the oligarchs in Russia) in 
an undemocratic manner can obtain a large share of the country's resources, and thereby constitute a 
democratic deficit. Still, the hypothesis in this analysis is that a high degree of economic 
liberalisation in the first few years after communism has generally had a positive long-term (and 
possibly path-dependent) effect on the prospects for democratization. The data to this variable are 
taken from De Melo's annual liberalisation index, and are measured as the average annual degree of 
economic liberalisation between 1989 and 1994. De Melo's index is based on the performance of 
the internal markets, the external markets, and the private sector entry (De Melo et al., 1996: 403).         
 
H13: Institutional Arrangements: This hypothesis is based on Steven Fish's assumption (2006) that 
stronger legislatures provides stronger democracies. Fish argues that weak legislatures leads to 
reduced horizontal accountability, as there are less checks and balances on executive power (Fish, 
2006: 12). This role of the legislature is also particularly important in new democracies or newly 
independent states as other control organs (such as the judicial system) often needs time to reform 
and get rid of its authoritarian habits (Fish, 2006: 20). A strong legislature is also necessary in order 
to promote the development of political parties, which is a crucial element of political competition 
and vertical accountability (without competition, the electorate would have greater difficulties in 
controlling its representatives) (Fish, 2006: 13). Fish substantiates his theories with an empirical 
analysis that finds that countries with more powerful legislatures are generally more democratic 
than states that have weaker legislatures (Fish, 2006: 18). The measurement of this variable is based 
on the parliamentary power index, which is developed by Fish. The legislative power of each 
country at the time they adopted their first constitution (after communism ended) is measured on a 
scale from 0-100. While there have been constitutional changes and amendments in several of the 
postcommunist states since then (i.e. Albania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine), it still seems likely that the original institutional arrangements have had an 
effect in the long run. Fish also rule out the possibility that the power of the legislatures are not 
simply an effect of democratization (and not the other way around) by finding that political 
openness (measured a year in advance of the legislatures) correlates weakly with legislative power 
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at the constitutional moment (Fish, 2006: 10). Thus, it seems like adopting a constitution with a 
strong legislature has a positive long-term effect on democratization.  
 
2.4 Data reliability in the empirical analysis 
 
The qualitative and empirical analysis in chapter 4 will hopefully complement the statistical 
analysis, and provide more detailed and nuanced explanations of the general trends regarding the 
political development in the postcommunist region. All relevant independent factors/variables will 
be identified through the use of second-hand sources with the purpose of answering whether, and 
how, the different hybrid regimes have managed to fulfill the 10 different criteria of democracy, 
which constitute the qualitative operationalisation of democracy, and regime types, discussed in 
chapter 2.2. 
 
One of the greatest concerns regarding the reliability of the empirical analysis, and of the 
subsequent regime classification, is whether a sufficient number of relevant sources have been 
applied, and consequently whether all of the relevant independent variables and conditions of 
democracy have been identified. Thus, the verdict on whether, and how, the different countries 
fulfill the different criteria, will inevitably be biased by the sources that have been selected to make 
these qualitative considerations. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that for some countries 
there have been conducted much less political research then what is the case in many other 
countries. For example, a large number of articles and books have been produced about the political 
development in Russia, while in the case of Macedonia the number of available studies seem to be 
fairly limited. In other words, it is questionable whether the qualitative classification of regime 
types will be completely accurate, as a sufficient number of relevant sources may not have been 
identified. It should however provide a decent descriptive evaluation of the political development, 
and hopefully it would also be able to identify some general trends and significant independent 
variables, which the statistical analysis is unable to detect, regarding how some regimes have 
become «stuck in transition», some have reverted to authoritarianism, and some regimes are 
gradually becoming more democratic. In addition, due to its more detailed and qualitative 
operationalisaton of the dependent variable, the empirical analysis should also be capable of 
describing and explaining eventual nuances and differences between the different regime types (i.e. 
between different types of hybrid regimes), in a way that the statistical analysis is unable to do.   
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3. Statistical analysis 
 
 
In comparative politics, one of the most common fallacies when aiming to explain empirical 
phenomena, is that there often tends to be a lack of methodological awareness, and a portion of  
«unconscious thinking» involved (Sartori in Lijphart, 1971: 682). Thus, it is important to be aware 
of both the possible limitations and weaknesses as well as the strengths of the method(s) that is(are) 
applied to explain empirical relationships (Lijphart, 1971: 682). In the social sciences, there are four 
basic methodological approaches; the experimental, statistical, comparative, and case study 
methods (Lijphart, 1971: 682). The main objective of all these methods (except for certain types of 
case studies), is to scientifically explain the empirical relationships between two or more variables, 
while at the same time controlling for the effect of other variables (Lijphart, 1971: 683). The 
experimental method appears to be the most ideal procedure for scientific explanation, but due to 
obvious practical and ethical limitations, this method is nearly impossible to apply in political 
science (Lijphart, 1971: 683). It would for instance be extremely difficult (or impossible) to identify 
and compare two completely equivalent cases (countries), and then expose one of the cases to one 
variable while the other variables are held constant. The closest, and perhaps most feasible 
alternative to experimentalism is the statistical method, as it is able to produce partial correlations 
among variables while at the same time keeping other variables constant (Lijphart, 1971: 684). 
However, the statistical method is most adequate when there are a high number of cases, and 
particularly if more variables are included in the analysis there is also a need for more cases, in 
order to produce statistically significant results (Lijphart, 1971: 684). In situations with a small N 
(small number of cases, often lower then ten), the more qualitative, comparative method (or a case 
study approach) should usually be preferred instead of the statistical method (Lijphart, 1971: 686).  
 
Regarding the context of this research project, where there is an intermediate number of cases (25), 
a combination of the statistical and the comparative method would be the most appropriate 
approach, according to Lijphart (Lijphart, 1971: 685). Lijphart argues that whenever it is possible, 
the statistical method should be applied instead of the weaker comparative method, but that the 
latter approach may also function as a complement to the «superficial» nature of the statistical 
analysis (Lijphart, 1971: 685). The most obvious limitations of the statistical method when 
comparing postcommunist regimes in this research project, is the low number of observations, and 
also the high number of variables, and combined, these two factors cause several statistical 
challenges. This could possibly have been solved by either increasing the number of observations, 
or removing some of the variables. The most effective way of adding cases would be the application 
of a time-series analysis (for instance from 1994-2008, resulting in a N=350), or by adding more 
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postcommunist countries, but due to a considerable lack of data neither of these alternatives were 
possible. Reducing the number of variables also seems like a bad alternative, given their perceived 
theoretical importance. Thus, a multivariate regression analysis of these 25 postcommunist regimes 
yields statistically questionable results, especially because of the high multicollinearity (very high 
correlations among independent variables that makes it hard to distinguish between the relative 
effects of each variable), and a lack of a normal distribution of the variables in the normal 
probability plot. These are two of the most vital prerequisites in order to produce reliable and valid 
results in a regression analysis, and since these are violated, an alternative statistical procedure 
seems necessary.  
 
The problems of a small N/ many variables-analysis, and the resulting high levels of 
multicollinearity, was also one of the main concerns in Herbert Kitschelt's research of 
postcommunist regimes in his article; «Accounting for outcomes of post-communist regime 
change» (Kitschelt, 1999). Kitschelt also operated with 25 cases (the exact same countries as in this 
analysis), and due to the statistical constraints (high multicollinearity; usually correlations above 
.70), he chose to apply a bivariate correlation analysis instead of a more advanced multivariate 
statistical analysis (Kitschelt, 1999: 38). By doing this, it became possible to better distinguish 
between the relative effects of each of the rival explanations (independent variables) on the 
dependent variable. This methodological approach was also motivated by theoretical considerations, 
as a multivariate statistical analysis including several variables that are far from equally distant in 
time to the explained outcome, usually assigns more explanatory power to the more proximate 
causes (Kitschelt, 1999: 21). Thus, it may ignore the fact that the more «shallow» or proximate 
causes may often be dependent or heavily influenced by «deeper» structural conditions or legacies. 
This theoretical consideration is also relevant for several of the independent variables that are 
discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, as some of these variables are far more temporally distant (i.e. 
historical legacy, balance of power) than others (i.e. modernisation, economic growth). Thus, due to 
both statistical and theoretical considerations it seems that the most feasible and adequate 
methodological approach in this analysis is to apply a bivariate correlation analysis when aiming to 
explain the political development in the postcommunist region. By applying a correlation analysis, 
it is possible to reveal whether the relationships between the explanatory variables and the outcome 
are significant, but unfortunately it can not say anything about the causal directions (which for 
instance would have been possible in a multivariate time-series analysis). In other words, if there is 
a high correlation between the amount of NGOs (Openness variable) and liberal democracies, the 
correlation analysis is unable to tell whether it is the liberal democracies that have been caused by 
vibrant civil societies, or whether it's the other way round (or both, which seems most likely). 
 41 
However, based on the theories and hypotheses discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, and by 
examining the correlations among all of the variables, it should be possible to draw conclusions 
about the most likely causal directions. In addition, the results from the correlation analysis will be 
combined with a qualitative comparative approach in chapter 4. 
 
3.1 Data, and measurement of the independent variables 
 
In this analysis, the dependent variable (regime types) is measured at two different conjunctures, in 
1994 and 2008 (for all 25 countries). Due to the lack of data, not all of the independent variables 
have been measured at the exact same time in all of the 25 units of analysis. For some of the 
countries there is a lack of data concerning a few of the variables. In these cases, the closest 
available data have been chosen, and data preceding the measured conjuncture have been preferred 
over data that succeed it. Thus, due to less reliable data, the effects of some of these variables are 
most likely not as valid as the variables that have been measured simultaneously with the dependent 
variable in all of the countries. The most problematic variables are; natural resources, social 
inequality, control of corruption, ethnicity, and religion.  
 
In the 1994 correlation analysis, the natural resources variable (measured as fuel exports in % of 
merchandise exports) has data from 1994 in only ten countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). The data for Slovenia are 
from 1993, while the rest of the countries have been measured after 1994, with Tajikistan being the 
most deviant case (data from 2000). For Uzbekistan, there are no data whatsoever (in neither of the 
analyses), and this may weaken the results of the correlation analysis, as Uzbekistan is known to 
produce considerable amounts of natural resources. In the 2008 analysis, most of the data are found 
in 2007, except Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (both in 2000). While the lack of data naturally 
weakens the relevance of this variable, the data that are applied largely confirm which of these 
countries that possess large quantities of natural resources (mostly in Central Asia). Thus, the 
resulting correlations can still contribute to either confirming or rejecting the hypothesised 
relationship with the dependent variable, even though the data are less reliable than desired. 
 
Regarding the social inequality variable, where the Gini index has been applied as measurement, 
there is also lack of data for the two years that are examined, and considerable deviations between 
the times of measurement. A possible alternative to the Gini index could have been the Human 
Development Index (HDI) as it has more available data, but unfortunately the HDI index is also 
much less accurate as it measures not only the level of inequality, but also incorporates other 
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features of human wellbeing (life expectancy, GDP etc.). In the 1994 analysis, the data for the 
majority of countries are measured either one or two years in advance (in 1992 or 1993), which may 
actually portray a more valid comparison of the effects on the dependent variable, as the level of 
social inequality then has some «time» to influence political changes. A few countries are measured 
several years later, Uzbekistan, Macedonia, Croatia (all in 1998), and Tajikistan in 1999. In the 
2008 analysis, most of the data have been collected between 2003 and 2005, but some deviant cases 
such as Slovakia, Czech Republic (both in 1996), and Turkmenistan (in 1998), seriously weaken the 
reliability (and possibly also validity) of this variable. 
 
The corruption variable (measured as state control of corruption, from WGI indicators), has much 
more reliable data, as all the measured values were found either in 1996 or 2008. Thus, only in the 
1994 correlation analysis, can the effects of this variable be regarded as questionable. However, it 
seems unlikely that there have been significant changes in the level of corruption during just two 
years (at least for the majority of the cases), and at least all of the countries are measured 
simultaneously, which makes the comparison more valuable. 
 
The data for the ethnicity and the religion variables, have both been collected from the Pippa Norris 
dataset (2009), and were originally measured by Alesina in 2002 (for all countries). As the level of 
religious or ethnic fractionalization in a society are two processes that usually change in a very 
gradual manner over time, unless there are genocides or massive purges of ethnic minorities, there 
have most likely not been any considerable changes in ethnic or religious fractionalization 
throughout this time period. However, the data are certainly not ideal, and the effects of this 
variable are also to some extent questionable. 
 
For the remaining eight variables, the data seem to be very reliable. The modernisation (GDP per 
capita) and economic growth variables both have consistent and reliable data for both 1994 and 
2008, and for all of the 25 countries. The openness variable (measured by the NGO index), is only 
included in the 2008 analysis, as the NGO index began collecting data as late as 1997. The five last 
variables are «deeper» variables that have theoretically been assumed to have a long-term effect on 
the dependent variable. These are: economic reform (measured as the average annual economic 
liberalisation between 1989 and 1994), balance of power (at the first post-independence election), 
institutional arrangements (parliamentary power at the constitutional moment), historical legacy 
(type of communist administrative system), and geographical location (East or West).  
 
3.2 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 1994 
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Table 3.1 Correlation analysis 1994: 
  Autocracy Hybrid_Reg Flawed_ dem Liberal_dem 
Modernisation P.correlation -,443* -0,32 0,24 ,719** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,03 0,12 0,25 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Eco_growth P.correlation -,417* -0,15 0,33 0,31 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,04 0,47 0,11 0,13 
N 25 25 25 25 
Geo_location P.correlation -,667** -0,01 ,421* 0,28 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,98 0,04 0,18 
N 25 25 25 25 
Nat_resources P.correlation ,704** -0,22 -0,21 -0,2 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,31 0,33 0,36 
N 24 24 24 24 
Soc_inequalitie
s 
P.correlation 0,21 0,15 -0,23 -0,18 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,33 0,48 0,28 0,39 
N 25 25 25 25 
Balance_power P.correlation -,500* -0,22 ,445* 0,37 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,11 0,29 0,03 0,07 
N 25 25 25 25 
Corruption P.correlation -,515** -0,27 0,32 ,632** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,01 0,19 0,12 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Historical_lega
cy 
P.correlation ,606** 0,26 ,-475* -,520** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,21 0,02 0,01 
N 25 25 25 25 
Eco_reform P.correlation -,520** -0,28 ,540** 0,36 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,01 0,18 0,01 0,08 
N 25 25 25 25 
Inst_arrangeme
nts 
P.correlation -,564** -0,19 ,498* 0,33 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,37 0,01 0,11 
N 25 25 25 25 
Ethnicity P.correlation 0,19 0,07 -0,01 -0,33 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,36 0,76 0,98 0,12 
N 24 24 24 24 
Religion P.correlation -0,33 0,21 0,01 0,07 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,11 0,32 0,95 0,75 
N 25 25 25 25 
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In order to better depict the relative effects of each of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable, the latter has been reformed into four new dummy variables (i.e. the autocracy dummy is 
operationalised as; 0=not autocratic and 1=autocratic, and so on). As the table shows, many of the 
independent variables have statistically significant correlations with the dependent variables. Thus, 
in cases where the significance value is lower than the two thresholds of 0.01, or 0.05, there is less 
than 1 % or 5 % possibility that the null hypothesis is correct (the null hypothesis assumes that in 
the population as a whole, there is no correlation). If a one-tailed test had been applied instead of 
the stricter and more demanding two-tailed test, a larger number of these variables would also have 
been able to defeat the null hypothesis (and have statistically significant correlations).  
 
The modernisation variable seems to have a linear effect on the dependent variable. Low levels of 
modernisation has a statistically significant correlation with autocratic regimes at the 0.05 level 
(both in a two-tailed and one-tailed test), and lack of modernisation also seems to be concurrent 
with hybrid regimes although the correlation is not significant (almost significant in a one-tailed test 
at the 0.05 level). High levels of modernisation have a slightly positive, but far from significant 
correlation with flawed democracies, and a very significant correlation with liberal democracies (at 
the 0.01 level). Based on the theory in the first hypothesis it therefore seem that the liberal 
democracies (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) in 1994 had already become consolidated 
democracies (as high levels of modernisation make a democratic breakdown very unlikely), while 
the flawed democracies may be dependent on higher economic development in order to render the 
democratization process irreversible. The low levels of economic development may also have 
facilitated the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, and perhaps also the hybrid regimes. High 
levels of modernisation also have significant correlations with high levels of economic growth, 
rapid economic reforms, high control of corruption (low corruption), high legislative power, and 
regimes with a Western geographical location. In addition, it also has a significant correlation with 
low levels of social inequality, a bureaucratic-authoritarian (or national-accommodative) past, and 
with regimes where the opposition won the first post-independence election.  
 
As hypothesised in section 2.3 of chapter 2, high levels of economic growth have a high correlation 
with economic development, which in turn should increase the chances of democratization. 
However, high economic growth does not significantly relate to either of the two democratic regime 
types (although there is almost a significant correlation in a one-tailed test at the 0.05 level in both 
cases). Low levels of economic growth was also predicted to increase the chances of a regime 
breakdown, but despite a significant correlation (at the 0.05 level) between low economic growth 
and autocracies, all of the autocratic regimes in 1994 remained authoritarian fourteen years later (in 
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the 2008 analysis). The level of economic growth doesn't seem to have any explanatory power for 
the existence of hybrid regimes. With regard to the correlations with the other independent 
variables, the economic growth variable shares many of the same features as the modernisation 
variable, except that it doesn't have a significant correlation with social inequality. In addition, high 
levels of economic growth correlate strongly with small amounts of natural resources and ethnically 
homogenous societies.  
 
The prospects for democratization are apparently, and as predicted, much higher for states that are 
located to the West, and are proximate to Western Europe. A Western geographical location yields a 
significant correlation with liberal democracies, while the opposite (regimes closer to the influence 
of Russia) seems to favour the existence of authoritarian regimes. For the two other regime types 
(hybrid regimes, and flawed democracies) geography has had less influence, although in a one-
tailed test a Western geographical location has a significant correlation with flawed democracies. 
The other correlations of the Geo_location variable also makes it clear that regimes that are located 
further to the East, generally have higher amounts of natural resources, greater social differences, 
higher corruption, slower economic reforms, less legislative power, and on several occasions has 
the first post-independence election been won by the incumbent regime. 
 
Regimes that have high amounts of natural resources (and are mostly located in the East), also tend 
to be authoritarian regimes, according to the correlation analysis (significant at the 0.01 level). For 
the other three regime types there is no significant effect, most likely because only Russia (hybrid 
regime) has considerable amounts of natural resources among these countries. This finding 
confirms the hypothesis that high quantities of natural resources may facilitate the existence of 
authoritarian regimes. The correlation analysis also finds that these regimes also tend to have very 
high corruption, a slow process of economic reforms, low legislative power, and that their 
administrative systems during communism were either of a colonial peripheral or patrimonial 
communist nature. 
 
The level of social inequality is not significantly correlated with any of the four regime types. 
Although the analysis may indicate that lower levels of inequality increases the prospects for 
democratization, and that the opposite leads to either hybrid or authoritarian regimes, the 
relationship is far from significant for any of the instances. However, the hypothesis that large 
social differences lower the chances of democratization, is strengthened by the high correlation with 
a low level of economic development, lack of economic reform, low legislative power, colonial 
peripheral (or patrimonial communist) systems, and regimes that have an Eastern geographical 
 46 
location. All of these attributes appears to have a negative effect on democratization, but due both to 
the questionable reliability and validity of this variable, as well as the lack of significant findings, it 
would be difficult (and wrong) to draw any conclusion as to the effect of social inequality on 
postcommunist regime types. 
 
Whether the first elections after communism were won by the incumbent political elites (former 
communists), there was a «pacted» transition (even balance of power), or the opposition won a clear 
victory, seems to have made a significant contribution to the political development in the early years 
after transition. There is a significant correlation between transitions where the balance of power 
favoured the incumbent political elites, and autocratic regimes (at the 0.05 level). In cases where the 
opposition won a clear victory, it seems to have often resulted in a transition to flawed democracies. 
There is no significant correlation between this variable and the hybrid regimes and liberal 
democracies, although the latter would be significant in a one-tailed test (in a correlation with the 
opposition winning the election). The lack of explanatory value for the hybrid regimes, could stem 
from the fact that there often was an even balance of power at the first election, and also from the 
great variation among these regimes, as unlike in the cases of the autocratic or democratic regime 
types, none of the three types of transition were particularly dominant compared to the other types. 
When converting the balance_power variable into three new dummy variables (one for each type of 
transition), there is still no type of transition that can help explain the existence of hybrid regimes 
(and the «even balance of power» dummy has no significant impact on any of the regime types). In 
the cases where the opposition won the first election, there generally also seems to be low levels of 
corruption, rapid economic reform, high legislative power, high economic development and growth, 
and a bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative past. 
 
The assumption that corruption is one of the main challenges to democratization in the 
postcommunist region is underpinned by the results of the correlation analysis. High levels of 
corruption have a statistically significant correlation with autocratic regimes, while the opposite is 
true for liberal democracies (both at the 0.01 level). In a one-tailed analysis both hybrid regimes and 
flawed democracies are close to having a significant correlation, with high and low levels of 
corruption, respectively. Whether there is a high or low level of corruption, or a negative or positive 
impact on democracy, these values correlate significantly with the other «negative» and «positive» 
attributes (for democracy) of several of the other independent variables (such as modernisation, 
eco_growth, geo_loc, nat_resources, balance_power, inst_arrangements, eco_reform, and 
hist_legacy). In addition, high levels of corruption seem to be more prevalent in ethnically 
heterogeneous societies (significant at the 0.05 level). 
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As expected, the degree of state-building prior to the fall of communism has a statistically 
significant correlation with the degree of democracy after the transition. The existence of highly 
developed state institutions, and a relatively open and developed civil society (bureaucratic-
authoritarianism and/or national-accommodative administrative systems) correlate significantly 
with both of the democratic regime types (at the 0.05 level with respect to flawed democracies, and 
at the 0.01 level with regard to liberal democracies). Among the autocratic regimes in 1994, the two 
other administrative types (patrimonial and colonial peripheral communism) appear to have been 
most prevalent during communism, while for hybrid regimes there is no distinct tendency.  
 
Despite the widespread critique of the Washington consensus approach (those advocating rapid 
economic reform in order to advance the democratization process more effectively), it seems that 
rapid economic reforms and liberalisation had a very positive impact on democratization in the 
early 1990s (significant correlation with flawed democracies at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed 
analysis, and with liberal democracies at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed analysis). The majority of 
gradual reformers appears to have retained more authoritarian modes of governance, while for 
hybrid regimes the effect of a rapid or gradual approach is uncertain. 
 
Those countries that granted considerable power to the legislature in their first postcommunist 
constitutions, predominantly appear to be in a transition towards democracy, according to the 
correlation analysis. Strong legislative power has a highly significant relationship with flawed 
democracies, and would also be significant for liberal democracies in a one-tailed test. In autocratic 
regimes the executive branch generally has considerably more power than other state institutions 
(such as the legislature), and, not surprisingly, there is also a significant correlation between low 
legislative power and autocracies. Lack of legislative power also seems to be prevalent among the 
hybrid regimes, even though there is no significant correlation. 
 
The latter three variables that are discussed above (historical legacy, economic reform, and 
institutional arrangements), as well as the balance of power variable, all share some important 
characteristics. They have all been defined as path-dependent variables that have a long-term effect 
on political development. In addition, they also have very high and nearly coinciding correlations 
with most of the other independent variables (except for ethnicity and religion), as well as for two 
of the dependent variables (autocracies and flawed democracies, to some extent also liberal 
democracies). Thus, it appears that these three variables do in fact have a path-dependent influence, 
not only on the prospects for democratization but also on socioeconomic development (such as the 
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modernisation, economic growth, corruption, and social inequality variables). Even though these 
socioeconomic variables (except for social inequality) also have very high correlations with most of 
the other independent variables, it seems quite likely that these variables have been influenced to 
some extent by the structural conditions already in place (that are largely determined by the 
aforementioned three variables). In turn, the effect of the path-dependent variables on the other 
independent variables may in fact reinforce their initial effect on the dependent variable. For 
instance, the extent of economic reform (gradual or rapid) or the level of state-building prior to the 
transition (historical legacy), are likely to have influenced the degree of economic growth, 
economic development, and social inequality, which in turn have an impact on the political 
development. 
 
The last two independent variables, ethnicity and religion, seem to be less relevant for explaining 
the dependent variable. Neither of them has any significant impact on the dependent variable(s). A 
high level of ethnic homogeneity has almost a significant correlation with liberal democracies in a 
one-tailed test, and the same is true for high religious homogeneity and autocracies. However, as 
mentioned earlier, the data for both of these variables are not completely reliable, and therefore 
these findings are somewhat questionable. 
 
To sum up, the correlation analysis is not able to explain why there were 11 hybrid regimes in 1994, 
but it provides several indications as to how the authoritarian or democratic regimes had come into 
being in the first few years after the transition. A Western geographical location, high levels of 
economic development, low social inequality, and low levels of corruption, seem to be have been 
very positive for democratization in the early 1990s. In addition, these regimes (mostly flawed 
democracies) had often been preceded by bureaucratic-authoritarian or national-accommodative 
administrative systems (during communism), and had later been influenced by a strong democratic 
opposition (that had won the first elections), and subsequently adopted constitutions that allowed 
for strong legislatures, and that initiated rapid economic reforms. For those regimes that were 
autocratic in 1994, the story was almost the opposite. Most of the autocracies were located in the 
East, and they generally had low levels of economic development and economic growth, high levels 
of corruption, and a considerable amount of natural resources. These regimes were also often 
preceded by patrimonial or colonial peripheral communism, often resulting in a balance of power 
favouring the incumbent political elites, and they generally had weak legislatures and slow 
economic reforms. For the eleven hybrid regimes in 1994 it is hard to discover any general 
tendency, as there are no significant correlations with the independent variables.  
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Table 3.2 Correlation analysis 2008: 
2008  Autocracy Hybrid_regimes Flawed_dem Liberal_dem 
Modernisation P.correlation -0,34 -,525** 0,01 ,797** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,1 0,01 0,97 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Eco_growth P.correlation ,527** 0,11 -0,01 -,598** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,01 0,6 0,96 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Geo_location P.correlation -,646** -0,16 0,33 ,514** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,43 0,11 0,01 
N 25 25 25 25 
Nat_resources P.correlation ,858** -0,32 -0,16 -0,37 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,13 0,45 0,08 
N 24 24 24 24 
Soc_inequalitie
s 
P.correlation 0,28 0,33 -,416* -0,25 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,17 0,11 0,04 0,23 
N 25 25 25 25 
Balance_power P.correlation -,601** -0,02 -0,11 ,686** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,91 0,6 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Corruption P.correlation -,758** -0,14 0,12 ,769** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,5 0,58 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Openness P.correlation ,762** 0,11 -0,17 -,704** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,6 0,43 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Historical_legac
y 
P.correlation ,556** 0,37 -0,08 -,805** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,07 0,69 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Eco_reform P.correlation -,649** -0,21 0,2 ,659** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,31 0,34 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Inst_arrangeme
nts 
P.correlation -,704** -0,07 0,17 ,608** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0,75 0,43 0 
N 25 25 25 25 
Ethnicity P.correlation 0,08 0,16 0,06 -0,26 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,72 0,47 0,78 0,23 
N 24 24 24 24 
Religion P.correlation -0,22 0,23 0,02 -0,02 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,3 0,26 0,91 0,91 
N 25 25 25 25 
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3.3 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 2008 
 
Based on the findings in the 2008 correlation analysis, it seems that the gradual polarization of the 
political development (that was visible in the 1994 analysis) has become even stronger among the 
25 postcommunist countries since then. All of the liberal democracies have a Western geographical 
location (located in Central or Eastern Europe), while most of the autocracies are found in Central 
Asia. The flawed democracies and the hybrid regimes are more evenly spread geographically, 
although none of the flawed democracies are found as far east as Central Asia. In addition, most of 
the factors that significantly explained the development of liberal democracies and autocratic 
regimes in 1994, still have a significant effect in 2008. Thus, it seems that there has been some sort 
of path-dependent political development in the postcommunist region, and especially with regard to 
those regimes that are located either very close to Western Europe or far to the East (in Central 
Asia). Among the regimes situated somewhere in the middle (geographically), there is a higher 
regime diversity, and far less significant explanations. 
 
Compared to 1994, there are six more independent variables that significantly correlate with liberal 
democracies in 2008. The main reason behind this development is most likely that five of the 
flawed democracies in 1994 have become liberal democracies (only Bulgaria remained a flawed 
democracy compared to the 1994 analysis). Thus, variables such as a Western geographical 
location, a balance of power favouring the opposition (at the first postcommunist election), rapid 
economic reform, and constitutions that grant the legislature considerable powers, have all become 
significant in its correlations with liberal democracies, while they no longer have significant 
correlations with flawed democracies. The latter finding also suggests that these four variables had 
a critical impact on the democratization process in the five former flawed democracies (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia). In addition, a high degree of openness (measured by the NGO 
index), also has a significant correlation with liberal democracies (this variable was not included in 
the 1994 analysis).  Perhaps the most surprising and unexpected result of this correlation analysis, is 
that a low level of economic growth has a highly significant correlation with liberal democracies, 
and that a high level of economic growth correlates significantly with autocracies. This could 
possibly be explained by the global financial crises in 2008, that had a devastating effect on most of 
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and also that the oil and gas producing nations may 
have been less vulnerable to the financial meltdown (most of the autocratic postcommunist 
countries have large quantities of natural resources). High economic development, a low level of 
corruption, and a bureaucratic-authoritarian or a national-accommodative past, are still significant 
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explanations for liberal democracies (as they were in 1994), and all of the liberal democratic 
regimes in 1994 (Czech republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) are still liberal democracies in 2008. 
 
There are also very high correlations among most of the independent variables that correlate 
significantly with liberal democracies, which is yet another indication that these regimes may have 
experienced a path-dependent political development. As already mentioned, all of the liberal 
democracies have a «Western» location, and they also appear to share most of the other attributes 
that were hypothesised to have a positive impact on democratization. Thus, of those variables that 
have a significant correlation, only lack of economic growth somewhat contradicts the hypothesised 
effect on the prospects for democracy. However, the low level of economic growth may also imply 
that the liberal democracies have become increasingly vulnerable to regime breakdown and/or 
political instability. As all of these countries are becoming increasingly integrated with Western 
Europe through their membership in the European Union, a serious democratic breakdown does, 
however, not seem very likely. 
 
Despite the perceived (and empirically proven) importance of a Western geographical location, not 
all of the regimes situated close to the West have entered the ranks of liberal democracies. Among 
the exceptions are Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia (flawed democracies in 2008), and Albania, and 
Macedonia (hybrid regimes both in 1994 and 2008). There is also one exception at the other end of 
the spectrum, as one of the regimes further to the East (Ukraine) has passed the threshold to 
democracy (was a flawed democracy in 2008).  While the geographical location variable has been 
operationalised as a dummy, with only two values (West or East), several of the regimes are 
arguably in a more intermediate geographical position, as they are influenced both by the West (EU, 
IMF etc.), and the East (Russia). This may also help explain why the regime diversity is greater 
among these countries, as they apparently face less structural conditions that could either facilitate 
or inhibit a development towards either authoritarianism or democracy. The majority of these 
countries are either hybrid regimes or flawed democracies. This may also be one of the main 
reasons why there are very few significant correlations between the independent variables and these 
two regime types. While the authoritarian regimes on the one hand, and the liberal democracies on 
the other, seem to share many of the same attributes, there is much greater variation both among the 
hybrid regimes and the flawed democracies. 
 
For the flawed democracies, there seems to be a very low level of social inequality (correlates at the 
0.05 level). This is the only significant correlation (both in a two-tailed and one-tailed test) between 
the independent variables and this regime type. Thus, there appears to be a much higher political 
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diversity among the flawed democracies in 2008 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine), than 
what was the case in 1994. The latter three of these regimes were hybrid regimes in 1994, and none 
of these regimes have been defined as an «Eastern» regime (although Ukraine should be regarded as 
a borderline case). A Western geographical location has also nearly a significant correlation with 
flawed democracies, and it seems likely that the «neighbour effect» and Western pressure and 
funding (from the EU, IMF, etc.) have had a positive impact on the democratization process in these 
countries. However, in the case of Ukraine, that for strategic reasons need to maintain a close 
relationship with Russia (partly because of gas imports, and a large Russian minority), the process 
of democratization is most likely more fragile and vulnerable to a setback than in the countries 
further to the West. Due to the lack of significant findings in this analysis, it therefore seems 
necessary to assess these countries more thoroughly in a qualitative case-comparative study. 
 
There is also a great lack of significant findings for the hybrid regimes in 2008, as a low level of 
modernisation is the only variable that has a significant correlation (at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed 
test). In a one-tailed test, a legacy of patrimonial or colonial peripheral communism also correlate 
significantly (at the 0.05 level), and high social inequality and a low level of natural resources are 
nearly significant. All of the 6 hybrid regimes in 2008, were also hybrid regimes in 1994. Thus, it 
seems like these regimes (Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Moldova) have 
become consolidated as hybrid regimes, but neither in 1994 nor in 2008 are there many variables 
that could help explain why this has happened. As already mentioned, three of the hybrid regimes in 
1994 (Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine) have now passed the threshold of democracy, without any 
significant correlation (perhaps apart from low level of social inequality) to explain that 
phenomenon either. In addition, two of the hybrid regimes have become authoritarian between 1994 
and 2008 (Russia and Belarus). Thus, it seems that the 11 hybrid regimes in 1994 should be devoted 
most of the attention in the case-comparative study, as these two correlation analyses are largely 
unable to explain the political development in these countries. 
 
For the authoritarian regimes there are many significant correlations both in the 1994 and 2008 
analyses. The tendency is that these correlations are generally the opposite of what is significant for 
the liberal and flawed democracies in 1994, and the liberal democracies in 2008. Thus, an Eastern 
geographical location, high amounts of natural resources, the incumbent regime winning the first 
elections, high corruption, a poorly developed civil society, a patrimonial or colonial peripheral 
past, slow economic reform, and a weak legislature, are all factors that seem to be conducive to 
authoritarianism. As mentioned before, there are also very high correlations between most of these 
independent variables, and because the opposite values of all these variables (except for natural 
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resources) significantly correlate with liberal democracies, it also implies that these regimes have 
experienced some sort of path-dependent political development. In addition, these correlations also 
confirm most of the hypotheses in section 2.3 of chapter 2. The only exceptions are the eco_growth 
variable, which has the opposite effect of what was expected, the social inequality variable, which 
only has a significant effect for flawed democracies, and the ethnicity and religion variables that 
have no significant correlations whatsoever.  
 
While the correlation analysis significantly explain the political development in the authoritarian 
states and in the liberal democratic regimes (including most of the flawed democracies in 1994), it 
fails to reveal any general tendency among the regimes that were hybrid in 1994. These 11 regimes 
will therefore be of particular interest in the following chapter. Why did three of these regimes 
become flawed democracies and another two become authoritarian, while the remaining six 
countries seem to have become consolidated as hybrid regimes? Perhaps more importantly, should 
the statistical operationalisation of the dependent variable (based on Freedom House) be trusted, or 
could a more qualitative assessment end up classifying the regimes in a different manner? For 
instance, should Ukraine really be classified as a flawed democracy and Russia as an autocracy, or 
are they both still hybrid regimes? As these two correlation analyses produce strong indications as 
to how the political development has proceeded among the regimes that are either democratic or 
authoritarian, the focus will therefore be on these 11 regimes that were considered as hybrid in 
1994, from now on. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical analyses of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes 
 
 
In this chapter, the 11 regimes that were considered to be hybrid regimes in 1994 (in the statistical 
analysis), will be evaluated based on whether, and how, they have managed to fulfill the 10 
democratic criteria that constitute the qualitative operationalisation of democracy (that was defined 
in chapter 2.2). The reason why the other 14 regimes, which were classified as either democracies 
or autocracies in the statistical analyses, have not been included is mainly that they were relatively 
well explained in the previous chapter. In addition, practical limitations, such as the page limit of 
this master thesis, meant that it was not feasible to include all of the 25 postcommunist regimes in 
this qualitative case-based approach. 
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4.1 Rating of Russia according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
Under the Yeltsin regime (1991-1999), the political elections, both to the parliament and the 
executive, generally fulfilled the minimum electoral criteria, according to Barnes (Barnes, 2001: 
41), and Wyman (Wyman, 1997: 86). However, the high threshold in parliamentary elections (5 %) 
combined with a fragmented party system, and imbalanced media coverage favouring pro-
government parties, as well as the use of state resources to fund Yeltsin's electoral campaigns, imply 
that both the 1995 and 1996 elections (to the State Duma and the presidency) seem to have lacked 
somewhat in fairness and competitiveness (Wyman, 1997: 80-81). After Putin was elected president 
in 2000, the electoral process has become much less competitive. Especially after the electoral 
reforms between 2003 and 2007 that added several new obligations for political parties, including 
requirements that they meet much higher minimum thresholds for membership, and pass a threshold 
of 7% in order to gain seats in parliament, the number of parties able to compete in elections has 
inevitably decreased (Sakwa, 2008: 122). Increasingly, political candidates are also being banned 
from competing in elections through the governmental use of a politicized judiciary (Sakwa, 2008: 
122). The party system is also very fluid, which can partly be attributed to the frequent electoral 
amendments by the executive, and it poorly represents social interests. In addition, there seems to 
be a tendency that the state is increasingly merging with the «regime parties» (those parties that are 
being supported by the regime prior to elections), providing them with state resources, and 
favourable media campaigns, while also harassing several of the opposition parties (White, 2009: 
173).  According to Sakwa, Russia's regime type could therefore be described as a form of 
«managed democracy», in which the president and his administrative apparatus are in full control 
(Sakwa, 2008: 106). While Russia barely fulfilled the minimum electoral criteria on some occasions 
in the 1990s, by 2008 it is far off the mark as its elections only meet one of the four criteria: 
inclusiveness (full enfranchisement). 
Verdict: NO 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
During the 1990s there was a relatively high degree of press freedom in Russia, but most of the 
media were owned and/or dominated by the oligarchs. Thus, as the Putin regime began the process 
of limiting the powerful role of the oligarchs in Russian society, it also entailed an attack on the 
media (Sakwa, 2008: 151). Instead of «restoring» the independence of the media, most of the media 
in Russia have become state-owned, and several journalists who have been critical of the regime 
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have been harassed or even murdered in recent years (Sakwa, 2008: 154). Thus, most of the media 
are either faced with government-imposed censorship or they choose themselves to apply self-
censorship in fear of retaliations from the state. In addition to lacking freedom of speech, and the 
right to alternative information, there have also been several reports of discrimination, and 
particularly against minority groups.  
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
Partly because of the weak state institutions following the collapse of communism, a «state 
bourgeoisie» emerged in Russia during the 1990s. This was characterized by informal relationships 
and alliances between political elites and the new class of powerful oligarchs (Sakwa, 2008: 136). 
In addition, local and regional elites exploited the power vacuum of the central authorities and state 
institutions that erupted partly as a consequence of Russia's experiment of embarking on three 
major political and economic transitions simultaneously (Ross, 2000: 405). As the new regime 
struggled to complete the transitions to democracy, market economy and federalism (improving the 
balance of power between central and local authorities), local elites, often in alliance with the 
business class, made demands for increased local autonomy, and they were often successful. While 
the Yeltsin regime was either unable or unwilling to recentralise much political and economic power 
to the Kremlin, as he and his allies personally benefited from the emerging «state bourgeoisie», this 
all changed when Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000. The strong electoral support for 
Putin is perhaps one of the main reasons why the executive branch was able to implement major 
reforms in order to regain political and economic power from both regional elites and the oligarchs 
(Ross, 2003: 31). Thus, Russia has been able to transform its political economy into a corporatist 
system with a vast state bureaucracy, and the state is no longer dependent on the financial capital of 
the oligarchs. By limiting the power and influence of the oligarchs and the local and regional elites, 
the Russian government is no longer significantly constrained by other undemocratic actors. 
However, while the Putin regime was able to reacquire the ability of Russian governments to 
govern effectively, this happened at the expense of democratization, and unlike the Yeltsin 
governments, the new regime, which is now led by president Medvedev (following the 2008 
elections), can therefore not be regarded as being legitimately elected, as nearly all of the electoral 
criteria are significantly violated. 
Verdict: NO 
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4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
There have been several reports of vote fraud and stuffed ballot boxes, particularly in some of the 
republics in Russia (such as Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Tatarstan). In both the parliamentary 
elections in 2003, and the presidential elections in 2004, there were reports of stuffed ballot boxes 
in some of the republics and regions (Sakwa, 2008: 114-117). In addition, there has been 
widespread use of administrative resources to «improve» the vote turnout, as was the case in the 
2004 presidential elections when Putin won in every single region of Russia (Sakwa, 2008: 117). 
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
In 1993, prior to the referendum on the new constitution, President Yeltsin dissolved parliament 
through the use of military force, and shortly thereafter a new constitution which granted large 
powers to the presidency, was adopted (Barnes, 2001: 42). Since then, there have not been any 
significant outbreaks of violence that have prevented elected officials from assuming office or from 
performing their constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise power. However, as seen above, 
Russia has become gradually more authoritarian, as the elections are fraudulent and manipulated by 
the regime, and it is therefore not a democratic achievement that the illegitimately elected officials 
have not been violently prevented from assuming office. 
Verdict: NO 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
After Boris Yeltsin was elected president in 1991, to an office created by parliament, a power 
struggle quickly erupted between the parliament and the presidency, especially concerning the 
drafts for a new constitution and the separation of powers (Gonenc, 2002: 163) In 1993, the 
parliament was violently disbanded by the presidential administration, and a new constitution 
favouring a strong presidency was subsequently adopted by referendum, allowing the president to 
dissolve parliament, and to rule by decree on many matters (Barnes, 2001: 42). Under Putin, 
horizontal accountability has deteriorated even further as the powers of the executive branch have 
grown stronger. This has happened partly through the many amendments to the electoral legislation 
in recent years, which have managed to narrow the level of political competitiveness. According to 
Sakwa, the major purpose behind these amendments, was to remove the independent political 
parties from parliament, and to replace them with pro-government «regime parties» (Sakwa, 2008: 
108-109). In addition, regional parties have nearly been eliminated as a result of these amendments, 
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which is particularly damaging to horizontal accountability as Russia is (supposed to be) a federal 
state (Sakwa, 2008: 108). Among these «regime-parties», one of them has become very dominant 
(United Russia), and the Russian regime is therefore increasingly being defined as a dominant one-
party system. In addition, the executive branch controls the appointment and dismissal procedures 
of the judiciary, and consistently interferes in those court cases that are of importance to the regime 
(Sakwa, 2008: 158). Because of all these authoritarian, state-building reforms, opposition 
politicians have labeled the new system of governance as «Putinism», and defined it as having the 
following characteristics; «one-party system, censorship, puppet parliament, tame judiciary, strong 
centralization of powers and finances, and an exaggerated role for the secret services and 
bureaucracy» (Sakwa, 2008: 115). Thus, it seems evident that both the parliament and the judiciary 
lack sufficient independence to be able to hold the executive accountable. 
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
The number of NGOs have risen dramatically over the last decade, to more than half a million 
registered organisations by 2006 (Sakwa, 2008: 167). However, they have very little influence on 
the decision making process, both by the central authorities, and in the regions. Their significance 
has also been reduced even further as a result of the recent state-building reforms by Putin (Sakwa, 
2008: 167-168). The establishment of the civic forum, and later the public chamber in 2005, was 
officially designed by the government to give civil society organisations an improved supervising 
role over new legislative proposals. In reality it seems like it has been a successful method of 
assimilating large sections of civil society into a corporatist system, which is controlled and 
manipulated from above (Sakwa, 2008: 168-169). Russian civil society is highly fragmented, partly 
because most NGOs are heavily dependent on foreign funding, and also because of tight 
government regulation. A new law in 2006 also made it much easier for the government to force 
NGOs to close down (Sakwa, 2008: 176). In addition, all of the political alternatives to the current 
regime are suppressed through various means. Political parties are regularly denied access to media, 
denied to compete in elections, and subject to ever-changing electoral legislation. Thus, even 
despite the high popularity of the current regime among the electorate, vertical accountability in 
Russia is relatively low. 
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
The professionalism of the judiciary seems to have been improved following new legal reforms in 
2002, which provided a large salary increase for judges (in order to combat corruption) and more 
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funds to make sure that their rulings are efficiently implemented (Sakwa, 2008: 155-156). However, 
as long as the government controls the appointment procedures of the judges, the judicial system is 
far from independent, especially not in those cases that are of importance to the executive (Sakwa, 
2008 p.158).  
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
The size of the bureaucracy has become inflated during the Putin regime, and has been growing 
enormously since the fall of communism (Sakwa, 2008: 163). One of the main reasons behind this 
bureaucratic expansion, is that the control and regulation of the Russian economy is increasingly 
and more effectively in the hands of a vast state bureaucracy, that tightly regulates the private 
sphere and the interests of the oligarchs (and not the other way around, which was the case in the 
1990s) (Sakwa, 2008: 163). In order to accomplish this transformation, the Putin regime has 
increased the salaries of civil servants in order to improve the professionalism and efficiency of the 
bureaucracy (Sakwa, 2008: 165). The overall bureaucratic integrity has not been strengthened 
sufficiently, as there is still a high level of public corruption. In 2008, Russia ranked as 147th out of 
about 180 countries in a survey of the most corrupt countries in the world, by Transparency 
International (Transparency International, 2008).  
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
Partly because of the weak state institutions and the considerable power of regional elites following 
the fall of communism (see above, in the discussion of «effective power to govern»), Russia under 
Yeltsin developed an asymmetrical type of federalism as the high levels of regional autonomy led to 
many different political regimes, ranging from nearly democratic to full authoritarianism, among 
the various local governments and republics (Ross, 2000: 417). This changed after Putin was 
elected president, as his strong electoral mandate, both in the presidential elections in 2000 and in 
the parliamentary election in 1999, enabled him to launch attacks against the considerable powers 
of the regions and the republics, and to recentralize power to the Kremlin (Ross, 2003: 31). Some of 
Putin's most significant reforms were the creation of seven new super-districts, that were granted 
vast supervising and regulative powers over the local government administrations, and a new law 
that enabled the national regime to dismiss elected local and regional governments (Ross, 2003: 
37). These reforms have had both a positive and a negative effect on democratization in Russia. The 
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increased central power and the universal application of federal legislation in all of the regions, has 
contributed to higher respect for civil liberties in some of the most «anarchic» republics during the 
Yeltsin years (such as Bashkortostan, Dagestan etc.). However, the reforms have also weakened the 
system of checks and balances, as the executive branch has grown heaps stronger, and it has 
become extremely difficult for any other state institution to hold it accountable (Ross, 2003: 44). 
According to Ross, Putin's reforms sacrificed democracy in order to gain unity and improve 
stability (Ross, 2003: 45). Thus, as the local governments have been stripped of their powers and 
become totally dependent on the national executive, they can not be regarded as democratic 
institutions, and the regime can therefore not be considered to meet this criterion. 
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: Autocracy 
 
4.2 Rating of Belarus according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
The road to political power for current president Lukashenko, was mainly enabled by the high 
political openness preceding the 1994 presidential elections, which so far has been considered the 
only free and fair election in Belarus (Silitski, 2005: 85-86). Since then, none of the political 
elections have been considered to meet the minimum electoral democratic requirements by 
international election observers (Marples, 2009: 760). Harassment of opposition politicians, 
intimidation of voters, application of state resources for the incumbent regime's electoral campaign, 
unbalanced media coverage, and vote rigging have all been dominant features of Belarusian 
elections. In addition, several constitutional amendments (since 1995/96), have strengthened the 
executive so much; «that all meaningful opposition has been eliminated» according to Silitski 
(Silitski, 2005: 88).  
Verdict: NO 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
After Lukashenko had consolidated his authoritarian power within the state institutions, following 
constitutional amendments in 1996, civil society organisations and the media became gradually 
more regulated and constrained by the regime, which consequently has worsened the level of civil 
liberties. In order to contain the further development of civil society, the Lukashenko regime has 
increasingly engaged in preemptive policymaking and attacks against civil society meant to 
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constrain and limit any possible source of political opposition (Silitski, 2005). The regime has 
become less tolerant of freedom of assembly, as demonstrations are often violently dissolved by the 
security agencies, and many NGOs have also been forced to close down (Silitski, 2005: 91). While 
the regime owns and controls much of the media, the remaining independent media outlets have 
been increasingly pressured into self-censorship (Silitski, 2005: 92). Thus, there has generally been 
a very high level of repression against organisations that have been critical of the regime, such as 
political parties, media outlets, and NGOs, and the regime's performance regarding human rights is 
therefore very bad in Belarus. 
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
While the Belarusian government could be considered to have a relatively effective power to 
govern, its claim to be regarded as an elected government is more controversial. As the regime is 
completely in control of the electoral process and efficiently limits any meaningful opposition 
alternative, then the only role of elections seems to be the legitimacy-enhancing efforts of the 
regime. The borderline between such a situation (as in Belarus) where the government is not 
defined as elected, and a situation where a regime fails to meet the minimum electoral threshold, but 
is still defined as elected due to a higher degree of political openness (more free, and/or fair, and/or 
competitive, and/or inclusive elections), is not a clear-cut one but rather based on qualitative 
assumptions. Thus, the decision not to define the Belarusian government as an elected government 
is based on the qualitative assessment that the degree of electoral democraticness is below an 
«invisible» threshold that separates elected governments from non-elected governments. Basically, 
if the electoral process is almost completely in the hands of the regime, and there is a significant 
lack of electoral freedom, fairness, competitiveness, and inclusiveness, the criteria that elected 
governments should have effective power to govern becomes irrelevant in terms of democratization, 
as it implies that the regime is in fact authoritarian. 
Verdict: NO   
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
Due to the many reports of vote rigging and fraud in all of the political elections since 1994, and the 
fact that the electoral commission has been controlled by the executive since 1996 (Silitski, 2005: 
87), the likelihood that all electoral votes have been weighed equally is rather low. One relevant 
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example is the 2001 elections, where the OSCE electoral observers found that about 14 % of the 
votes had been cast in an opaque manner, without proper supervision prior to the election (White, 
2003: 178). 
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
Because the Lukashenko regime has such a strong authoritarian hold on power, the inability of the 
opposition to violently deny their illegitimate, authoritarian government to take office should not be 
considered as a democratic achievement. 
Verdict: NO 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
Shortly after the new constitution had been adopted in 1994, Alexander Lukashenko won the 
presidential elections with a very strong mandate (about 80 % of the votes), which enabled him to 
extend the presidential powers through further amendments of the constitution (White, 2003: 173).  
These amendments, that can be considered as a form of «constitutional coup», included dissolving 
the old parliament and replacing it with a regime-loyal assembly, changes of personnel within the 
constitutional court (appointing judges who were loyal to the regime), and that presidential decrees 
became regarded as binding laws (Silitski, 2005: 87). The right to make appointments to both the 
constitutional court and the electoral commission was also transferred from parliament to the 
presidency. The referendum, in 1996, on whether to make these changes, has also been considered 
as an extremely fraudulent process (Silitski, 2005: 87). Since then, both of the presidential elections 
(in 2001 and 2006) have been used to enhance the authority of the presidency in some way or other 
(Marples, 2009: 758). Horizontal accountability is therefore very weak, and by removing the term 
limits for the presidency, through a 2004 referendum, Lukashenko also made sure that he could 
continue as president for an indefinite number of terms.  
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
As mentioned above (in the discussion of civil liberties) civil society and the media, which are two 
of the main instruments in providing vertical accountability, have been increasingly repressed by the 
regime since Lukashenko came to power. For a brief moment following the 2006 elections there 
were signs that a rejuvenation of the civil society could be possible in the future, as spontaneous 
demonstrations erupted in opposition to what was perceived as a rigged electoral process 
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(Korosteleva, 2009: 326). For the time being, civil society organisations are poorly organised, and 
are also closely monitored and often persecuted by the regime. In addition, the elections are very 
fraudulent and completely controlled by the regime, and it is therefore nearly impossible for the 
electorate to hold the government accountable. 
Verdict: NO  
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
Based on the discussion of horizontal accountability above, it became evident that the judiciary is 
highly dependent on the executive branch. According to Silitski, the judiciary is «de facto 
subordinated to the presidency» (Silitski in Goehring (red), 2008: 121). 
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
A large part of the bureaucracy is made up of the Presidential business office, a non-transparent  
institution directly controlled by the president (Silitski in Goehring (red), 2008: 122). The 
bureaucracy is vast, and civil servants often offer privileges to informal, clientelist connections. 
Thus, the level of corruption is very high, and on the Transparency International's corruption 
perception index in 2008, Belarus was ranked as 151th in the world, with a score of 2 on a scale 
from 0-10 (where 0 is highly corrupt) (Transparency International, 2008). 
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
In addition to quickly acquiring personal control over the national state institutions, President 
Lukashenko also abolished the autonomy of local governments shortly after he was elected 
president (Silitski, 2005: 86). By installing his own regional administrations he did ensure that the 
local governments became accountable and loyal to the authoritarian rules and regulations set by the 
national government, but clearly not in a democratic manner, as the local governments are now 
merely an effective instrument to implement the policies of the authoritarian regime. The lack of 
independence for the local governments also contributes to decreasing the level of horizontal 
accountability. 
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: Autocracy 
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4.3 Rating of Armenia according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
The 2007 parliamentary election was highly competitive, and was also considered by the OSCE to 
be the first free and fair elections since the referendum on independence in 1991 (Ruiz-Rufino, 
2008: 369). The presidential election in 2008 was also regarded to meet minimum democratic 
requirements by the OSCE observers (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 3). 
According to Ruiz-Rufino, this electoral democratic breakthrough can partly be explained by the 
many constitutional amendments that were adopted between 2003-07, which led to a better 
separation of powers and a more powerful legislature (Ruiz-Rufino, 2008: 369). 
Verdict: YES 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
The Armenian constitution officially guarantees that civil liberties should be respected, but in 
practice several of these rights are regularly being violated (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, 
and labor, 2009). In 2008, freedom of speech was suspended temporarily (in March), and the media 
have also been pressured into self-censorship after several incidents of intimidation and harassment 
of journalists (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, 2009). There have also been some 
occasions where the government has applied the military forces to break up peaceful rallies held by 
opposition organisations (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 5). However, there have 
still been some improvements regarding civil liberties in recent years as constitutional amendments 
in 2005 ensured much improved access for various groups in appealing to the court system (for 
citizens, NGOs, parties, etc.) (Markarov, 2006: 169). 
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
Following independence in 1991, a coalition of clan-based political elites quickly seized political 
power, and gradually also accumulated large economic power through patronage/clientelist politics 
(Freire and Simao, 2007: 5). When Armenia eventually installed a semi-presidential system with 
large powers granted to the presidency, in the 1995 constitution, it became an effective way for the 
 64 
regime to run clientelist politics (Matsuzato, 2006: 317-318). Thus, instead of being informally 
constrained by patrimonial networks, the strong Armenian executive could manipulate and control 
various elite clans through its ability to appoint and dismiss prime ministers and the cabinet, as well 
as dissolving parliament (Matsuzato, 2006: 318). This corrupt system of patronage politics has 
nevertheless had a negative impact on effective decision making, according to Freire (Freire et al., 
2007: 6), and possibly even more so after the recent constitutional amendments in 2005, which 
transferred many of the presidential powers (and leverage) to the parliament. However, much more 
troublesome for the elected government's effective power to govern, is the formal constraints 
imposed through the increasing militarization of the state. Exploiting the nationalist sentiments that 
erupted as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (an Armenian-populated territory within 
Azerbaijan), political elites claimed that a much more powerful military, also politically, was 
necessary to preserve national security (Freire et al., 2007: 5). In reality, this alliance between the 
powerful clans and the military was an effective way of securing regime survival, and to increase 
the personal power of regime officials, both politically and economically. Another alarming 
challenge for the Armenian government(s) is the high political influence of other states, and 
particularly Russia. Because Armenia has become increasingly isolated economically, which is 
partly due to economic blockades from two of its neighbour countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan, it has 
also become much more dependent on Russia, due to its vast energy supplies and investments. 
Russia owns and controls large segments of the Armenian economy (i.e. in the banking system, 
telecommunications, and energy companies) and can therefore use that as leverage to influence 
Armenian politics (Freire et al., 2007: 11). 
Verdict: NO 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
As the electoral process in many of the rural areas in Armenia often lack secrecy and is tightly 
controlled by the heads of the local communities (see below; local government accountability), it is 
highly doubtful that all electoral votes weigh equally. Intimidation of voters, stuffed ballot boxes, 
and bribes to influence voter choices have often been regarded as common features in many of these 
rural areas (Sahakyan and Atanesyan, 2006: 350).  
Verdict: NO   
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
Following the fraudulent presidential elections in 2003, the government ordered the military to 
suppress protesters who were accusing the regime of vote rigging (Freire et al., 2007: 6). Thus, the 
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regime legitimised violent behaviour as a means to stay in power. The military forces had also 
suppressed opposition movements following the rigged elections in 1996, and did so again in 2004, 
and most recently after the relatively free presidential elections in 2008 (Way, 2008: 63). Because 
the two most recent elections (in 2007 and 2008) were considered to meet the minimum democratic 
requirements, the (re)elected officials were not prevented through violent means from assuming 
power. However, the willingness to apply coercion and repression of the opposition in order to 
secure the survival of the regime has been demonstrated on several occasions, and it therefore 
seems unlikely that the regime and/or the military would have allowed the opposition to assume 
office if they had won the elections. 
Verdict: NO 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
In the constitution of 1995 there were no real guarantees for the independence of the various 
branches of the state, as the presidency enjoyed considerable powers (i.e. to appoint/dismiss the 
prime minister, dissolve parliament, and select judges to the constitutional court, etc.) (Markarov, 
2006: 162-163). Following a long-lasting constitutional debate between the incumbent government 
and the opposition, which was also influenced by external actors (international organisations and 
Western countries), several amendments to the constitution were made through a referendum in 
2005. The presidential prerogatives were reduced in favour of the parliament, and the independence 
of the judiciary was strengthened, resulting in improved horizontal accountability (Markarov, 2006: 
165). Since the adoption of these constitutional reforms, the prime minister is no longer accountable 
to the president but to the parliament (with a few exceptions) (Markarov, 2006: 167). The 
independence of the judiciary has also improved somewhat after several legislative reforms 
recently, but alarmingly, the president is still granted the right to select and appoint judges 
(Commission of the European communities, 2008: 4). While the overall horizontal accountability 
seems to have improved significantly, at least theoretically, concerns still remain regarding the 
effective implementation of these reforms, and of the highly informal, and clientelist nature of 
Armenian politics that undermines transparency within decision making, and that ultimately may 
also deprive these accountability-strengthening measures of their supposed content and purpose. 
This is especially relevant as the three regime parties (HKK, Prosperous Armenia, and the 
Armenian revolutionary Federation) currently control 75 out of 90 seats in parliament (Ruiz-Rufino, 
2008: 371-372), which therefore mitigates the relevance of a less powerful presidency (after the 
2005 constitutional amendments). Until it is evident whether all of the adopted reforms have been 
effectively implemented, and the judiciary has become more independent, Armenia is considered to 
fail to comply with this criterion. 
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Verdict: NO  
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
Nearly all aspects of Armenian society seem to be determined by the informal relationships between 
and within social networks (i.e. allocation of resources, decision making, protection of civil liberties 
etc.) (Freire et al., 2007: 7). The strong importance of deep historical traditions, and of community 
and family relationships have so far seemed to limit the development of a democratic political 
culture and civil society, which according to Sahakyan is one of the greatest obstacles to 
democratization in Armenia (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 351). High government repression and efficient 
electoral party patronage have made it extremely difficult for the opposition to mobilize electoral 
support. As national authorities often make alliances with the heads of local communities, who 
subsequently secure the votes of the locals, it has also made it more difficult for the opposition or 
the NGOs to continue its development, and to demand improved vertical accountability. However, 
several large demonstrations have been conducted in opposition to election results over the last two 
decades (in 1996, 2003, 2004, and 2008). This indicates that there is a potential for a continued 
development of civil society, and of increased demands for improved vertical accountability among 
the electorate, and especially in the urban areas, where party patronage is far less effective than in 
the rural areas.  
Verdict: NO  
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
The judicial system is weak and influenced by the government, although a new law tailored to 
increase the independence and efficiency of the judiciary was implemented in 2008 (Walker in 
Goehring (red), 2008: 80). Most Armenians also have little trust in the capabilities of the judicial 
system to protect human rights (Walker in Goehring (red), 2008: 80), and in a 2004 survey only 12 
% of the population considered the judiciary to be independent of executive control (Freire et al., 
2007: 6).  
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
There is a very high level of corruption within the government administration and bureaucracy, and 
bribes are common instruments among politicians and civil servants who want to acquire more 
powerful positions within the state institutions, government or parliament (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 
350). Transparency International ranks Armenia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world 
(109th) on the 2008 corruption perception index, with a score of 2.9 on a scale from 1-10 
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(Transparency International, 2008).  
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
Armenian society has for centuries been based on very strong community relationships, which have 
particularly been built around the Armenian Apostolic Church, and/or the most powerful and 
wealthy clans and local elites (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 348). These local communities have retained 
their powerful status in the political and social sphere of society also after independence in 1991, 
especially in the rural areas, and an entrenched system of clientelism is therefore better equipped to 
explain the electoral process than political ideology and/or personal preferences among the 
electorate (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 349). As mentioned above in the discussion of vertical 
accountability, the national authorities consistently apply their political and economical power 
(bribes, coercion etc.) to ally with the heads of local communities in order to increase their electoral 
support (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 349). Thus, the local governments are generally accountable to the 
national government, but not in a democratic manner as the relations between national and local 
authorities clearly lack transparency, and have a highly informal and corrupt nature. 
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: FCE 
 
4.4 Rating of Albania according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
During the first decade following the end of communism, most of the elections (except the 1992 
elections) were full of irregularities and widespread manipulation of voters, exercised both by the 
government as well as opposition parties (Kajsiu, Bumci, and Rakipi, 2003: 5) The political 
elections were regarded as competitive but still not fully free and fair. There were however several 
improvements in the 2005 elections, following the implementation of a new electoral code in 2003 
that provided a more reliable and efficient counting of votes (Szajkowski, 2007: 228). Still, the 
2005 parliamentary elections only partially complied with international standards for democratic 
elections (Szajkowski, 2007: 229), and the same verdict was given for the 2007 local elections 
(Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 53). Generally, it therefore seems that Albania has made some 
progress towards reaching the threshold of electoral democracy, which is partly caused by 
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international pressure and EU conditionality. The democratic electoral progress in the 2005 
elections was for instance seen as a necessary precondition for Albania in order to be allowed to 
sign the Stability and Association agreement with EU in 2006 (Szajkowski, 2007: 231). The 
presidential election in 2007, which was executed indirectly by parliamentary vote, went according 
to the constitution, but electoral campaigns are still marred by irregularities. A poor system of voter 
registration, lack of a completely reliable vote-count, and intimidation of voters are issues that need 
to be dealt with before Albania is able to pass the minimum electoral threshold. 
Verdict: NO 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
The media and civil society have been relatively independent and active since the fall of 
communism, which is probably partly due to the weak state institutions (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 30). On 
some occasions, such as between 1990-1992, and following the economic crisis in 1997, the state 
institutions completely collapsed, and the power vacuum was filled by organised crime and 
informal clientelist networks (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). Thus, it is likely that the Albanian state 
lacked the coercive strength to neither suppress nor protect civil liberties, as large parts of the 
Albanian territory were outside of government control (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). However, by 2008 
all of the minimum constitutional criteria were relatively well protected by the state, according to 
the annual progress report by the EU commission, and all of these civil liberties are also guaranteed 
by the Albanian constitution, which was ratified in 1998 (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 13-16). Currently, the constitution also seems to be respected throughout the 
entire country, and Feilcke-Tiemann therefore argues that all Albanian citizens possess the same 
civil rights (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 28). However, there are some concerns about the lack of 
transparency regarding media ownership and funding, and the lack of opportunities (education, 
employment) for the Roma minority (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 13-17).  
Verdict: YES 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
As mentioned above, the weak state building process in Albania has on some occasions resulted in a 
lack of state monopoly on taxation and the use of force. This was particularly true just after the old 
communist regime fell in 1990, and again after the economic crisis and parliamentary elections in 
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1997, that resulted in the Socialist Party gaining office and readapting the state institutions to its 
own advantage (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). While the state institutions have been strengthened 
somewhat after the new constitution was adopted in 1998, they still suffer from a high level of 
politicization and corruption, as there are significant changes within the bureaucracy and the 
judiciary whenever there is a change of government (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 28-29). This partly 
stems from the communist legacy of identifying the governing party with the state, and from the 
political and social cleavage between former communists and the anti-communists, which is still a 
salient issue today (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 15). Another likely explanation behind the weakness of the 
state institutions is the extremely isolated situation that Albania experienced during its communist 
era (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 5). Because of all these factors, Albanian politics is extremely polarized, 
and this development has also made it extremely difficult for the parliament to pass legislation, 
particularly on electoral and judicial reforms, as a broad political consensus is demanded by the 
constitution (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 51). As a result of all these factors (the lack of 
political dialogue, polarized political climate, and politicized state institutions), the influence of 
informal actors, such as the EU, and the OSCE, on Albanian politics has increased, and has also 
become one of the primary sources of legitimacy for the Albanian governments, that are facing an 
increasingly disaffected and disillusioned electorate (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 20-24). The conditionality 
agreements between external and informal actors such as the EU/NATO, and Albania, with regard 
to membership, or increased cooperation with these organisations, seem to have facilitated further 
democratization, and also improved the ability of elected governments to govern (Pearce, 2008). In 
2008, this was exemplified by the successful adoption of a new and more proportional electoral 
system, which would have been impossible if it had not been for the sudden cooperation, and 
improved consensus among the two main political parties and arch rivals, The Democratic Party 
and the Socialist party (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 6). Thus, under some 
doubt, Albania is judged to have complied with this criterion. 
Verdict: YES (barely) 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
In the parliamentary elections in 2005 there were several reports of abuse of administrative 
resources, vote buying, and multiple voting (Szajkowski, 2007: 229). These irregularities also 
appear to have been common features in the Albanian elections since the end of communism. The 
new electronic vote system that was established after the 2005 elections also appears to be less than 
reliable (Commission of the European communities, 2007: 6). 
Verdict: NO  
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5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
During the parliamentary elections in 1996, which had been rigged by the incumbent Democratic 
Party, the opposition was violently suppressed by the police (Szajkowski, 2007: 228). There have 
also been examples of police intimidation and violence during some of the other elections, and 
according to Feilcke-Tiemann, the election in 2005 was the first time political power was 
transferred in a relatively peaceful and democratic way (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 40).  
Verdict: YES 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
One of the main causes behind the huge economic crisis in 1997 was the lack of government 
accountability and transparency2
Verdict: NO 
, and the weakly regulated and informal economy in Albania 
(Pearce 2008). Since then, it seems that there have been some improvements regarding the 
transparency and accountability of the executive branch. The election in 2001 was perhaps a turning 
point as it marked the end of a decade-long tradition where opposition parties used to boycott state 
institutions (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 12). Since 2001, the opposition parties have participated in 
parliament, thereby increasing the legitimacy and transparency of political governance as less issues 
are being decided behind closed doors (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 12). However, the state institutions, such 
as the judiciary and bureaucracy, are still highly politicized by the incumbent governments, and this 
vicious cycle repeats itself whenever there is a change of government (Pearce, 2008), (Feilcke-
Tiemann, 2006: 28-29). The judiciary also lacks constitutional protection for its judges (Pearce, 
2008), and is often faced with political interference (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 29). In addition, the 
executive branch (presidential administration) is responsible for appointing judges (Commission of 
the European communities, 2008: 7). The conflict between the parliament and the president in 2008 
regarding presidential appointments to the judiciary also indicates that the parliament is too weak to 
hold the executive adequately accountable (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
Civil society have been dominated by organisations that are either dependent on foreign funding, or 
that are closely connected to the political elites (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 29) While the civic activity has 
been low, there is a growing and independent media sector that provides a more open political 
debate, which in turn has improved the transparency and accountability of the regime (Kajsiu et al., 
                                                 
2 Many political elites also benefited from the pyramid scheme companies that were partly responsible for the 
economic crisis in 1997 (Pearce, 2008). 
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2003: 30). However, some of the civil society organisations, such as MJAFT! (Enough!) have 
become increasingly active in monitoring the government (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 13), and particularly with regard to the fulfilment of the SAA criteria (Stability 
and association pact with the EU) (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 30). Thus, vertical accountability seems 
to be improving, but due to fraudulent elections and the highly corrupt and inefficient governance 
by the Albanian governments over the last two decades, the electorate has become increasingly 
disaffected with politics (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 30). In the parliamentary elections in 2005 the 
voter turnout was only 49,2 %, and it therefore seems that improved transparency, and a more 
democratic political culture are required in order to improve vertical accountability. 
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
The judiciary is like most other state institutions highly politicized by the incumbent political party, 
that often hired their «own» judges and used it as an instrument for political struggles with the 
opposition (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 19). Thus, the judiciary not only lacks independence but also 
professionalism, which makes the enactment and implementation of laws even more inefficient. It 
also lacks adequate office space, equipment, and funding (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 9). The lack of judicial independence, professionalism and efficiency, is 
probably also one of the main reasons why the level of corruption remains so high. 
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
As mentioned above, the bureaucracy is highly politicized, and civil servants are usually appointed 
for political reasons rather than merit (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 8). There is 
also a high level of corruption within the oversized bureaucracy, as both citizens and private 
businesses are forced to pay bribes when dealing with it (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 37). Another reason for 
the high corruption is that state institutions provide employment and income possibilities in an 
economy where the level of unemployment and poverty is very high (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 6). In the 
2008 corruption perception index, conducted by Transparency International, Albania was ranked 
85th with a score of 3.4 out of 10 (Transparency International, 2008). 
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
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According to Bushati, the process of decentralization has become irreversible since 1998 (when the 
new constitution was adopted), and the cooperation between national and local governments is 
gradually improving (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 57). This has especially been the case since 
the local elections in 2007, but some of the local governments are still not adequately funded by the 
national government (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 58). 
Verdict: YES 
 
Regime type: BCL, EP+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Local government accountability) 
 
4.5 Rating of Kyrgyzstan according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
According to Scott Radnitz, the parliamentary elections held in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 that eventually 
led to the resignation of President Akayev, during the Tulip revolution, were perhaps the most 
democratic elections ever held in Central Asia (Radnitz, 2006: 134). The OSCE claims that this 
election was truly competitive, but that it was still lacking both in the level of freedom and fairness 
(Radnitz, 2006: 134). In previous elections there had been several reports of widespread electoral 
irregularities, for instance in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995 (Anderson, 1996) 
and in the 2000 parliamentary elections (Abazov, 2003: 549-550), where many parties and 
candidates were denied the right to compete in the elections. Since 2005, the new regime led by 
president Bakyev, who was later forced to resign following the April 2010 coup, has continued  
Akayev's unfinished process of establishing more authoritarian modes of governance, and the 2007 
parliamentary elections also failed to meet the minimum electoral threshold (Nichol, 2009: 7). Since 
2008, when this analysis ends, the situation has deteriorated even further, eventually resulting in a 
coup d`etat in April 2010 and ethnic conflict and violence during the following months.3
Verdict: NO 
     
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was regarded by many scholars as «an island of democracy» in 
Central Asia (Dukenbaev and Hansen, 2003: 27). In addition to relatively competitive elections, 
there was also a relatively high level of civil liberties. Following several constitutional amendments 
                                                 
3 In June 2010, the power of the parliament was significantly strengthened as several prerogatives were transferred 
from the presidency to the parliament through new constitutional amendments, which were adopted by referendum 
(New York Times, 11.10.2010). However, it is possible that these changes may soon be reversed, as the interim 
government (following Bakiyev's ouster) that proposed these changes seems to have lost the recent parliamentary 
elections (on 10th of October) to an opposition that favours a strong presidency (Asianews.it, 15.10.2010).  
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(in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003), the executive branch gradually increased its powers, and 
began to limit the freedom of the mass media and the opposition. The judicial branch, which was 
controlled by the president, was abused to persecute several newspapers and members of the 
opposition that had been critical of the regime, thereby violating three of the minimum 
constitutional criteria (freedom of speech, freedom of organization, and right to alternative 
information) (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 32-33). While the constitution of 1993 officially protects 
basic human rights and civil liberties, the increased powers of the presidency and the subsequent 
lack of accountability and transparency means that the executive is able to circumvent the 
constitution when necessary. This trend has also continued after the Tulip Revolution, as 
independent media outlets and the political opposition are regularly being harassed (i.e. with 
lawsuits), and public demonstrations are often banned or violently dissolved (Nichol, 2009: 6-7). 
However, compared to the other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has a much more liberal society 
with a higher level of civil liberties, but still fails to meet the minimum constitutional threshold. 
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
Ever since independence, the politics of Kyrgyzstan has been largely determined by the informal 
networks and patronage ties among the executive branch, the state bureaucracy, regional elites, and 
business elites (Radnitz, 2006: 132). The importance of localism, and the informal and personal 
patronage ties between local communities and the local and regional political candidates, who, 
when in office often provide material support to their local villages and supporters, are crucial 
factors for political mobilisation in Kyrgyzstan, and was also a vital element in the overthrow of the 
Akayev regime in 2005 (Radnitz, 2006: 137-138). Combined with weak state institutions and the 
authoritarian measures of the presidential administration (that often cause discontent and envy 
among other elites), the powerful patronage networks are one of the main reasons for Kyrgyzstan's 
constant political instability in recent years (Radnitz, 2006: 139). In addition to the «reserved 
domains» of powerful regional and business elites and the corrupt and incompetent state 
bureaucracy, it could be argued that the presidential administration, despite being an elected office, 
also functions as an «undemocratic» constraint on the government and the prime minister, as most 
of the government's constitutionally granted prerogatives (i.e. formulation and implementation of 
public policy) have been illegally assigned to the presidency (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 34). Because 
of the rivalries between different clans, and between different regions (especially along the North-
 74 
South divide), and the relatively weak central authority, which is dependent on unstable alliances 
with regional elites, the Kyrgyz state is unable to efficiently collect taxes and redistribute resources 
(Ruget and Usmanalieva,  2007: 442). Kyrgyzstan is also one of the poorest countries in the world, 
has a massive foreign debt (nearly 2 billion US dollars in 2005), and is very dependent on external 
sources of income, such as loans and investments from international organisations (Radnitz, 2006: 
143). 
Verdict: NO  
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
In the parliamentary elections in December 2007, there were, according to the OSCE, «serious 
irregularities and inconsistencies» in the counting of votes and major discrepancies between the 
preliminary and final vote results (Nichol, 2009: 7). In 2009, during the presidential elections there 
were also several reports of vote rigging, flawed voting lists and some cases of multiple voting 
(Nichol, 2009: 7).  
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
Because the elections in Kyrgyzstan have been considered to be very fraudulent, the new 
representatives in the legislature and government can not be regarded as being legitimately elected. 
Thus, Kyrgyzstan fails to meet this criterion. 
Verdict: NO 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
Following independence in 1991 (once the Soviet Union collapsed) newly elected president Askar 
Akayev (elected in 1990) promised democratic reform, but during the 1990s there was a gradual 
extension of presidential powers vis-à-vis parliament (Anderson, 1996: 530). In 1994, Akayev 
dissolved parliament, and replaced it with a bicameral legislature, thereby weakening horizontal 
accountability (Abazov, 2003: 546). While the constitution of 1993 allowed for a strong presidency, 
further constitutional amendments in 1996, 1998, and 2000, radically increased the powers of the 
presidency while limiting that of the parliament (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 30). The role of the 
government, led by the prime minister, has been reduced to merely implementing the near 
unilaterally decided policies by the presidential administration, which also has the power to appoint 
and dismiss judges (to both the constitutional and the supreme courts, as well as some of the local-
level courts) (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 34/35). The presidential administration also enjoys legal 
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impunity, and has the right to veto legislation by the parliament and to dissolve it (Dukenbaev et al., 
2004: 30). Following the Tulip Revolution, the new president (Bakyev) was forced to make some 
constitutional compromises with the opposition, and the right to nominate the prime minister was 
transferred to parliament in 2006 (Tudoroiu, 2007: 335), but in 2007 all recent constitutional 
changes were invalidated (Nichol, 2009: 6). Thus, horizontal accountability remains dismally low in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
Verdict: NO  
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
The Tulip Revolution, which erupted in response to the fraudulent parliamentary elections in 
February 2005, and to the highly corrupt, semi-authoritarian, and unpopular rule by the Akayev 
regime, may appear to have been a demonstration of strong vertical accountability. However, 
according to Ruget et al. (2007), Tudoroiu (2007), and Radnitz (2006), the mobilisation of 
opposition towards the regime was mainly orchestrated by disaffected and defected political elites, 
many of which were local clan or tribal leaders, who became united in its quest to remove Akayev 
and change the political leadership. Many citizens were also paid or manipulated into participating 
in demonstrations against the Akayev regime and the rigged election results (Ruget et al., 2007: 
450). It therefore seems that civil society organisations only played a minor role in the revolution 
(Tudoroiu, 2007: 333). Because of the weak state institutions, which were highly corrupt, and 
poorly equipped to provide security, law and order, and collect taxes, the loyalty of the citizens to 
the regime has also vanished. The citizens have generally become less willing to pay taxes and obey 
laws, and the electorate has become increasingly disillusioned not only with the state institutions 
and the government, but also with the idea of installing democracy as a political system in 
Kyrgyzstan (Ruget et al., 2007: 455). Thus, instead of holding the government accountable through 
the ballot box, it seem that the public disaffection with the government is increasingly likely to be 
resolved through violent means, as occurred in the April 2010 revolts.  
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
After constitutional amendments in 1996, the presidential administration was enabled to control 
(appoint and sack) members of the judiciary (Anderson, 1996: 532). According to Dukenbaev the 
major purpose of the judicial system has become the protection of specific elite interests (of the 
president and his allies), while the public interests are neglected (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 35). 
Verdict: NO 
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9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
Kyrgyzstan is one of the most corrupt and least transparent countries in the world, and ordinary 
citizens are often forced to give bribes to the state bureaucracy due to the poor protection of 
property rights (Abazov, 2003: 546). Both during the Akayev regime (1991-2005), and under the 
reign of Bakyiev (2005-2010), the state bureaucracy has been dominated by the interests of 
clientelistic networks, and has engaged in widespread corruption (Tudoroiu, 2007). In 2006, 
Kyrgyzstan was ranked by Transparency International as 142 out of 163 among the most corrupt 
countries in the world (Ruget et al., 2007: 446), and in 2008 they were ranked 166th in the 
corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2008). 
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
According to Abazov, local governments often fail to follow the constitutional and government 
procedures mainly because they are influenced or ruled by personal and/or clan loyalties, and also 
because they receive very limited funding from the national government (Abazov, 2003: 547-548). 
Local elites and clans are very powerful in Kyrgyzstan, which is partly because both the Kyrgyz 
government and parliament are controlled by local elites, and more importantly, because it is in 
their own personal interests to preserve the privileges within their «reserved domains» (Radnitz, 
2006: 140).  As a result of the capture of the state institutions by corrupt local elites and 
businessmen, the state remains weak and unable to acquire a monopoly on the use of force or 
taxation (Ruget et al., 2007: 443).   
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: Autocracy 
 
4.6 Rating of Macedonia according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
The parliamentary elections in 2008 were full of electoral irregularities, according to OSCE-
ODHIR (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). There was an unbalanced media 
coverage during the electoral campaign (biased in favour of the incumbent government), organised 
violence on election day in some of the ethnically Albanian areas, and widespread stuffing of ballot 
boxes (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). There were also several irregularities 
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during the 2006 parliamentary elections (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). 
Verdict: NO 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
The legal framework (i.e. the constitution) meets all the required criteria, but in practice there have 
been and still are many violations of some of the basic civil liberties and human rights in 
Macedonia. Despite the Ohrid Framework agreement that was signed in 20014
Verdict: NO 
, which provided 
better rights and privileges for ethnic minorities, the progress on the protection of human rights has 
been slow, as there are still many reported cases of torture and harassment of ethnic minorities 
(particularly the Roma and Albanian minorities). In addition, the public has also limited access to 
the judicial system (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 15-17). There is also lack of 
freedom of expression and rights to alternative information, due to the high political interference in 
the media and the highly concentrated ownership of the media in Macedonia (Commission of the 
European communities, 2008: 17).  
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
During the first decade after independence, the state had inadequate control of its border regions, as 
organized crime networks were very active in the smuggling of drugs, weapons and refugees 
(Tsukatos, 2008: 60). Combined with a very high level of unemployment, this lack of territorial 
control contributed to a very large black market in the economy. These matters have improved since 
2001 (after the Ohrid framework agreement), and partly because of foreign investments and loans 
(from the EU, IMF, the World Bank, and other international donors) as well as considerable political 
and economic reforms, the level of «stateness» seems to have improved (Tsukatos, 2008). While 
undemocratic actors such as criminal networks and nationalistic minority groups are still active, 
they don't seem to be a threat to the elected government, nor its ability to govern effectively. 
Verdict: YES 
 
                                                 
4 The Ohrid framework agreement was signed 13th August 2001, and was a peace treaty between the Macedonian 
government and Albanian minority leaders. The agreement was signed following the escalation of an ethnic conflict 
between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian minority in 2001 (Tsukatos, 2008: 33-35). As a result of this treaty, 
the Albanians have been granted better privileges/rights, and it has also enabled the Macedonian government to 
improve its relation to the European Union (Tsukatos, 2008: 35-36). 
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4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
Due to the violent attacks on several polling stations, and the stuffing of ballot boxes in the 2008 
parliamentary elections, 15 % of the vote counts were regarded as bad or very bad by the OSCE 
(Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). Despite moderately successful attempts at 
new rounds of voting, the votes can hardly be said to have been weighed equally during this 
election. 
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
While there were several outbreaks of violence on election day in 2008, which possibly had a 
significant effect on the outcome of the elections (involving members of the Albanian minority) 
(Mavrikos-Adamou, 2010: 517), the winners of the election (a coalition led by the VMRO-DPMNE 
party) were not prevented from assuming office. Thus, under some doubt, Macedonia is considered 
to have fulfilled this criterion. 
Verdict: YES (barely) 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
The government in office between 1991 and 1998, led by the SDSM party, was regularly alleged to 
be corrupt, and to politicize the public sector (Tsukatos, 2008: 28). The public administration was 
also highly underdeveloped, and there was a severe lack of accountability mechanisms within the 
state (Tsukatos, 2008: 29). According to the EU commission report, there is still a great lack of 
political dialogue between political actors/parties, which has halted the progress of promoting better 
accountability structures and transparency within the state institutions. As a result, both the 
bureaucracy and the judiciary remain highly politicized (Commission of the European communities, 
2008: 9). A recent example of this lack of political dialogue was the near unilateral adoption of 170 
new laws by the newly elected government in 2008, by urgent procedure, while the opposition 
parties had been boycotting parliament (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9).  
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
Vertical accountability is also relatively poor, as most civil society organisations are heavily 
dependent on foreign funding, and the government has so far been unwilling to offer much support 
(Commission of the European communities, 2008: 17). The level of public trust in the elected 
representatives is also very low (only 12 % in a 2001 survey), partly due to high corruption and the 
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poor rule of law in Macedonia (Tsukatos, 2008: 29). Because the electoral process is also 
insufficiently democratic, Macedonia is considered to fail to comply with this criterion.  
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
The judicial system in Macedonia has generally been very politicized, inefficient, and corrupt 
(Tsukatos, 2008: 62). In 2004, there were approximately 1 million court cases, which constitute half 
a case for each inhabitant. Due to considerable international pressure, several attempts to reform the 
judiciary have been made in recent years, but progress has been slow (Tsukatos, 2008: 63). The EU 
commission maintains that the independence and efficiency of the judiciary have been somewhat 
improved, but that lack of adequate funding and poor recruitment procedures, means that 
Macedonia has only moderately advanced in this area (Commission of the European communities, 
2008: 13/14). The fragmented legal system has also made the implementation of laws very 
inefficient. 
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
While the state bureaucracy has improved in terms of efficiency and professionalism, due to better 
training and recruitment procedures, the level of transparency and accountability is still not up to 
international standards, according to the EU commission report (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 11). This is partly because the level of public corruption remains such a serious 
issue, even despite recent improvements following new anti-corruption policies (Commission of the 
European communities, 2008: 15). In the 2008 corruption perception index, Macedonia was ranked 
as 72th in the world, with a score of 3.6 out of 10 (Transparency International, 2008), and according 
to Vladimir Misev, most Macedonians have come to perceive of corruption as an integral part of 
public life (Misev in Goehring (red), 2008: 385). 
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has a full monopoly on taxation and the use 
of force: 
One of the basic principles of the peace treaty that ended the ethnic revolts in 2001, the Ohrid 
framework agreement, was power-sharing governance, including considerable self-government for 
ethnic communities, and local and regional governments (Tsukatos, 2008: 48). While 
decentralization reforms since 2001 have been largely successful, state funding of local and regional 
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governments is insufficient, and the efficiency, transparency and accountability of many of these 
local governments are therefore inadequate (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 10).  
Verdict: NO   
 
Regimetype: EP+1AF (Electoral irreversibility) 
 
4.7 Rating of Moldova according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
Except for the uncontested election in 1991, all parliamentary and presidential elections during the 
first decade of independence were highly competitive (Way, 2002: 130). Even though there have 
been some electoral irregularities prior to some of the elections, such as unequal campaigning 
opportunities, Moldova should according to McDonagh be considered to meet the minimum 
threshold of democracy (McDonagh, 2008: 147). However, after the Communist Party won the 
elections in 2001 (stayed in power until 2009), the level of political competition became slightly 
more limited, as several political candidates and parties were banned (Way, 2002: 130-131). The 
local elections in 2007 were considered by the OSCE/ODIHR to be generally free and fair, but they 
lacked somewhat in competitiveness, as some candidates were denied the right to compete for 
public office (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 3). Despite these minor 
shortcomings, all elections since 1991 have been recognized as legitimate democratic elections by 
international observers, such as the OSCE and IEOM (Senyuva, 2010: 190). One of the greatest 
(electoral) democratic tests for Moldova so far came during the parliamentary elections in April 
2009, as it led to violent protests by the opposition and accusations of electoral fraud in what has 
later been called «the Twitter Revolution». However, the turmoil was eventually solved peacefully 
with a transfer of power from the Communist Party to a united opposition, a coalition of opposition 
parties, labeled as the Alliance for European Integration, following new and «virtually trouble free 
elections» in July 2009, according to Senyuva (Senyuva, 2010: 194).  
Verdict: YES 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
There has generally been a high level of political pluralism and freedom in Moldova, as the state 
has been too weak to efficiently limit (or improve) civil liberties, such as freedom of expression 
(Way, 2002: 133). In the 1990s the media outlets were relatively free, and were able to provide 
many alternative sources of information, according to Way (Way, 2002: 130). After the Communist 
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Party came to power, press freedom deteriorated, particularly among the predominantly state-owned 
television media, and in 2001 an anti-government newspaper was forced to close down (Way, 2002: 
131). During the same time-span, violations of human rights also increased, especially regarding 
basic political rights, such as the four criteria that constitute the BCL dimension (the minimum 
constitutional threshold) of democracy (McDonagh, 2008: 148). The discrimination of ethnic 
groups and their civil and cultural rights has also been cited as one of the main reasons behind the 
secessionist claims made by minority groups within Moldova since independence (Heintz (red), 
2008: 5). In addition, there are frequent human rights abuses within the secessionist province of 
Transnistria, a region within Moldova's territorial borders that the Moldovan government is unable 
to control (Popescu in Heintz (red), 2008: 58). 
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
All of the Moldovan governments since independence have lacked an effective power to govern, for 
several different reasons. First, considerable parts of the Moldovan territory are beyond government 
control, such as the secessionist province of Transnistria, which controls nearly all of the energy 
resources within Moldova (Heintz (red), 2008: 7). Transnistria, which is governed by a rebel 
government and supported by Russia, has declared the province to be autonomous, and refused to 
participate in Moldovan politics (Way, 2002: 128). Secondly, the question of whether Moldova 
should be independent or reunite with Romania has led to very polarized identity politics, and also a 
polarized electorate (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009: 141). Thirdly, Russia has an enormous 
influence over Moldovan politics, both economically and politically, as Moldova is highly 
dependent on gas and electricity coming through the Russian-controlled Transnistrian pipelines, and 
because Russia still has a significant military presence in the country, in support of Transnistria’s 
independence claims (Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2009: 141). The fourth reason is the very close links 
between political elites and informal patrimonial networks, which has led to the «capture» of the 
state by particular interest groups, such as clientelist networks consisting of political and economic 
elites (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 23). Thus, the bureaucracy has also been increasingly 
politicized by government (Way, 2002: 129). Finally, the Moldovan state lacks sufficient control 
over its border regions, where organized crime networks are heavily involved in smuggling and 
trafficking of drugs, humans etc. (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 27). 
Verdict: NO 
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4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
While the OSCE report on the parliamentary elections in April 2009 was very positive (perhaps due 
to Russian influence within the OSCE), there were several complaints made by the opposition 
regarding multiple voting, inaccurate voter lists, and graveyard votes, which ultimately led to the 
Twitter Revolution (Senyuva, 2010: 192). New elections in July 2009, which were called because 
the opposition boycotted parliament, were considered to meet international democratic standards, 
and the only significant issue was the lack of a completely balanced media coverage (Senyuva, 
2010: 194). 
Verdict: YES 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
While there was a great deal of violence after the parliamentary elections in April 2009, as the 
parliament was set on fire, and there were clashes between protesters and the police, the new 
elections in July 2009 were executed without any major violent incidents, and political power was 
transferred in a peaceful and democratic manner (Senyuva, 2010: 194). 
Verdict: YES 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
During the first decade of independence, both the legislature as well as the constitutional court were 
very effective in limiting the power of the president and the government, and of holding the 
executive branch accountable (Way, 2002: 130). In 2001, the Communist Party won the elections 
with a strong electoral mandate (winning 71 of 101 seats in parliament), and the legislature 
therefore became dominated by the new government (Way, 2002: 130). Horizontal accountability 
was further weakened through new judicial reforms, limiting the independence of the judiciary 
(Way, 2002: 130). The communist legacy of combining informal and formal institutions has also 
constituted a severe constraint on the degree of accountability and transparency, and of the whole 
state-building process (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 23). Because of the patrimonialisation of 
the state by different interest groups5
Verdict: NO 
, the formal democratic institutions are in consequence 
subordinated to informal and clientelistic modes of governance (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 
29).  
                                                 
5 Patrimonialisation of the state can be defined as the «private appropriation of the governmental sphere by those who 
carry political power» (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 29). 
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7) Vertical accountability: 
Vertical accountability is relatively weak, partly because civil society is poorly developed. One of 
the main reasons for the weakness of civil society is probably that the population is predominantly 
rural. Thus, Moldova could be defined as a «nation of villages» that are poorly interconnected and 
have a largely uninformed electorate (Heintz (red), 2008: 11). In addition, most NGOs are 
dependent on foreign funding, there is no independent business class, and civil society is therefore 
unable to hold state actors accountable (Way, 2002: 129). The electoral mobilisation and voting 
patterns among the parts of the electorate that have not become disillusioned with politics (and 
abstain from voting), are also predominantly determined by the patron-client relations between 
political elites and the citizens, along hierarchical lines from the national to the local level 
(Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 30-31). Thus, as long as a large share of the votes are «bought» 
by patrons, representing various political parties, and civil society remains underdeveloped, vertical 
accountability will also remain low. 
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
As mentioned above, judicial independence has deteriorated significantly during the last decade, 
following the new judicial reforms and increased government control over appointment procedures 
for judges (Way, 2002: 131). The level of professionalism and efficiency also seem to be poor, as 
the implementation and enforcement of laws with regard to human rights legislation has been very 
slow, despite the fact that Moldova has a fully democratic constitution (Heintz (red), 2008: 9).  
Verdict: NO 
  
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
Because of the weak legal tradition in Moldova, several state institutions, such as the tax 
administration and the intelligence bodies, have become politicized by the government (Way, 2002: 
129). These formal state institutions have often been abused by political elites to implement policies 
and allocate resources in an informal manner, through their patrimonial networks of political allies 
and supporters (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 24). Such «client politics», which has been a 
dominant feature of Moldovan politics, generally involves high corruption levels and the use of 
state resources for personal gain (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 31). According to the World 
Bank, Moldova ranks as the second worst country with regard to «state capture» (by other 
undemocratic actors) among the former Soviet republics, and Transparency International rates 
Moldova as one of the least transparent and most corrupt countries in the world (113th out of 180) 
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(Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2009: 140). 
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
As mentioned above, the Moldovan state does not have absolute control over its territory, and 
neither the governments nor the citizens in these areas take part in national Moldovan politics (only 
2 % of the Transnistrians voted in the 2009 parliamentary elections; Senyuva, 2010: 192). In 
addition, the «local» elections in Transnistria are very fraudulent, and human rights have been 
frequently violated by the Transnistrian governments (Popescu in Heintz (red), 2008: 58).  
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: FCE+2AF (Electoral integrity and Electoral irreversibility) 
 
4.8 Rating of Croatia according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
The 1995 elections marked the end of a dominant one-party system in Croatia. The Croatian 
national movement that had been formed before the first free elections in 1990 had until 1995 been 
indistinguishable from HDZ, the party that had governed Croatia throughout the Balkan Wars 
(Kasapovic, 1996: 273). Since 2000, the elections in Croatia have generally been free and fair, and 
there were no irregularities in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 6). Some of the main reasons behind this development, seem to be the 
influence from international organisations (such as the EU, USA, and NATO), as the main political 
parties and political elites (including HDZ, which governed Croatia in an authoritarian manner 
throughout the 1990s) have become increasingly moderate, pro-democratic, and pro-European 
(Pickering and Baskin, 2008: 534-536).  
Verdict: YES 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
Currently there seems to be high respect for freedom of expression, freedom of organization, and 
the right to alternative information (pluralist media), but in some of the local municipalities there 
have been some cases of political pressure and attacks aimed at journalists (Commission of the 
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European communities, 2008: 10-11). Freedom from discrimination is officially respected, but there 
have been some minor incidents of persecution of minorities, especially against Roma and Serbs, 
and the judicial system has sometimes been accused of being biased towards Croats against Serbs 
(in cases of war crimes, property (re)allocation etc.) (Blitz, 2008: 132). However, Croatia has 
generally been able to fulfill the minimum constitutional democratic threshold (Commission of the 
European communities, 2008). 
Verdict: YES 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
Due to the EU accession requirements regarding possible future membership, Croatian politics is 
very much influenced from abroad (Antic and Dodic, 2008: 755), albeit in a positive democracy-
enhancing way. There is also a large consensus among the Croatian political parties about the need 
for further European integration (Doric in Goehring (red), 2008: 173-174), and there doesn't seem 
to be any significant formal or informal constraints on the elected government's capability of 
governing effectively. 
Verdict: YES 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
There have been some problems regarding the large Diaspora vote (mostly Bosnian Croats), which 
is sometimes cast under military and not civilian control, and there seems to be an arbitrary control 
over these foreign polling stations (Kasapovic, 1996: 272). In addition, Croatia still has a very 
«complicated, disorganized, and senseless» representation of minorities (Antic et al., 2008: 754), as 
there are separate, proportional elections for ethnic minorities, and these minorities are often 
overrepresented (except for the Serbs) in parliament (Antic et al., 2008: 752). 
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
In the 2000 parliamentary elections, a group of war veterans organised mass protests as the 
incumbent party (HDZ) lost the elections, but they failed to remove the newly elected government 
(Zakosek, 2010: 600). Since then, elections have been relatively peaceful and democratic, and the 
electoral process in Croatia has therefore been irreversible. 
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Verdict: YES 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
During the 1990s, the governing political party, HDZ, and president Tudjman were able to 
monopolise political power, and control all state institutions, partly because they were seen as «the 
champion of Croatian statehood» during the war against Serbia, and also because the opposition 
was highly fragmented and poorly organised (Ottaway and Maltz, 2001: 376). The end of the war, 
in 1995, and a dire economic situation eventually led to declining legitimacy for the authoritarian 
regime, which was weakened even further when Tudjman died in 1999 (Ottaway et al., 2001: 377). 
In addition, an electoral reform in 1999, which installed a more proportional and democratic 
electoral system, and a better mobilised and organised opposition and civil society, which were 
actively monitoring the incumbents in order to prevent electoral fraud, were also some of the critical 
factors behind the sudden transition to democracy in 2000. This event has later been labeled 
Croatia's second transition (Pickering et al., 2008: 533). Following the first relatively democratic 
elections in 2000, several constitutional amendments were adopted, which limited the power of the 
presidency and installed a more parliamentary regime, thereby improving horizontal accountability 
(Pickering et al., 2008: 534). However, the authoritarian legacy of the Tudjman era, and possibly 
also the communist era, still causes problems for the consolidation of democracy in Croatia. Both 
the judiciary and the bureaucracy remain highly politicized, and the judiciary is constantly prey to 
political interference in court cases (especially concerning war crimes). Thus, as long as the 
judiciary lacks sufficient independence (see below for further elaboration), horizontal accountability 
also remains inadequate. 
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
In the 2000 elections that finalised the transition to electoral democracy, several civil society 
organisations, such as Glas and Gong, played a very important part in monitoring the election and 
increasing the transparency of the electoral process (Pickering et al., 2008: 533). Thus, vertical 
accountability was improved, and according to Doric, civil society is currently highly developed 
and continues to have a strong political influence (Doric in Goehring (red), 2008: 178-179). 
Verdict: YES  
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
According to Blitz, the judicial system in Croatia has been, and still is; «astonishingly slow, corrupt, 
and inefficient», and particularly at the local level (Blitz, 2008: 132-133). The judiciary also lacks 
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independence, as the legislature on several occasions has intervened and altered decisions made by 
the Constitutional Court (Blitz, 2008: 134). While there has been increasing international pressure 
on Croatia to implement necessary judicial reforms (particularly from the EU), this has proved to be 
very difficult, mainly because of a politicized and weak bureaucracy (Commission of the European 
communities, 2008: 8). 
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
As mentioned above, the bureaucracy is weak and highly politicized, and it is also seriously lacking 
in qualified personnel (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). Corruption is also 
widespread, and due to the lack in professionalism and transparency, the bureaucracy is still too 
weak to effectively fight corruption (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9). In 2008, 
Croatia was ranked 62th in the world, with a score of 4.4 out of 10 in the corruption perception 
index (Transparency International, 2008).   
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
During the Tudjman era, the Croatian state was very centralised and local governments were highly 
dependent on the central government (Ottaway et al., 2001: 376). One of the main reasons behind 
this policy was probably that Croatia lacked control over large parts of its territory at the time, as 
Serb insurgents were fighting for increased autonomy or secession from Croatia in some of the 
Serb-dominated provinces (Zakosek, 2010: 599). Since then, Croatia has been under lot of 
international pressure to initiate local government reforms and improve the balance of power 
between central and local governments, but so far few changes have been made (Doric in Goehring 
(red), 2008: 182). The lack of independence for local governments is partly due to poor 
coordination within the bureaucracy, lack of dialogue between central and local governments, and 
lack of political will in the central government (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 
8). 
Verdict: NO  
 
Regime type: FCE, BCL, EP+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Vertical accountability) 
 
4.9 Rating of Georgia according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
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1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
Following fraudulent elections in 2000 (presidential election) and in 2003 (parliamentary), there 
was a massive mobilisation of the opposition and civil society, which eventually resulted in the 
Rose Revolution, and the resignation of president Eduard Shevardnadze (Tudoroiu, 2007: 322). The 
new «special» elections in 2004 (both presidential and parliamentary) were considered relatively 
free and fair by the OSCE (Jones, 2005: 308). While some scholars, such as Lincoln Mitchell, claim 
that «fair elections are now the rule» (Mitchell, 2006: 672), there have been several electoral 
irregularities in the most recent elections. According to the European Commission, the most recent 
elections in Georgia, the parliamentary elections in May 2008, generally met international 
democratic standards. However, there had been some electoral irregularities in the presidential 
elections four months earlier, in January 2008, such as unbalanced media coverage, intimidation of 
opposition candidates, and lack of transparency (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 
3-4). Still, the OSCE did note several improvements in the parliamentary elections, but did not 
make any detailed assessment of the many electoral irregularities that had been mentioned by 
domestic observers (Lanskoy and Areshidze, 2008: 165). Due to these reports, it can be argued that 
Georgia barely manages to meet the required electoral standards, despite domestic reports regarding 
lack of fairness (several reports of voter intimidation etc.) that were not thoroughly assessed by 
international observers. 
Verdict: YES (barely) 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
During the Shevardnadze regime, the society was relatively open and free, with a independent and 
active media and civil society (Mitchell, 2006: 673). Since Saakashvili was elected in 2004, civil 
liberties have become more limited, as a result of more authoritarian government policies. The 
state-building reforms of Saakashvili therefore seem to have come at the expense of further 
democratization (Mitchell, 2006: 674). In the fall of 2007, the opposition staged several large 
demonstrations protesting against the lack of freedom of speech, as the media were becoming 
increasingly dependent on the regime, and against the impunity and corruption of political elites 
(Lanskoy et al., 2008: 162). The Saakashvili regime responded by closing down the most popular 
(and opposition-friendly) private television station (Imedi) (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 163). According to 
Sue Davis, this move by the government to limit political pluralism can be explained by the inverse 
relationship that exists between regime insecurity and media freedom (and other features of a liberal 
society) (Davis, 2008: 471). Thus, the less popular a regime is, the more repressive it will become 
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(towards opposition, media etc.).  
Verdict: NO 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
One of the main reasons why civil liberties have become more limited in Georgia during the last 
decade is probably the great necessity of reforming and strengthening the state institutions, which in 
turn has had a damaging effect on democratization. As two provinces within Georgian territory, 
Abkhasia and South Ossetia, remain outside of government/state control, the Saakashvili regime 
opted for constitutional amendments (in 2004) that strengthened the power of the executive, so that 
it could more easily reform and improve the state institutions. The main aim of this process seems 
to be future state consolidation, and a potential reunification with the aforementioned provinces. 
While the decisionmaking of the government and the president have become more effective6
Verdict: NO 
, these 
two provinces remain independent, and they were also the source of a military conflict with Russia 
in 2008. However, the Saakashvili regime has managed to regain control over the Adsjara province, 
which was autonomous until 2004. The vastly improved state institutions, including a more 
professional and efficient bureaucracy, combined with a stronger executive (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 
159), means that the Georgian government most likely has improved its ability to govern effectively 
within the territory that it controls. However, the overall power to govern effectively is severely 
limited, not only by the separatist provinces, but also because of the strong Russian influence on 
Georgian politics. In addition to Russia's strong support for Georgia's secessionist regions, Georgia 
is highly dependent on Russian gas (Tudoroiu, 2007: 319). Thus, despite increased economic and 
political cooperation with Western organisations and countries (such as the EU, USA etc.), the 
Georgian government still lacks an effective power to govern. 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
In the presidential elections in January 2008, the vote-counting process in as many as 24 % of the 
precincts, mostly in ethnic-minority areas, was regarded as bad or very bad by the OSCE. This was 
mainly due to inaccurate voter lists, and despite the improvements of electoral legislation, it seems 
unlikely that these flaws had been adequately amended before the parliamentary elections in May 
                                                 
6 Following the 2004 «special» elections and constitutional amendments, the Saakashvili regime not only managed to 
strengthen the executive, but also gained control over more than 2/3 of the seats in parliament (Mitchell, 2006: 673). 
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2008 (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 164-165).  
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
During the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008, the opposition held several large 
demonstrations protesting against perceived fraudulent election results, but there doesn't seem to be 
any evidence of elected officials being violently or unconstitutionally prevented from assuming 
office or exercising power.  
Verdict: YES 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
The constitution of 1995 allowed for a strong legislature and Supreme Court, and it therefore 
provided for an effective separation of powers among state institutions (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 157). 
Following constitutional reforms in 2004 that were adopted without any political debate, president 
Saakashvili now has the power to appoint the prime minister and cabinet, as well as dissolving the 
parliament (Mitchell, 2006: 672). The governing party, UNM, that supports and is supported by 
president Saakashvili, also controls more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, which has led to 
an increasing degree of party patronage within state institutions (Mitchell, 2006: 673). As both 
president Saakashvili and his political party, UNM, won the presidential and parliamentary elections 
in 2004 with a very strong mandate, about 96 % of the votes, the new regime has managed not only 
to gain considerable control over the legislature, but has also exploited its great political power to 
politicize the judiciary (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 160). It has therefore become a super presidential 
system (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 160), where there is a great lack of horizontal accountability and 
transparency.   
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
While press freedom is becoming increasingly limited, civil society organisations are relatively 
independent from interference and restrictions by the state institutions (Nodia in Goehring (red), 
2008: 232). Civil society organisations were very active during the Rose Revolution, but their 
influence on decision making has diminished since then, which partly stems from the fact that many 
of the dominant figures during the Rose Revolution have now become part of the government or the 
opposition, and also because of the high dependence on foreign funding (Nodia in Goehring (red), 
2008: 232-233). Most of the NGOs are also located in the capital (Tbilisi), and have very limited 
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influence on the electorate in other parts of the country (Nodia in Goehring (red), 2008: 225). 
According to Fairbanks, the electorate is quite disillusioned with politics, which has been 
demonstrated by low voter turnout, and in the presidential elections in January 2008 it also lacked 
adequate ability to hold the executive accountable (Fairbanks, 2010: 146). Statistical analyses 
showed that Saakashvili would not have won the majority of votes (he won 53,4 %) without fraud. 
While the parliamentary elections four months later, in May 2008, were free and fair, the lack of 
vertical accountability with respect to the executive branch, which was largely determined by the 
fraudulent presidential elections, means that Georgia is considered to fail this criterion. 
Verdict: NO 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
According to Charles H. Fairbanks, the judicial system is the least independent state institution in 
Georgia, and in all court cases that are even remotely political there is a high level of political 
interference from the government (Fairbanks, 2010: 147).  
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
Before the Rose Revolution in 2003, the state institutions in Georgia were considered to be very 
weak, with a highly corrupt and unqualified bureaucracy (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 157). However, 
since Saakashvili was elected president, his regime has been extremely effective in reducing the 
level of corruption and improving state institutions (Fairbanks, 2010: 145). Thus, the efficiency and 
professionalism of civil servants has improved. This is partly due to better salaries and better 
training procedures, and these improvements may also have contributed to lower levels of 
corruption, according to Lanskoy and Areshidze (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 159). Despite these 
improvements, the level of public corruption still seems to be relatively high, as Georgia ranked as 
number 67 in the world in the 2008 corruption perception index, conducted by Transparency 
International, with a score of 3.9 on a scale from 0-10 (where 0 is highly corrupt) (Transparency 
International, 2008).    
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
Following independence, in 1991, a civil war broke out between the Georgian government that was 
led by the highly nationalistic president Gamsakhurdia, and the provinces of Abkhasia (claiming 
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full independence) and South Ossetia (desiring reunification with North Ossetia, which is part of 
Russia). These two provinces are still self-autonomous, and their independence and reunification 
claims are backed by Russia (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 155). Similar to the situation in Moldova, where 
Russia supports the separatist province of Transnistria, very few citizens from Abkhasia and South 
Ossetia have been taking part in the political elections in Georgia, as these areas remain outside 
governmental control (Jones, 2005: 306). While Georgia managed to regain control over the Adsjara 
province in 2004, which had been under the personal control of Aslan Abashidze for over a decade, 
the unsuccessful war against Russia, Abkhasia, and South Ossetia in 2008 indicates that the chances 
of restoring or establishing local government accountability to an acceptable democratic level seems 
very limited. 
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: FCE+1AF (Electoral irreversibility) 
 
4.10 Rating of Romania according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
According to Gross, 2004 can be seen as a turning point in the possible consolidation of Romanian 
democracy, as the incumbent Socialist Party (heirs of the former communists) lost both the 
parliamentary and presidential elections to a more democratic, and pro-European opposition (Gross 
and Tismaneanu, 2005:146). The four parliamentary and presidential elections that had been held 
before 2004, and mostly during PSD (Socialist Party) rule, were considered as free, but not entirely 
fair (Gross et al., 2005: 151). Party patronage, illegal use of state resources to run electoral 
campaigns, and unbalanced media coverage (in favour of the incumbent party) had been dominant 
features of Romanian politics, especially before the 2004 elections (Ciobanu, 2007). However, by 
2008, both the local and parliamentary elections that were held that year were considered to be free 
and fair, and to meet the minimum democratic requirements (Stan and Zaharia, 2009: 1099).  
Verdict: YES 
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
Since the fall of communism, the media have been subject to a relatively high level of party 
patronage, as the government is responsible for appointing officials to the broadcasting council 
which often refuses to grant licences to media outlets that are critical of the regime (Roper, 2006: 
370). In addition, large sections of the media are financially indebted to (and thus dependent on) the 
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state, which could possibly be used as leverage by the government in order to pressure the media 
into self-censorship (Roper, 2006: 370). However, according to the 2008 human rights report by the 
US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, Romania currently fulfills all of the minimum 
civil liberties criteria, despite some minor incidents and flaws (regarding harassment of journalists, 
the highly concentrated ownership of media in the hands of a small group of powerful elites, and 
police brutality towards the Roma minority) (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, 
2008). 
Verdict: YES 
 
3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
The legacy of a patrimonial and totalitarian communist system seems to have had a negative effect 
on the democratization process in Romania, and on the ability of elected governments to govern 
effectively. Due to the total lack of an active civil society and opposition during communism, the 
violent revolution in 1989, which led to the downfall of patrimonial-totalitarian president 
Ceausescu, was more or less a transfer of power among incumbent political elites, as large parts of 
the former nomenklatura dominated the transition process and the crafting of new institutions after 
the fall of communism (Ciobanu, 2007: 1432). Partly because there was no «clean break» with 
communism, the patrimonial political system (re)consolidated through the increasingly closer ties 
between the political elites and the emerging business class, and this led to a highly clientelistic 
party system (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). This also made it harder to introduce both legal and 
democratic norms as modes of governance within the new state institutions (Ciobanu, 2007: 1431-
1432). Thus, the political sphere became highly informal, corrupt and opaque (Weber in Zielonka 
(red), 2001: 224), and was dominated by informal alliances between political elites and the business 
class (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). It also contributed to an extremely polarized political climate where 
the main cleavage line ran between former communists and anti-communists. Throughout the 
1990s, conflicts both within and between political parties and government coalitions considerably 
reduced the ability of elected governments to govern effectively, and new legislation often had to be 
passed through the issuance of executive emergency ordinances (Ciobanu, 2007 p.1436). Romanian 
politics remain very polarized and confrontational today, which is perhaps one of the main reasons 
why the policymaking of the executive is increasingly being decided upon in courts and not in the 
legislature or within the government administration. Similar to the situation in the Ukraine 
following the Orange Revolution, the Constitutional Court has increasingly assumed an executive 
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role in politics, as it is appealed to for arbitrating disputes between government and parliament, and 
the presidency and prime minister (Stan et al., 2009: 1087). Following the 2008 elections that led to 
a government coalition consisting of two arch rivals (the Liberal Democratic and Social Democratic 
parties), the politicization of the judiciary seems likely to continue. Thus, the patrimonial political 
legacy, that has led to high levels of public corruption, lack of transparency, and clientelistic 
political parties, is still a significant obstacle for the ability of elected governments to govern 
effectively. 
Verdict: NO 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
In the 2004 elections, about 160 000 votes «disappeared» and were annulled from the vote-counting 
procedure, and attempts at new rounds of voting were flawed (Ciobanu, 2007: 1441). This event 
was one of the catalysts behind the rapid development of civil society organisations that demanded 
improved transparency (Ciobanu, 2007: 1441). Several amendments have been made to the 
electoral process since then, including more proportional representation and the removal of party 
lists, which have led to increased electoral transparency and accountability, as it has become easier 
for the electorate to know who they vote for (Downs, 2009: 511), and there have also been fewer 
electoral irregularities in the most recent elections. 
Verdict: YES 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
office or exercising power): 
It can be argued that Romania fulfilled this criterion for the first time in 1996, as the illiberal 
incumbents (former communists) peacefully left office after losing what Kalandadze refers to as 
Romania's critical election (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009: 1405). Peaceful transfers of power 
from the incumbents to the opposition also occurred following the elections in 2000, 2004 and 
2008. 
Verdict: YES  
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
Due to the symbolic and vague nature of the constitution (of December 1991), the separation of 
powers are not explicit, nor are the prerogatives of various state institutions (Weber in Zielonka 
(red), 2001: 222). The Romanian constitution of 1991 allowed for a very strong presidency, where 
the president had the power to dissolve parliament (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 223). The debate 
on whether Romania should have a more parliamentary or a more presidential system is still a 
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salient issue today, and is perhaps one of the main reasons why the judiciary is becoming 
increasingly politicized and less independent (Stan et al., 2009: 1093). Another important reason is 
the high level of competition and polarization within the legislature, and within the executive, 
which makes it more difficult for the government to pass legislation. However, this also indicates 
that the legislature is relatively independent and able to hold the executive accountable. As a 
consequence of this development, an increasing number of political issues are being decided upon 
in the courts. Thus, the independence of the judiciary has decreased, severely weakening the ability 
of the judicial system to hold the executive accountable. In order to improve horizontal 
accountability, the judiciary therefore needs to be strengthened and become more independent, and 
the decision making process must become more transparent and less informal, which probably 
requires an improved political dialogue between parties, thereby reducing the polarization of 
political competition in Romania. 
Verdict: NO 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
Civil society experienced rejuvenation during the 2004 elections, as it played a pivotal role in 
mobilising the electorate, and in assuring improved vertical accountability (Gross et al., 2005: 148). 
A coalition of civil society organisations presented a proposal for a clean parliament, and made 
successful demands that a large number of «dirty» politicians should be dismissed from the 
parliament (Gross et al., 2005: 149). These civil society organisations have been highly successful 
in promoting higher fairness and transparency in the electoral process and in improving the 
accountability of the elected representatives (Ciobanu, 2007: 1440). This development seems to 
have influenced the electorate, as the relatively illiberal and semi-authoritarian rule of the PSD was 
punished in the 2004 elections, and they were voted out of office. However, the high level of 
political corruption and the informal, clientelistic nature of governance (by all parties) has also 
made the Romanian electorate very disillusioned with politics, and is perhaps one of the main 
causes behind the increased popularity of nationalistic, populist, and «anti-system» parties. Thus, 
the increasing activity of civil society seems to have had a countervailing effect on this trend, as its 
democratizing influence on political elites indirectly also improves the democratic political culture 
among the electorate (and extremist parties have also become less prevalent since their peak in the 
2000 elections). 
Verdict: YES 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
The Romanian judicial system lacks independence, qualified personnel, and operates with outdated 
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laws, according to Gross (Gross et al., 2005: 149). Appointments of judges, and judicial personnel 
have also to a large degree been controlled by the executive (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 229), 
and as mentioned above (in the discussion of horizontal accountability) it has become increasingly 
politicized due to high polarization and competition within the legislature and the executive. 
According to Ciobanu, the weakness of the rule of law also partly stems from the close ties between 
political elites and the business class (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). Thus, entrenched public corruption 
and clientelism has made it more difficult for the judiciary to become truly independent, 
professional and effective. 
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
According to Stan, the Romanian bureaucracy is inefficient, lacks transparency, and the civil 
servants are poorly trained and poorly paid (Stan et al., 2009: 1094). Over the last decade, several 
reforms aiming to improve the transparency and professionalism of the bureaucracy have been 
passed, but there is great variation in the implementation of these laws across the different 
ministries (Roper, 2006: 371). According to Roper, this is mostly due to the unequal monitoring of 
ministries by international agencies, such as the EU, and only those ministries that have been 
closely monitored and assisted by these external agencies have succeeded in establishing an 
adequate level of bureaucratic integrity (Roper, 2006: 371). In addition, the size of the staff in the 
bureaucracy is highly inflated, mostly due to client/patronage politics (Roper, 2006: 371). Romania 
ranked 70th in the world with a score of 3.8 out of 10 in the 2008 corruption perception index that 
was conducted by Transparency International (Transparency International, 2008).  
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
The Romanian state is very centralized and little power or competence has been delegated to the 
local level (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 232-233). In addition, party patronage extends to the 
local level, as government representatives have large control over local governments, in effect of 
their power to appoint and dismiss local representatives (Roper, 2006: 368). Local opposition 
officials are often persuaded or pressured by possible material benefits, or by the threat of dismissal, 
into switching party affiliations (Roper, 2006: 369). Thus, this causes not only a lack of local 
government accountability and transparency, but also a significant reduction in horizontal 
accountability, as local representatives have limited opportunities to hold the central authorities 
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accountable for their actions. Another problem is that in some of the poorest counties of Romania, 
local elites have in some cases «stolen» EU investments, and harassed the local media (Ciobanu, 
2007: 1439). 
Verdict: NO 
 
Regime type: FCE, BCL+3AF (Electoral integrity, Electoral irreversibility, and Vertical 
accountability) 
 
4.11 Rating of Ukraine according to my operationalisation of democracy: 
 
1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE): 
Broad presidential powers and a high degree of party patronage allowed Leonid Kuchma to stay in 
power from 1994 to 2004, for two presidential terms (Hesli, 2006: 168-169). In the 2004 
presidential elections there were widespread allegations from the opposition that state resources 
were unfairly applied to back prime minister Yanukovich as presidential candidate, as he was 
favoured by incumbent president Kuchma. According to most international observers of the 
election, both the first and second round of voting failed to meet basic democratic standards, and  
the implausible results (Yanukovich won) resulted in large-scale public protests (the Orange 
Revolution) that eventually led the Supreme Court to demand that new elections be held (Hesli, 
2006: 171). The Orange coalition led by Yushchenko won the new elections, and this time the 
elections were rated as democratic (peaceful and free of fraud) (Hesli, 2006: 175). Both of the 
following elections, the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007, have also been regarded as free 
and fair (Herron, 2008: 551).7
Verdict: YES 
  
 
2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and 
freedom from discrimination (BCL): 
According to the EU commission (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 4), and the US 
bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor (2008), Ukraine currently meets all of the required 
civil liberties in order to pass the minimum constitutional democratic threshold. Two of the main 
reasons are probably the fast development of civil society during the Orange Revolution, and a 
much more independent and active media in recent years (since the Orange Revolution).  
Verdict: YES 
                                                 
7 In the presidential elections in January and February 2010, Viktor Yanukovich became the new president following a 
narrow victory over the other main presidential candidate, Yulia Tymoshenko. 
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3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected 
governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any 
undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial 
networks, other states etc. (informal constraint): 
According to Kubicek, the lack of a sufficiently «clean break» with the communist legacy, and lack 
of institutional change, are the main reasons why postcommunism has ended in political instability 
that is inhibiting further democratization (Kubicek, 2009: 325-326). While the party system has 
stabilized, it remains highly personalistic (Herron, 2008: 555), and most political parties operate as 
patronage networks (Kubicek, 2009: 339). The Orange coalition that came to power in 2004, 
included many of the political and economic elites that had benefitted economically during the 
Kuchma rule (Kubicek, 2009: 331). Thus, much political power still remains in the hands of the 
oligarchs, clientelistic networks, and clans, and most of these elites enjoy immunity from 
prosecution, which may also explain why there is still a high level of corruption, clientelism, and 
informal politics in Ukraine (Kubicek, 2009: 332). In addition to the informal influence of business 
elites and clans, the highly polarized and confrontational political climate, both between the Orange 
coalition and the opposition, and also within the Orange coalition, has also had a devastating effect 
on the elected government's capability to govern effectively. As will be further elaborated below (in 
the section on horizontal accountability), governmental decision making is increasingly being 
decided upon within the judicial system, which as a consequence is becoming increasingly 
politicized. Because of these informal constraints, and the lack of political dialogue, the Ukrainan 
government lacks an effective power to govern. 
Verdict: NO 
 
4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally): 
A possible violation of the electoral integrity criterion occurred in the 2007 elections, as there was 
some uncertainty regarding the regulation of absentee voters (Ukrainians living abroad), and to 
what extent they were either allowed or denied the possibility to vote (Herron, 2008: 552). This may 
have disproportionally affected the votes of the OU-SPD and Byut parties, as there may have been 
some cases of multiple voting, and some cases where voters have been disenfranchised (Herron, 
2008: 552). Because of the uncertainty regarding these votes, and the possible politicization of 
absentee votes, Ukraine is not regarded as having fulfilled this criterion. 
Verdict: NO 
 
5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking 
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office or exercising power): 
The most recent political elections in Ukraine, following the Orange Revolution, have been 
relatively free and fair. There has also been a peaceful transfer of power in those cases where the 
incumbent party has lost the elections, such as in 2006 when President Yushchenko was forced to 
cooperate with his arch rival Yanukovich, following the parliamentary elections. 
Verdict: YES 
 
6) Horizontal accountability: 
Within the legislature, the horizontal accountability has increased considerably since the Orange 
Revolution, as the political competition and fragmentation is now very high compared to the 
situation during the Kuchma regime (1994-2004), when the government/president had much more 
power vis-à-vis the legislature. Several new reforms that have increased the power of the legislature 
and limited presidential powers seem to have improved the separation of powers and accountability 
structures, but it has also made it more difficult to implement further democratic reforms (Kubicek, 
2009: 328). The main reason for this is the high polarization among political elites, and a much 
stronger opposition than before in the legislature, which means that governmental decision making 
has become much more difficult in recent years, as it often requires support from arch rivals 
(Trochev, 2010: 140). For the same reason, the judicial system has become the main source of 
acquiring political power. Thus, state bodies, and especially the judiciary, but also parts of the 
bureaucracy, have become more politicized, as political actors appoint loyal servants, and secure 
judicial loyalty through the use of bribes. This development is most likely a consequence of the 
highly polarized climate in the legislature, or even within the executive branch, which in effect 
means that the overall horizontal accountability remains inadequate.8
Verdict: NO 
 
 
7) Vertical accountability: 
Vertical accountability has improved in recent years, and according to Hesli, a rejuvenated civil 
society was a critical factor in the democratization process that began during the Orange Revolution 
(Hesli, 2006: 175). Combined with more independent and active media, civil society organisations 
have become much more active and persistent in demanding improved transparency and 
accountability from the Ukrainian governments (Kubicek, 2009: 338). In addition, all elections 
since 2004 have been relatively free and fair, which indicates that the Orange Revolution was the 
                                                 
8 On October 1. 2010, the constitutional amendments from 2004/2005 were repealed, and the semi-presidential 
system that was adopted in the original constitution of 1996 was reinstated, following a ruling from the Ukrainian 
Constitutional Court (KyivPost, 01.10.2010). This means that the newly elected president, Viktor Yanukovich, has 
been granted large powers (i.e. to dissolve parliament, appoint cabinet ministers, nominate candidates for prime 
minister, and veto government resolutions), while the powers of the parliament has been significantly weakened.   
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triggering cause behind improved vertical accountability in the Ukraine. 
Verdict: YES 
 
8) Legal accountability (rule of law): 
Judicial independence has decreased significantly over the last decade, according to reports from 
Freedom House and the World Bank (Trochev, 2010: 122). Due to increasingly competitive 
elections, and high fragmentation and polarization among political parties and political elites, the 
stakes have been raised so much that; «rival elites use all available resources (including courts) to 
win elections, to hold onto power, or to undermine the political and economic bases of rivals» 
(Trochev, 2010: 123). Normally such a development, which involves high competition and 
fragmentation, would lead to the opposite result, namely an empowered and independent judiciary, 
but in the Ukraine these elements are combined with entrenched impunity for political and 
economic elites, and a hightened uncertainty regarding the political process (Trochev, 2010: 128). 
While the constitution officially guarantees judicial independence (Trochev, 2010: 132), the 
judiciary is nevertheless getting increasingly politicized by political parties, and even electoral 
results are increasingly being decided upon in courts (Trochev, 2010: 128).  
Verdict: NO 
 
9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy): 
According to Sushko and Prystayko, the bureaucracy lacks transparency and accountability, which 
partly stems from the high level of politicization, as civil servants are usually appointed based on 
their party affiliations rather than merit or professional competences (Sushko and Prystayko in 
Goehring (red), 2008: 613). In 2008, Ukraine was ranked 134th in Transparency International's 
perceptions of corruption index (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 4), and 
according to GRECO (the Group of States Against Corruption, which is a commitee in the 
European Union) the high public corruption is a threat to the democratic principles in the Ukraine 
(Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 613).   
Verdict: NO 
 
10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). 
This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the 
use of force: 
Local governments are inadequately funded, and they are also less transparent than the national 
government (Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 609). In addition, the members of the local 
governments are highly dependent on both the central government, as the president is entitled to 
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dismiss local-level officials, and on the political parties that got them elected, as a new law in 2007 
enabled political parties to dissolve the powers of local officials (if they are affiliated with that 
party) (Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 609-610). Thus, there is a lack of democratic self-
governance and transparency in the local government administrations. 
Verdict: NO   
 
Regime type: FCE, BCL+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Vertical accountability) 
 
Table 4.1 A qualitative operationalisation of the 11 hybrid regimes in 2008 
 Autocracies Hybrid regimes fl.dem. 
0 1 1+regimes 2+regimes 3+reg. 
Belaru
s 
Kyrgy
zstan 
Russia Armen
ia 
Georgi
a 
Maced
onia 
Moldo
va 
Albani
a 
Ukrain
e 
Roman
ia 
Croatia 
FCE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
BCL NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
EP NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES 
Elec. 
integrit
y 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Elec. 
irrever
sibility 
NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Horizo
ntal 
accoun
tability 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Vertica
l 
accoun
tability 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Legal 
accoun
tability 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Bur. 
integrit
y 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Local 
gov. 
accoun
tability 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
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Table 4.2 A qualitative regime typology of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes in 2008: 
 
0                 1                  1+                2                  2+                3                  3+                4 
Autocracy                          Hybrid regimes Flawed democracies Liberal 
democracy 
 FCE FCE+AF FCE, BCL FCE, 
BCL+AF 
FCE, BCL, 
EP 
FCE, BCL, 
EP+AF 
FCE, BCL, 
EP+AAF 
 BCL BCL+AF FCE, EP FCE, 
EP+AF 
   
 EP EP+AF BCL, EP BCL, 
EP+AF 
   
Belarus 
Kyrgyztan 
Russia 
Armenia 
 
Georgia 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
 Albania 
Romania 
Ukraine 
 Croatia  
 
4.12 Conclusions: 
 
As can be seen in the table above, the qualitative classification of regime types differs somewhat 
from the statistical regime typology. This is partly due to the application of an expanded procedural 
minimum definition of democracy (FCE, BCL, EP) as a means to distinguish between democracies 
and non-democracies. Thus, in the empirical analysis only Croatia is assessed to be a democracy 
(flawed democracy). However, if the procedural minimum definition (FCE, BCL) had been applied 
instead,9
                                                 
9 FCE and BCL resemble the two criteria that Freedom House have applied when operationalising regime types; 
political rights and civil liberties (and that therefore also became the main pillars of the statistical operationalisation 
of regime types, in section 2.1 of chapter 2). However, Freedom House defines these two criteria as including many 
more components of democracy than what is applied in this qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable.  
 both Romania and Ukraine would also have been regarded as flawed democracies (like 
they were in the statistical analysis). Albania, the third regime in the 2+ category, would not, as it 
fails to meet the FCE criterion, but unlike Romania and Ukraine it does comply with the EP 
criterion, which illustrates how the process of democratization may proceed in different ways. 
Albania also fulfills the minimum constitutional criterion (BCL), and one of the additional 
constitutional criteria (local government accountability), and therefore seems to have made more 
progress on the constitutional dimension of democracy than it has on the electoral dimension. The 
case of Albania therefore shows the usefulness of assigning equal value to the three core elements 
of democracy (and of applying an expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy), as the 
democratization process may evolve differently from country to country. Another difference from 
the statistical regime typology, is that Kyrgyzstan is considered to be an autocratic regime (but was 
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categorized as a hybrid regime in the statistical analysis) as it fails to meet any of the 10 democratic 
criteria. Last but not least, the hybrid regimes have become better differentiated both with regard to 
their level of democraticness (ranging from 1 to 2+ in the typology), and also with regard to what 
type of regime they are (depending on which criteria they have fulfilled, which is listed in the 
summary formula of each of the country assessments) 
 
Based on the findings in the empirical analysis, it seems that the 11 regimes that were hybrid in 
1994 have mostly democratized along the electoral dimension of democracy. Only the 4 most 
democratic regimes, Albania, Romania, Ukraine (in the 2+category), and Croatia (the only 
democratic regime, in the 3+category) managed to fulfill the minimum constitutional democratic 
criterion (BCL) in 2008. With regard to the additional constitutional criteria, none of these 11 
regimes are considered to have an adequate democratic level of horizontal accountability, legal 
accountability (rule of law), or bureaucratic integrity, while only Albania (2+) fulfills the local 
government accountability criterion. In addition, three of the most democratic regimes (Romania 
and Ukraine in the 2+ category), and Croatia (the only flawed democracy, in the 3+ category), are 
considered to comply with the criterion of vertical accountability. By contrast, 5 out of 7 hybrid 
regimes in 2008 (ranging from 1 to the 2+ category) fulfill the minimum electoral criterion (FCE). 
In addition, all the hybrid regimes except Armenia, and the flawed democracy (Croatia), fulfill the 
electoral irreversibility criterion, while Moldova and Romania also comply with the electoral 
integrity criterion. Regarding the EP criterion (elected governments have effective power to 
govern), which should also be considered a component of the electoral dimension of democracy (as 
it was operationalised as the electoral empowerment and sovereignty of elected officials, who also 
needed to be democratically elected), only Macedonia (1+), Albania (2+), and Croatia (3+) have 
been considered to fulfill this criterion. In total then, the four criteria along the electoral dimension 
of democracy (FCE, EP, electoral integrity, and electoral irreversibility) have been fulfilled in 18 
observations, while the remaining six constitutional criteria have only been fulfilled in 8 
observations, by these 11 postcommunist regimes (in 2008). Thus, it is fair to say that where 
democratization has occurred, it has predominantly happened along the electoral dimension of 
democracy. 
 
These findings therefore seem to support the theories of Diamond (2002: 24) and Schedler (2002: 
36), as they have argued that many hybrid regimes hold relatively free elections as a means to 
manipulate the population and increase their legitimacy, and also to conceal their more authoritarian 
nature. Regardless of whether this is the case, these findings also appear to contradict the argument 
made by Møller; that electoral and constitutional democratization usually happens simultaneously 
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(Møller, 2009: 39). Should these seven hybrid regimes in the table above, and perhaps even Croatia 
(the only classified democratic regime) really be considered as «pseudo-democracies», or are there 
any other possible explanations behind this uneven development? 
 
In these 11 postcommunist countries, there seems to be some structural conditions in place, that 
have had a negative effect on the democratization of the constitutional criteria, and that ultimately 
may also explain why only one of these regimes has managed to become democratic (Croatia), 
while the rest of the regimes are either hybrid (7 regimes) or have reverted to authoritarianism (3 
regimes). Firstly, in 8 of these 11 countries there was an insufficient break with communism during 
the transition. Only Albania, Croatia, and Georgia were operationalised in the statistical analysis to 
have made a clean break with communism, as the opposition won the first postcommunist elections 
in these countries. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, only Croatia was perceived to have a 
democratically favourable historical legacy, as it had a national accommodative system during 
communism (see Kitschelt, 1999). Thus, with the exception of Croatia, the communist legacy is 
likely to have had a significant and negative effect on the prospects for democratization in these 
postcommunist countries. All of the other 10 countries had either a patrimonial or a colonial 
peripheral system of governance during the communist era. As mentioned in section 2.3.2 of 
chapter 2, these two systems of governance were characterized as having a high level of 
patrimonialism/clientelism, being very repressive, and having extremely weak civil societies 
(Kitschelt, 1999: 28). Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that all these postcommunist countries, to some 
extent also Croatia, currently have highly politicized state institutions, and high levels of corruption. 
Most of these countries also have clientelistic party systems with a high level of party patronage, 
perhaps with the exception of Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. To varying degrees, the mode of 
governance in these 11 countries is also quite informal, corrupt and non-transparent, which is 
probably also one of the reasons why so few of these countries fulfill the EP criterion. Only 
Macedonia (1+), Albania (2+), and Croatia (3+) have elected governments that have effective power 
to govern. With all of these constraints in place, it is understandable that less progress have been 
made with regard to the constitutional criteria of democracy than with respect to the electoral 
criteria. After all, high levels of horizontal accountability, legal accountability, bureaucratic 
integrity, and/or local government accountability, require relatively transparent, non-corrupt 
governance based mostly on formal institutions and rules, such as the constitution. If these 
conditions are present, it would also facilitate a more efficient protection of basic civil liberties 
(BCL; the minimum constitutional criterion).  
 
For the same reasons that the democratization along the constitutional dimension of democracy has 
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progressed rather slowly, it also seems likely that the classification of these 11 regimes as hybrid 
regimes in 1994, may be partly explained by the high level of clientelism, the high level of 
corruption, and the informal and non-transparent governance in these countries, which in turn are 
consequences of their unfavourable type of communist legacy. This probably also help explain why, 
14 years later (in 2008), only one regime (Croatia) had managed to become democratic, while 3 of 
these regimes had reverted to authoritarianism (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia), and 7 regimes 
still remain hybrid (Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Albania, and Romania). 
 
Those variables that appear to have been most conducive to democratization are the presence of a 
strong political influence from the European Union, relatively well developed civil societies, 
effective power to govern for elected governments, and the presence of an electoral revolution. The 
most democratic regimes, Croatia (3+) and Romania, Albania (2+) have all been highly influenced 
by the EU, partly through economic support, and partly through the leverage that EU has regarding 
membership accession and conditionality negotiations. The last regime in the 2+ category, Ukraine, 
seems to be highly influenced by both the EU as well as Russia. In addition, Macedonia (1+) is also 
strongly influenced by the EU. In all these regimes, it seems likely that the EU accession talks have 
contributed to democratic reforms. Another variable that appears to be of even greater significance 
when explaining the differences in democraticness, is the level of civil society development. The 
four most democratic regimes, including all of the 2+ regimes and the 3+ regime, are all considered 
to have relatively decently developed civil societies, and, except Albania, all of these regimes also 
fulfill the vertical accountability criterion. The remaining seven regimes, all of which have lower 
scores on the level of democraticness, have relatively poorly developed civil societies, and none of 
these regimes have therefore been capable of fulfilling the vertical accountability criterion. In 
addition, the fulfillment of the EP criterion, that elected governments have effective power to 
govern, seems to have had a slightly positive impact on the democratization process. Croatia (the 
most democratic regime), Albania (2+) and Macedonia (1+) are the only countries that fulfill this 
criterion. However, it should be noted that also two of the authoritarian regimes (Russia and 
Belarus) have effective power to govern, but their governments have not been 
legitimately/democratically elected. The fourth variable that appears to have had a positive 
influence on democratization is the presence of an electoral revolution.10
                                                 
10 Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik define an electoral revolution as a crucial election in which a liberal 
opposition is able to defeat the illiberal political incumbents/elites, and also introduce a more free and fair electoral 
process (this could also happen before or during these pivotal elections, often with the support of international 
agencies) (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006: 5-6).  
 In the postcommunist 
region, the electoral revolutions that at first sight appear to have been the most comprehensive and 
important in terms of political development, as they are widely described and analysed in the 
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literature, are the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). In 
the former two of these cases, Georgia and Ukraine, the electoral revolutions seem to have had a 
profound and positive impact on the democratization process, particularly along the electoral 
dimension of democracy. In the case of the Ukraine, the Orange Revolution also seem to have 
facilitated democratization along the constitutional dimension of democracy, as they now fulfill the 
minimum constitutional criterion, by more effectively guaranteeing basic civil liberties. The Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan was, on the other hand, less successful, which partly stems from the fact 
that the revolution was driven by illiberal political elites. Other less described, but perhaps equally 
or more successful electoral revolutions, were the Croatian election in 2000, which resulted in 
Croatia moving directly from «not free» to «free» in the Freedom House rankings (Bunce and 
Wolchik, 2006: 6), and Romania's elections in 1996, and in 2004. Also Slovakia and Bulgaria have 
experienced electoral revolutions (in the mid-1990s), which subsequently led to democratic 
progress. These electoral revolutions have mostly contributed to progress along the electoral 
dimension of democracy, even though Romania, Ukraine, and Croatia also fulfill the minimum 
constitutional criterion (BCL).  
 
Only one country (Croatia), has experienced the presence of all of the four variables mentioned 
above, which seems to have a positive impact on democratization (strong EU influence, highly 
developed civil society, EP, and an electoral revolution), while the most democratic of the hybrid 
regimes lack some of these attributes. In the 2+ category, Romania and the Ukraine lack EP, Albania 
has not experienced an electoral revolution, and the Ukraine is also strongly influenced by Russia, 
which are possible explanations why these countries haven't been able to pass the minimum 
democratic threshold. Another possible reason why the other hybrid regimes have been unable to 
become democratic is paradoxically also a possible cause behind the democratic progress that has 
been made by some of these hybrid regimes. In five out of seven hybrid regimes, the political 
climate is highly polarized (the only exceptions are Armenia and Georgia), and there is a severe 
lack of political dialogue between the main political actors. In the case of the Ukraine, the highly 
polarized political climate that erupted following the Orange Revolution in 2004, paradoxically 
seems like one of the main causes behind the democratization that followed, as political power 
became fragmented into several factions (both between the Orange coalition and the former 
incumbent elites, and within the Orange coalition), whereas before the revolution most of the power 
had been located in a strong executive branch (led by former president Leonid Kuchma). Thus, as 
none of these groups were powerful enough to rule unilaterally, it became easier for civil society, 
the opposition, and international agencies to demand democratic reforms from the government. 
However, the highly polarized political climate also meant that it became harder for the government 
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to pass legislation through the legislature, which resulted in an increasing politicization of the 
judicial system and other state institutions, as decision making increasingly became decided upon in 
the courts. This is also one of the main reasons why the process of democratization stagnated, and 
why it became harder to fulfill the constitutional criteria of democracy. In addition to the Ukraine, 
also Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Macedonia have a highly polarized climate, and the main 
cleavage line in these cases is usually found between former communist elites and anti-communists 
(who are often more liberal).   
 
Some of the variables that most clearly seem to distinguish the 1+ regimes from the 2+ regimes, are 
the presence in the former regime type (1+) of: poorly developed civil societies (in all of the three 
1+ regimes; Macedonia, Moldova, and Georgia), lack of state monopoly on taxation and the use of 
force (Moldova and Georgia), ethnic conflict (Macedonia), recent war (Georgia, in 2008), a very 
rural and uninformed electorate (Moldova), strong Russian influence (Moldova and Georgia), and a 
fairly strong and «unchecked» executive branch, partly induced by the strong electoral mandates of 
the current incumbents (Moldova and Georgia). However, it should be noted that also Croatia (3+ 
regime type) struggles with ethnic tensions and has experienced a war recently, though not as 
recently as Georgia (in 1995), and that also the Ukraine is strongly influenced by Russia (but unlike 
Georgia and Moldova, and similar to Macedonia, the Ukraine also appears to be strongly influenced 
by the EU).   
 
Armenia, the only regime in the 1 category, seems to share some of the features of the regimes in 
the 2+ category. Like the three 2+ regimes, Armenia has a poorly developed civil society, and 
similar to Moldova and Georgia, Armenia is also strongly influenced by Russia, and has a very 
strong executive branch (and a small and poorly organised opposition). The main aspect that seems 
to differentiate Armenia from the 2+ regimes, as well as all the other postcommunist regimes, is the 
militarization of the state. The military has become increasingly politicized, and a vital instrument 
for regime survival. In addition, Armenia also has a much more clientelistic societal structure than 
most of the other postcommunist countries, as nearly all aspects of Armenian society seem to be 
determined by the informal relationships between and within social networks (Freire et al., 2007: 7).  
 
Unlike the other regimes that are being compared in the empirical analysis, there is a much higher 
level of repression of the opposition and the media, and of civil liberties in general, in the 
authoritarian states (particularly in Belarus and Russia, and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan). This 
development of preemptive policymaking has partly been made possible by the increasingly 
powerful executive branches, in Belarus and Russia respectively (not in Kyrgyzstan, where the state 
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institutions are very weak), which have been able to eliminate most of the opposition. Examples of 
such preemptive political measures are: frequent changes to the electoral legislation, electoral fraud, 
persecution and repression of opposition, and control of the media. Both the Russian and the 
Belarusian regimes also enjoy high levels of popular legitimacy, and have received strong electoral 
mandates which have facilitated the authoritarian development in these two states. This can 
probably be partly attributed to great economic success/growth, lack of democratic 
history/traditions, and the charismatic leaders of these two countries. Both Belarus and Kyrgyzstan 
are also strongly influenced by Russia, which have facilitated continued authoritarian development 
and consolidation in these two countries. The main explanation why Kyrgyzstan has reverted to 
authoritarianism is probably that Kyrgyzstan is a much divided country, where different clan-based 
elites and ethnic groups compete for political and economic power. Combined with a highly 
clientelistic society and a very disillusioned electorate, which is unhappy not only with the 
government, but also with democracy as a political system, this has contributed to the lack of state 
monopoly on taxation and the use of force. The extremely high levels of corruption and cronyism, 
as well as very weak state institutions are other elements that may help explain why the Colour 
Revolution in 2005 became a failure, and why Kyrgyzstan currently is an authoritarian regime.  
 
  
5. Conclusion 
  
When assessing the political development of 25 postcommunist regimes since the fall of 
communism, it appeared necessary to combine quantitative and statistical methods with a more 
qualitative and case-based approach. This choice was partly motivated by the necessity of 
producing a definition of different regime types that could be explicitly linked to the means applied 
to measure these regime types. The linkage between the definition of these concepts (different 
regime types) on the one hand, and the measurement of these concepts on the other, is often lacking 
or very implicit in quantitative operationalisations of regime types. This methodological problem 
stems from the fact that large quantitative datasets, which are commonly applied as means to 
measure previously defined concepts, such as democracy, in many academic studies, often lack 
sufficient theoretical justification or explanation for how these concepts have been measured and/or 
defined. Thus, it is uncertain whether such graded measures collected from large datasets actually 
correspond to the definitions of these concepts, which ultimately may cause conceptual stretching 
(i.e. by categorizing countries to concepts they don't belong to). Thus, it seemed necessary to also 
produce a qualitative operarationalisation of the dependent variable, which could be more explicitly 
linked to empirical realities, and that could complement the results of the statistical analysis, which 
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had been based on a quantititative operationalisation of the dependent variable. Another reason 
behind this combination of methodological approaches when examining the political development 
of postcommunist regimes, was the great lack of data and observations in the statistical analysis, 
which inevitably caused several statistical challenges (such as high levels of multicollinearity). 
These statistical challenges consequently meant that advanced statistical methods (i.e. multivariate 
regression analysis) could no longer be regarded as appropriate measures when comparing these 
countries, as it would have yielded questionable statistical results. Thus, instead of applying either a 
time-series analysis (covering the entire time-span since the fall of communism) or a cross-sectional 
analysis, the simpler bivariate correlation analysis was applied when examining the political 
development in the postcommunist region. This allowed the comparison to avoid high levels of 
multicollinearity, better distinguish between the relative effects of different independent variables, 
and better differentiate between the explanatory power of long-term and short-term causes 
(independent variables), which also were the same reasons that made Herbert Kitschelt apply a 
bivariate correlation analysis when he conducted his comparison of postcommunist regimes in 1999 
(Kitschelt, 1999). However, the bivariate correlation analysis can only determine whether the 
relationship between two variables is significant, but not the direction of causality (i.e. whether the 
dependent variable is influenced by an independent variable, or the other way round). More 
importantly, the bivariate correlation analysis was only able to explain the political development of 
those postcommunist regimes that either became democratic or that reverted to authoritarianism, but 
proved to be an insufficient tool when trying to explain why a relatively large group of regimes 
became «stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes. Thus, these statistical challenges provided another 
good reason why the statistical approach needed to be complemented by a more qualitative and 
case-based analysis.  
 
When making a quantitative operationalisation of the dependent variable (in chapter 2.1), the 
regime types were conceptualized as autocracies, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal 
democracies. Differentiating between four main types of regimes appears to be relatively common 
within theories of democratization, as several scholars such as Diamond, Schedler, O'Donnell, 
Wigell, and Dahl, have all identified four main types of political regimes. In many studies of 
democratization, and particularly in statistical studies, it is also common to measure these concepts 
(regime types) by applying scores from Freedom House (or from other similar datasets that attempt 
to measure the level of democraticness in different regimes). This was also done in this analysis, 
partly because it made this analysis more comparable to other studies on democratization, and the 
values assigned to each of the four regime types also resemble the categorization that is applied by 
Freedom House (free, partly free, and not free) when applying the average value of political rights 
 110 
and civil liberties on a scale from 1-7. However, the aggregation of these scores, and the 
relationship and coding of each of the selected components of democracy, lack sufficient theoretical 
justification and explanation, according to Gerardo Munck (Munck, 2002: 20). Thus, the definition 
of democracy that has been applied by freedom House should be regarded as a maximalist 
definition, as it includes concepts and attributes that perhaps should rather have been regarded as 
possible causes or consequences of the defined concept, and it is also difficult to see exactly how 
these attributes of democracy have been coded, which in turn makes it difficult to know exactly 
which democratic components must be fulfilled (and/or to what degree) in order for a regime to 
meet the threshold/definition of democracy (and of other regime types). 
 
The difficulty of determining how Freedom House has measured the level of democraticness, and 
how much weight it has attributed to each component of democracy, is also the main reason why the 
quantitative operationalisation of regime types didn't include an explicit definition of democracy. In 
other words, it would be very difficult to produce a definition of democracy (and of different regime 
types) that could correspond to the measurement and aggregation of scores conducted by Freedom 
House without knowing exactly what methods they have applied. Instead, a theory-driven 
conceptualization of regime types (i.e. four main types of regimes) was combined with the scores 
from Freedom House in order to reveal the general political trends in the postcommunist region. 
However, a more thorough operationalisation and definition of democracy (and of the other regime 
types) that could be more explicitly connected to empirical realities also seemed necessary. Thus, in 
chapter 2.2, a qualitative regime typology was established by identifying the most important 
elements of democracy. These 10 democratic elements were identified and selected based on 
theoretical considerations, and as some of these components were assigned a higher value than 
others (also based on existing theory), it became possible to achieve greater differentiation between 
the various regime types. Similar to the statistical operationalisation, the same four regime types 
were applied (autocracy, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal democracies), although in 
the qualitative regime typology four different types of hybrid regimes were also included. One of 
the greatest advantages of this qualitative approach, is that the definition of these different regime 
types is relatively neutral, which therefore made it possible to achieve differentiation both in degree 
(level of democraticness) and in kind (what type of regime). Because the three core elements of 
democracy (FCE, BCL, EP) are of equal value, and higher than the 7 additional features of 
democracy, this typology therefore increased the capability of identifying different types of 
democratization processes, and also reduced the likelihood of conceptual stretching. The possible 
flaws of this approach were related to the measurement of these democratic elements in the 
empirical analysis, as it is uncertain whether sufficiently relevant sources have been applied when 
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determining whether the postcommunist regimes had managed to fulfill these criteria or not. In 
addition, the qualitative approach was only applied to analyse the political development of the 11 
regimes that were considered to be hybrid regimes in 1994, as these regimes were poorly explained 
by the statistical analysis. 
 
The development of the 14 postcommunist regimes that had either become democratic or had 
reverted to authoritarianism by 1994 was relatively well explained by the statistical analysis. Most 
of the hypotheses that were outlined in section 2.3 of chapter 2, were also confirmed in the two 
correlation analyses that assessed the situations in 1994 and 2008. In fact, many of the hypothesized 
effects were visible as early as 1994, and by 2008 the gradual polarization of the political 
development had become even stronger, as the correlations that had a significant relationship with 
democratic states generally had the opposite values of the correlations that significantly explained 
the autocratic regimes. In 1994, a high level of modernisation (economic development), a low level 
of corruption, and a favourable historical legacy (either a bureaucratic-authoritarian or a national-
accommodative administrative system during communism), were significantly correlated with 
liberal democracies. The latter condition (favourable historical legacy) also showed a strong 
correlation with flawed democracies. In addition, the flawed democracies could also be significantly 
explained by situations in which the opposition had won the first postcommunist elections, strong 
legislatures, rapid economic reform, and a Western geographical location. All of these correlations 
complied with the hypothesised relationships to the dependent variable predicted in section 2.3, and 
by 2008 these theories seem to have been thoroughly confirmed as all of these independent 
variables correlated strongly with liberal democracies, while no longer correlating with flawed 
democracies. These findings can partly be explained by the fact that all of the flawed democracies 
except Bulgaria became liberal democracies during this time-span. Perhaps more importantly, this 
also seems to confirm the thesis that there has been a path-dependent political development in the 
postcommunist region, as most of the independent variables that correlated strongly with liberal 
democracies in 2008 (and with both democratic regime types in 1994) also correlated strongly with 
each other. In addition, the opposite values on the majority of these independent variables strongly 
correlated with autocratic regimes in both of the two correlation analyses. In 2008, an Eastern 
geographical location, an unfavourable historical legacy (patrimonial or colonial peripheral 
administrative system during communism), the incumbent regime winning the first postcommunist 
elections, slow economic reform, a high level of corruption, and weak legislatures, were significant 
conditions explaining the autocratic regimes. Another significant factor; high amounts of natural 
resources, also correlated strongly with autocracies (both in 1994 and 2008). When comparing these 
findings to the results of the 1994 analysis, all of these factors also displayed significant 
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correlations with autocratic regimes 14 years earlier. The main differences were that the level of 
modernisation no longer had any significance in 2008 (a low level of modernisation significantly 
correlated with autocracies in 1994), and, surprisingly, also that the economic growth variable 
showed the opposite significant effects in 2008. The strong correlation between high levels of 
economic growth and autocracies (and between low economic growth and liberal democracies) in 
2008, can probably be explained by the global financial meltdown that occurred during that same 
year, and the stronger financial resources of the autocratic regimes, as they generally possessed 
higher amounts of natural resources that enabled them to cope better with the crises.  
  
As pointed out above, the findings of the statistical analysis indicate that there has been a path-
dependent political development in the postcommunist region. In addition to the obvious 
geographical explanation (regimes with a Western location are more likely to become democratic, 
while authoritarianism is more likely to take hold further to the East), the predicted long-term and 
path-dependent variables such as the historical legacy, the balance of power in the first 
postcommunist election, and the institutional choices made during or shortly after the transition 
from communism (such as the formal powers granted to the legislature and/or the speed of the 
transition toward a capitalist economy) appear to have been confirmed as having had significant 
path-dependent effects on the dependent variable in the majority of these postcommunist regimes 
(those regimes that are located either far to the East or far to the West). This argument is 
underpinned by the finding that the conditions that strongly correlate with democracies are nearly 
the opposite of the conditions that correlate with autocratic regimes, and also that these conditions 
share very strong correlations with each other when explaining these two regime types.  
 
However, the political development of the 11 regimes that were hybrid in 1994 were poorly 
explained by the statistical analysis. By 2008, the only condition that helps explain why three of 
these hybrid regimes (Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine) had become democratic (flawed 
democracies), was the significant correlation that had emerged between a low level of social 
inequality and flawed democracies. With regard to the two former hybrid regimes that had reverted 
to authoritarianism by 2008 (Belarus and Russia), the only statistical indication of why this had 
happened is that they appear to have experienced higher levels of economic development than the 6 
regimes that still remained hybrid in 2008, which contradicts the hypothesised relationship between 
modernisation and democratization. Thus, it became evident that it was necessary to conduct a case-
based analysis, based on the qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable in section 2.2, 
in order to explain the political development of the hybrid regimes in the postcommunist region. 
The qualitative classification of these 11 regimes in 2008 ended up being slightly different from the 
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statistical categorization of these regimes in the same year. Unlike in the statistical classification, 
Romania and Ukraine were not considered to have passed the democratic threshold (and remained 
hybrid regimes) in the qualitative assessment, which can probably be partly explained by the 
application of an expanded minimum definition of democracy (FCE, BCL, and EP). In addition, 
Kyrgyzstan turned out to be an authoritarian regime (and not a hybrid regime as it had been labeled 
in the statistical analysis).   
 
One of the main findings in the case-based analysis was that these 11 countries share several 
attributes that help explain why these regimes have made such limited progress on the constitutional 
dimension of democracy, why they were all hybrid regimes in 1994, and also why only one of these 
countries had managed to become democratic by 2008. To varying degrees, all of these countries 
struggle with relatively high levels of corruption, highly politicized state institutions, clientelistic 
party systems, and informal and non-transparent governance. These features can probably be partly 
attributed to the unfavourable historical legacies (in 10 out of these 11 countries11
                                                 
11 Only Croatia, which is the only country of these 11 regimes to become democratic by 2008, had a favourable 
historical legacy with a national-accommodative system. 
), and an 
insufficient break with communism (in 8 out of 11 countries). Considering this background it is 
understandable that more progress has been made along the electoral dimension of democracy, and 
that very few of these countries have managed to meet any of the constitutional criteria of 
democracy. The variables that appear to have had the most positive impact on democratization in 
these countries are: strong EU influence, highly developed civil societies, effective power to govern 
for elected governments, and electoral revolutions. The existence of a highly polarized climate also 
seems to have had a slightly positive influence on democratization in some cases (such as in 
Ukraine, where it resulted in higher political openness), but only to a limited extent, as polarization 
also makes it harder to achieve progress along the constitutional dimension of democracy. Further 
down the ladder in the level of democraticness, the impact of variables such as: strong Russian 
influence, poorly developed civil societies, lack of state monopoly on the use of force and taxation, 
ethnic conflict, quite strong and «unchecked» executive branches (which are often the result of 
strong electoral mandates for the incumbent elites), and militarization of the state (only Armenia), 
becomes more frequent. As for the 7 regimes that were still regarded as hybrid in 2008 (Armenia, 
Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Albania, Romania, and Ukraine), a low level of modernisation is 
also a significant explanatory factor (the only significant correlation with hybrid regimes in the 
statistical analysis, in 2008). The 3 regimes that are considered to have reverted to authoritarianism 
(Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan) share many of the «negative» factors for democratization that are 
common among the hybrid regimes. The main features that seem to distinguish these authoritarian 
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regimes from the rest, are: higher levels of regime repression (preemptive policymaking) and much 
stronger and more popular executive branches (Russia and Belarus), and an extremely divided, 
clientelistic, and poorly developed society, that in several cases have barely avoided civil war 
(Kyrgyzstan, in 2005 and 2010).  
 
To sum up, the quantitative analyses largely confirmed most of the theoretical models that were 
discussed in chapter 2.3, but were unable to explain the existence of hybrid regimes. However, the 
application of a qualitative analysis made it possible to identify several variables that help explain 
why these 11 regimes were «stuck in transition» following the collapse of communism, and also 
why there are considerable differences in the level of democraticness among these regimes in 2008. 
Another great advantage of this qualitative approach is that its more «conceptually neutral» 
definition of the dependent variable, ensured that it became possible to achieve greater analytical 
differentiation between these postcommunist regimes, both in degree and kind of democracy, while 
at the same time avoiding conceptual stretching. 
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